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A. Statement of the Problem 
The fundamental question which runs through the 
writings of Robert M. Maciver is the problem of the rela-
tion of the individual to the social system. It is the 
beginning point and the focus of his sociological investi-
gation. The nature of man and the nature of society, 
therefore, must be studied together in order to gain an 
understanding of either. Maciver investigates both man 
and society and in so doing he reveals a definite theory 
of the nature of man. 
The problem of this dissertation .is to investigate 
the literature written by Maciver for the purpose of determ-
ining and describing his conception of human nature. The 
problem also involves an investigation of certain represen-
tative views of human nature and includes a correlation of 
those views with the conception held by Maciver. The rep-
resentative views are those of Charles H. Cooley, George H. 
Mead, Edgar s. Brightman, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Comparison 
of these representati~e conceptions of human nature with 
Maciver's view of human nature is to be made in order to 
sharpen the issues, to define more precisely Maciver's 
conception of man's nature, and to ascertain whether 
Maciver's view measures up favorably or unfavorably in 
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comparison with the representative conceptions. This 
comp arison involves certain fundamental questions such as: 
1) Wha t are the conceptions of human nature held 
by Cooley, Mead, Brightman, Niebuhr, and 
Maciver? 
2) vVh at is the self, or person, or personality? 
3) What is the relation of individual to 
society? 
4) Under what conditions is man creative? 
5) Wn at are the ooss1bilities of individual 
and social morality? 
6) Wha t is the role of human nature in social 
change? 
This is an important problem. Historically the general 
problem of human nature has always been important. On the 
basis of an appeal to human nature, Aristotle defended 
human slavery, the Stoics declared that all men are created 
equal, Thomas Hobbes justified absolute monarchy, John 
Locke advocated political democracy, William James suggested 
the need for a "moral equivalent of war, 11 John Dewey outlined 
and established the theory and practice of progressive 
education in the United States, and Karl Marx propounded 
a ~~eory of dialectical materialism which has divided the 
world into two opposing governmental and economic camps, 
namely, dictatorship versus democracy and communism versus 
capitalism. Theology has continuously appealed to human 
nature in its effort to interpret the possibilities of 
individual and social salvation. Whether man is a child 
of God or a child of nature or a child of both, theology 
has always wanted to know the nature and capabilities of 
man. Today men are still concerned about the questions of 
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whether prob lems o f war and peace, problems of economic 
systems, and problems of types of governments are outgrowths 
of human nature. Wha t human nature is and what part it 
plays in social change and in the social process are there-
fore very significant. Accordingly any scientific facts 
and any valid interpretations which reveal the nature of 
human nature are important. 
The problem of ascertaining and describing Maciver's 
conception of human nature is exceedingly valuable because 
his interpretation of man avoids on the one hand the 
one-sidedness of those views which assert that man's social, 
religious , and cultural achievements are due to the prompt-
ings of his native impulses and on tbe other hand the one-
sidedness of those theories which h~ld that man's accomplish-
ments are determined by the stimuli of one or two factors 
in the environment or by the total environment itself. 
Maciver's interpretation of man reveals the roles which 
both environment and individuality play in the . life of man 
and his culture. His view of human nature involves the 
relevant factors of both environment and man's native en-
dowment. Unlike the geographic, economic, or other en-
vironmental dete.rmin1s ts, Maciver recognizes that man is 
woven of individuality and sociality and his native en-
dowment and environment are correlative. Therefore no 
single motivation is adequate to account for the manifold 
behavior patterns of the complex being called man. 
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Man is a unity in diversity; hence man's social 
order must take this fact into account and make adequate 
provision for the expression of unity in variety or witness 
a breakdown of the social system itself. This is not 
recognized and appreciated by the communist system for the 
communist ideology supports uniformity and maintains uni-
formity by force. Democracy, however, not only appreciates 
unity within variety but specifically sets forth the 
doctrine of unity in diversity as one of its main points. 
In as much as Maciver believes that man's nature is a 
unity in diversity and requires a social environment Which 
provides for man's need for unity in diversity, his conception 
of human nature throws light on the vital problem of commu-
nistic dictatorship and political democracy. Hence Maciver's 
view of human nature is relevant to the solution of one of 
the most critical problems of the twentieth century. 
Relative to the question of individual and social re-
sponsibility in a world of constant change, Maciver's view 
of human nature recognizes and takes account of the part 
that both the individual and the group play in morality. 
His view is not that 11 the fathers h ave eaten sour grapes 
and the children's teeth are set on edge", 1 nor is it that 
11 the soul that s inneth, it shall die 11 • 2 Rather his view 
is that individual and social responsibilities are correl-
ative. They exist together. Where there is stimulus there 
is response or reaction, but response and reaction are made 
1. The Holy Bible, Jeremiah 31:29. 
2. Ibid., Ezekiel 18: 4b. 
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selectively. Individuals are always selective; hence 
individuality and sociality are always present in behavior. 
Environment representing stimulus is present in behavior 
but so is individuality representing response and reaction. 
And in as much as reaction and response are selective 
behavior, initiative lies in individuality and environment. 
Individua lity and sociality, individual and group are 
correlative; they belong together. Growth of individual 
personality is accompanied by growth of the community; ;de-
velopment in communit y promotes growth in individual per-
sonality. Maciver's view of human nature is therefore in-
clusive and coherent, and it represents a vital contribu-
tion to an understanding of man and society • . 
B. Summary of Rese arch of Previous Investigators 
Although many references have been made to Maciver's 
systematic account of the nature of society, very little 
has been written about his conception of human nature. 
References to human nature as Maciver conceives it have 
been made by two important writers, namely, Emory S. 
Bogardus and Morris Ginsberg. Though Emory s. Bogardus 
was primarily concerned with Maciver's concept of "commun-
ity'', 11 association", and 11 inst1 tut ion11 , he made one point 
which is very important to the main problem of this 
dissertation. Bogardus asserts that according to Maciver, 
society arises from the physical and psychical aspects of 
human nature . He summarizes Maciver thus: : 
Society is a system of relationships 
that provides traditions and institu-
tions and a changeful order of life 
arising from physical and psychical needs 
of human nature. Within this milieu 
human beings fulfill themselves and 
transmit the faculties or living to the 
generations that follow. 
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Morris Ginsberg, in his book called Reason and Unreason 
in Society, summarizes Maciver's attempt to give a systematic 
interpretation of society and calls a ttention to the fact 
that Maciver classifies human drives into three categories. 
"He adopts for his purpose a classification of human drives 
based on the distinction between attitudes, interests, 
and motivations 11 • 2 According to Ginsberg, Maciver then 
points out that three broad modes of social groupings arise 
in society from the expression of these attitudes, interests, 
and motivations. The broad groups are (1) communities, 
(2) quasi-communal groups, such as, social classes, and 
(3) associations. Maciver explains the social causation 
and social change that take place within these groupings, 
says Ginsberg, by studying the way in which "the universal 
desires of mankind are given varying valua tion under particu-
lar conditions 11 .3 To conclude his discussion, Ginsberg 
states tha t Maciver avoids the error on the one hand of 
those who view social change as a mere outgrowth of na tive 
impulses and on the other the error of those who view social 
1. Bogardus, TDST, 460. For explanation of this and other 
abbreviations, see the bibliography. 
2. Ginsberg, RUS, 118. 
3. Ginsberg, RUS, 118. 
change as a reaction to the environment. He says, 
In his subtle and interesting analysis 
of this adjustment, Maciver has succeeded 
in avoiding the one-sidedness alike of 
those who interpret social change as 
merely a reaction to environmental changes 
and of those who view human history as the 
expresslon of capacities inherent in human 
nature. 
C. Four Representative Definitions of Human Nature 
Human na ture represents many things to many people. 
The meaning of the term itself is often vague and frag-
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mentary. In order to gain a clearer concept of what human 
nature means, four important definitions are described. 
The definitions have been chosen from four outstanding 
investigators who are interested in human nature from the 
point of view of social psychology. Since Maciver's work 
is concerned fundamentally with the relation of individuals 
and society, it was considered appropriate to select defini-
tions which came from the writings of men who are also 
interested in individuals 1n relation to society. 
The first description of human nature is taken from 
John Dewey. In his article on human nature in the 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Dewey points out that 
the term human nature has been used variously and that in 
the history of thought its meaning has been relative to 
the social climate of the time • . He says, 
1. Ibid. 
There is, however, one incontrovertible 
fact about human nature--that the term has 
been used in a variety of senses and 
that in the history of thought there 
has been some correspondence between 
the interpretation of the concept 
and the general institutional and 
intellectual character of the time.l 
His view is that the significance of human nature is not 
to be found in considering the relative importance of 
heredity and environment, native constitution and develop-
ment; r a ther the importance lies in making certain fundamental 
questions. The questions are: (1) What are the ttlimits to 
.. 
modification through learning?" (2) "How does the modifica-
tion concretely proceed?" ( 3) . "H~w . i ~- it controllable?" 2 
Dewey wa s interested in these questions because he was 
concerned with formulating a new theory of education. 
Dewey points out that man's "starting capital" is his 
native constitution but in the long run that which is 11 native 11 
3 
cannot be distinguished from that which is "acquired". 
In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey discusses the prob-
lem of the alterability of human nature. He says that both 
the radical reformer and the conservative rest their oases 
upon the factor that weakens their conclusions. The reform-
er bases his argument for social change upon the easy alter-
ability of acquired experience; the conservative grounds 
his argument against social change on the basis of the un-
changeability of human instincts. Dewey summarizes this 
point in the following manner: 
1. ESS, Vol. VII-VIII, 533. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
The radical reformer rests his con-
tention in behalf of easy and rapid 
change upon the psychology of habits, 
of institutions in shaping raw nature, , 
and the conservative grounds his 
counter-assertion upon the psychology 
of instincts. As a matter of fact, it 
is precisely custom which has greatest 
inertia, which is least susceptible of 
alteration; while instincts are most 
readily modifiable through use, 1most subject to educative direction. 
The main point that Dewey makes is tl~t the native con-
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stitution of a human being is complex and flexible enough 
to give rise to innumerable forms of institution, social 
customs, and social practices; but that the reason 
permanent soci al changes are so difficult to bring about 
is that social habits are so hard to break. He says, 
Those who argue that social and moral 
reform is impossible on the ground 
that the old Adam of human nature re-
mains forever the same, attribute how-
ever to native activities the permanence 
and inertia that in ~ruth belong only 
to acquired customs. 
Niebuhr's emphasis on the role of egoistic impulses in sin-
ful behavior might be considered a primary instance of the 
view "that the old Adam of human nature remains forever the 
same 11 • 
L. Guy Brown, a sociologist, is tb~ second investigator 
to be discussed in this summary of definitions of human na-
ture. In his book, Social Pathology, Brown defines human 
nature as being: 
1. Dewey, HNC, 107. 
2. Dewey, HNC, 109. 
everything that results from the inter-
action of the human-na ture potentialities 
in the organic and social heritages 
through the unique experience of an in-
dividual. It is the way in Which heredity 
and environment ari incorporated into a 
life organization. 
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He holds that neither the biological process .nor the social 
process taken alone can furnish a satisfactory explanation 
of the inception of human nature in the individual. Accord-
ing to him, the origin of human nature is in the "interaction 
of these two heri tages 11 , that is, in the interaction of 
the biological and the social heritages.2 He states 
emphatically: 
Human nature in the li f e of any individual, 
whether normal or abnormal, has its in-
ception in the unique experience of the 
person as these two heritages interact ••• 
Human nature, then, is something that has 
to be achieved after the birth of the in-
dividual.3 
In discussing human behavior, Brown maintains that 
all behavior is a manifestation of human nature • . Attitudes, 
ideas, desires, interests, etc., are but the overt ex-
pressions of human nature; therefore, human nature is 
subject to change. He says: 
Change in the human nature of an individual, 
however, is continuous, and in its general 
manifestations it i~ different for various 
historical periods. 
Being alway s relo. ted to the culture in which it develops, 
1. SP, 43. 
2. Ibid., 44. 
3. Ibid. 
4. SP, 50. 
11 
human nature "varies just as cultures vary 11 • 1 
Brown says th at there are certain respects in which 
human nature is everywhere the same. They are: 
(1) It does not exist at birth in the 
lives of the individuals of any 
culture and comes into existence in 
exactly the same way in every nation-
ality. 
(2) ••• it tends to persist once it has 
been achieved and can be changed in 
each world area through the same 
procedure. 
(3) It is always made up of the same units; 
that is, there are always attitudes, de-
sires, interests, habits, ideas, etc. 
The difference in human nature at this 
point is in the content of these units. 2 
His final point is that the life organization of 
each individual consists of a personality pattern of life 
and a social-type aspect. These two aspects of the individ-
ual interact with each other in the experience of the person. 
By personality pattern of life, Brown means "the typical 
reactions of the individual in the matter of temperament, 
disposition, moods, feelings, and social feeling 11 • The 
social-type aspects of the life organization refer to the 
attitudes, desires, interests, life philosophy, etc., 
wh:l.ch correspond with the cult~re in which the individual 
lives. 11 A person never ceases to experience his own life 
organization in both its phases for the development of 
human nature. 113 
1. Ibid., 52. 
2. Ibid. 
3. SP, 55 • 
12 
Ellsworth Far is is the third investigator to be 
summarized in this study. He agrees with Mead and Cooley, 
who will be discussed in Chapter II of this dissertation, 
tha t individuals become human through the social process 
of defining t heir actions by the gestures and actions of 
others • . Faris says: 
Ve not only judge ourselves by others, 
but we literally judge that we ~ 
selves as the result of what others do and 
say. We become human, to ourselves, when 
we are met and answered! opposed and blamed, 
praised and encouraged. 
It is c l e ar there f ore tha t human n ature arises in a social 
situation in which an individual uses his constructive 
imagination to assume the role of others. ~fuen one observes 
the behavior of another person and can imagine himself in 
that role, he infers that what he is observing is human 
nature. Therefore, Faris defines human n ature as "that 
quality which we attribute to others as the result of in-
trospective behavior 11 • 2 The investigator makes no plea for 
the validity of introspection which is anathema to some 
psychologists but merely points out a fact. He calls it 
an inevitable fact. He states: _ 
1. NHN, 7• 
It is not proposed here to make even 
a disguised plea for introspective 
methods. The essential point is not 
the desirability, but the inevitability, 
of just this type of imagination by 
which alone we recognize others as 
human, and which ultimately rests on 
our ability to identify in others what 
we know to be true in ourselves.3 
2. Ibid., 10. 
3· NHN, 12. 
He recognizes however that such "imaginative sympathy 11 
has certain limitations, the chief of which is ethno-
centrism. 
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Having pointed out how Faris holds that human nature 
is recognized, we now turn to his conception of the problem 
of how it is constituted. He rejects the theory that in-
stincts and inherited impulses constitute human nature. 
Instincts do not produce social customs and institutions. 
A study of cultural anthropology and isolable religious 
sects reveals the fallacy of the 11 instinct-to-institution11 
formulation. The myriad types of custom among preliterate 
peoples and the known history of relig ious sects are proof 
that instincts do not produce institutions. Faris contends 
that the truth lies in reversing the order. He says: 
Instead of the instincts of individuals 
being the cause of our customs and insti-
tutions, it is far truer to say it is the 
customs and institutions which explain the 
individual behavior so long called instinctive.1 
It follows, then, that human nature can be changed; 
it is indeed mutable. Customs are constantly changing and 
institutions are being continuously altered by the crises 
of the times; hence human nature is in a "continual state 
of flux 11 • 2 Faris maintains that while the day by day 
changes are slight, fundamental changes can be brought 
about by a serious crisis. He states emphatically: -
1. NHN, 17. 
2. Ibid., 18. 
Vfuat we call the stable elements of 
human nature are in truth the social 
attitudes of individual persons., 
which in turn are the subjective 
aspects of long-established group 
attitudes whose inertia must be 
reckoned with but whose mutability 
cannot be denied.! 
The final point which Faris makes about the nature 
of human nature is that the individual and society are 
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not one and the same. Individuality is a reality. In-
dividuality arises out of the interplay of the various and 
conflicting claims tha t are made upon the human being. In 
the midst of the myriad social forces that interact with 
the individual and play upon him, the phenomenon of con-
science and will arises in the individual and he umpires 
and arbitrates between these different claims, working out 
a life organization. Individuality, therefore, is the abil-
ity to umpire and to decide what shall be done with the 
interactive experiences in the life of the individual. The 
life organization which results from this is what is called 
character, and it constitutes the ultimate in the develop-
ment of human nature.2 
Gardner Murphy discusses the problem of human nature 
in two phases. On the one hand, he points out that there 
is a "developed human nature" which varies from group to 
group according to the prevailing culture patterns. He 
says, "We must conclude that the 'human nature' which we 
1. Ibid. 
2. l'l1IN, 19-20. 
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call experience, which we know well enough to build our 
lives upon, is a human nature which is developed as a result 
of living in human society." 1 On the other hand, Murphy 
postulates "a raw material of universal human nature which 
all men share".2 He explains that this "raw human nature", 
as distinguished from "developed human na ture", is "a mass 
of untutored tendencies, movements, impulses, more compli-
cated than those which we see in kittens, puppies, or young 
apes, but as blind and naive and, moreover, as plastic and 
modifiable " .3 He distinguishes two types of "raw" or 
"inborn" tendencies that individuals seem to have at birth 
and points out tha t it is exceedingly important to keep ·the 
distinctions clear. For instance, there are motives which 
"will occur no matter what one does about them". Hunger is 
an example. Then there are other tendencies which will arise 
only "when s12ecific outside pressures are brought to bear on 
. 4 
the individual11 • The tendency to become startled by a 
sudden loud noise is an example. The proper way to under-
stand human nature, therefore, is to study the native im-
pulses and what society does to and with them. 
D. Materials and Methods of This Dissertation 
The materials of this dissertation are found in the 
basic volumes of the writers with which this investigation 
1. HNEP, 14. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Murphy, HNEP, 19-20. 
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is primarily concerned. Charles H. Cooley's theory of 
human nature is taken primarily from f our of his works. 
They a re: Human Nature and the Social Order {1902), Social 
Organ1zat i on (1909 ), Social Process {1918) , and Life and 
the Student (1927). The exposi t ion of George H. Mead's 
ideas i s based primarily on his book, Mind, Self and 
Society from the Standpoint of§ Social Behaviorist (1934) •. 
However, some attention is given to his volumes, The 
Philosonhy of the ~resent {1932) and also The Philosophy 
of the Act (1938). 
Edgar S. Brightman's views on human nature are taken 
mainly from his books, ~Philosophy of Ideals (1928), Moral 
La ws (1933), Personality and Reli gion (1934), h Philosophy 
of Relig ion ( 1940), Nature and Values ( 19ll-5), and An 
Introduction to PhilosophY, rev. ed., (1951). Conclusions 
regarding Reinhold Niebuhr's theory of man are developed 
in the main from two of his books, namely, Moral Man and 
Immoral Society (1932), and The Nature and De s tiny of Man, 
vol. I., (1941). 
Although the ma terials on Robert M. Maciver are --taken 
from all of his writings, the fundamentals of his conception 
of human nature are developed from the following volumes: 
Community (1917), The Elements of Social Science {1922), 
The Modern State (1926), Society: Its Structure and Changes 
(1931), Towards~ Abiding Peace (1943), The Web of 
Government (1947), The More Perfect Union (1948), and 
Society: An Introductory Analysis (1949). 




A comprehensive explanation of Maciver's interpreta-
tion of human nature and an exposition of the manner in 
which individuals are related to society are given in order 
to sharpen the meaning of the nature of man and his relation 
to the group. Description and analysis are also made of 
Maciver's social ethic in relation to his conception of 
human nature. 
(2) Historical and Comparative. 
The method of this di_ssertation is also historical 
and comparative. An explanation of Maciver's view of human 
nature is presented genetically beginning with his writing 
on community in 1917 and closing with his work on group 
relations in 1950. This historical approach is followed 
in order to become acquainted with the way Maciver's thought 
has evolved and matured through the years and remained con-
sistent throughout. The method is moreover comparative. 
Maciver's view of human nature is compared with four repre-
sentative conceptions of human nature in order to describe 
his view more accurately and to point up the issues involved 
in his conception of man. Moreover the representative views 
serve as perspectives against which the comprehensiveness 
of Maciver's conception can be interpreted more coherently. 
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(3) Critical and Analytical. 
A critique of Maciver's conception of human nature is 
made in the light of the representative conceptions discussed 
in Chapter II. A critical analysis of Maciver's formulation 
of the nature of man as well as of hi s social ethic is also 
presented. 
E. The General Plan of This Dissertation 
The Introduction presents the main problem of this 
study by calling attention to six fundamental questions that 
constitute the core around which the entire dissertation is 
constructed. Attention is called to the significance of 
the problem and a summary of what other investigators have 
contributed to it is also given. The materials on which 
this study is based and the methods which it follows are 
also set forth. Chapter II summarizes some representative 
conceptions of human nature and discusses a few of the im-
portant issues which emerge. 
Chapter III is biographical. In Chapter IV an exposi-
tion of Maciver's conception of human nature as revealed 
in his theory of community ispresented. Chapter V gi vee 
an analysis of Maciver's view of human nature as shown in 
his political theory. Chapter VI provides a comprehensive 
summary of Maciver's conception of human nature, while in 
Chapter VII account is taken of Maciver's conception in re-
lation to the representative views of human nature. 
Chapter VIII gives the conclusions of the dissertation. 
CHAPTER II 
REPRESENTATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE 
It will be helpful to have several representative 
analyses of human nature before us as we develop Maciver's 
conception. These will serve as a setting for his view and 
will therefore be of assistance in helping us to sharpen 
the various tenets of his theory. The first representative 
conception to be considered will be Charles H. Cooley, and 
then the views of George H. Mead, Edgar s. Brightman, and 
Reinhold Niebuhr will follow in succession. 
A. Charles H. Cooley 
In Charles H. Cooley's analysis of human nature, human 
sentiments are central. By sentiments he means the "instinc-
tive emotions organized around ideas'', 1 or in other words 
"an organization of emotion around the i dea of an object". 2 
His emphasis is placed upon the importance of human senti-
menta as distinguished from the impulses which man also 
shares with lower animals. For Cooley, man has an animal 
nature as well as a human nature. His animal nature which 
consists of certain impulses has to be purified and human-
ized before it can be called distinctively human. With 
dramatic force, Cooley stresses this point over and over 
again. 
1. Cooley, et. al., ITS, 59. 
2. Ibid., 356. 
An important passage on this point is expressed in the 
following words: 
In their crudest form such passions as 
lust, greed, revenge, the pride of power 
and the like are not, distinctively, human 
nature at all, but animal nature and so 
far as we rise into the spirit of family 
or neighborhood association we control 
and subordinate them. They are rendered 
human only so far as they are brought 
under the discipline of sympathy, and 
refined into sentiments, such as love, 
resentment, and ambition. And in so far 
as they are thus humanized fhey become 
capable of useful function. 
Cooley points out that an individual is not a person at 
birth, but he becomes a person through experience and 
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association with his primary group. In the primary group 
the individual develops his human nature by refining his 
native passions and developing them into broad sentiments 
of sympathy. 
1) Human Nature: Its Constituents and Universality 
Human nature therefore consists of those sentiments 
that have been made universal, i.e., made to "belong to 
mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time", 2 
through the interaction of the individual's native impulses 
with the primary social groups. Cooley formulates the 
meaning of human nature in these words: 
By human nature, I suppose, we may under-
stand those sentiments and impulses that 
are human in being superior to those of 
1. Cooley, SO, 36. 
2. Cooley, et al., ITS, 53· 
lower~animals, and also in the sense 
that they belong to mankind at large, 
and not to any particular race or 
time. It means, particularly, 
sympathy and the innumerable senti-
ments into which sympathy enters, 
such as love, resentment, ambition, 
vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling 
of social right and wrong.l 
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Two important factors are stressed in this conception. 
First, distinctively human impulses are those animal 1m-
pulses that have been socialized and refined in the pri-
mary groups. Second, human nature is un1.versal in the 
sense that mankind everywhere exhibits certain common 
traits, such as "self-consciousness, enjoyment of appro- · 
bat1on, pain at censure, sense of right and wrong, and 
2 hero-worship. 11 
From an empirical point of view, Cooley maintains 
that human nature, as he conceives it, is "a comparatively 
permanent element in society".3 He contends that we can 
observe the various universal expressions of human senti-
menta in the different societies in the world. In every 
society, men desire social approval, love their children, 
and express common human sentiments. He asserts, 
Always and everywhere men seek honor 
and dread ridicule, defer to public 
opinion, cherish their goods and their 
children, and admire courage, generosity, 
and success. It is always safe to aasume 
that people are and have been human. 
The universality of human nature and common sentiments 
1. so, 28. 
2. Cooley, et al., ITS, 53· 
3· so, 28. 
4. Ibid. 
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does not mean that individuals are born with these special 
sentiments; it means that individuals everywhere develop 
them through association and communication within their 
primary groups. Wherever primary groups form, irrespec-
tive of race or nationality, individuals invariably acquire 
human nature as defined above. This human nature is more a 
product of the group than it is a product of the individuals 
involved. Cooley expresses the point thus: 
The view here maintained is that human 
nature is not something existing 
separately in tbe individual, but a 
group-nature or primary phase of 
society, a relatively simple and 1 general condition of the social mind. 
Further on Cooley says categorically: 11 Man does not have 
human nature at birth. 112 Human nature is acquired through 
primary group fellowship. Cooley says, "The ideal that 
grows up in familiar association may be said to be a part 
of human nature itself. 11 3 
Thomas Hobbes and other believers in the "social 
contract" were wrong in assuming that the individual ante-
.L~ 
dates society. The truth is that society and the indi-
vidual are born together. Man can be understood best when 
seen in groups because it is in groups that his human na-
ture and character are developed. 5 Primary groups are 
present before there is human nature, for human nature is 
1. so, 29. 
2. Ibid., 31. 
3· Ibid., 33· 
4. Ibid., 47. 
5. Ibid., 48. 
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developed through participation in primary groups.l 
Healthy play in a face to face group is essential to the 
growth of human nature in the individual. 
Reference has been made several times to the concept 
of primary groups, but no clear definition has as yet been 
given to it. By primary groups, Cooley means those social 
groups that are "characterised by intimate face-to-face 
association and cooperation".2 Examples would be the 
family, the play-groups of children, and neighborhood 
groups of adults. These groups are primary in several re-
spects but for Cooley the most important one is the part 
that such groups play in the formation of the social na-
ture and ideals of the individual. 
For Cooley, the self simply means the ordinary use of 
11 I 11 and the social self is "simply any idea, or system of 
ideas, drawn from the communicative life, that the mind 
cherishes as its own". 3 Cooley says, "The core of human 
- 4 
nature is a social self." And social selves are developed 
in primary groups; hence there is a very definite relation 
between the social self and the face-to-face group out of 
which the social self arises. Cooley's view is that while 
the instincts that are born in us do enter into human na-
ture, they do not of themselves constitute it. Human na-
ture is more than instinct am "somet...lling less ••• than the 
1. Ibid., 109. 
2. so, 23;. 
3· Cooley, HNSO, 147. 
4. LTS, 192. 
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more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that 
makes up institutions11 • 1 He says, 
It is the nature which is develop~d . 
and expressed in those simple, face-to-face 
groups that are somewhat alike in all so-
cieties; groups of the family~ tba play-
ground, and the nei3hborhood. 
Therefore the primary group out of which the social self 
arises constitutes the foundation of human nature and 
accounts for the universality of the common human senti-
menta discussed above. Human nature is thus a trait of 
primary groups and is not an attribute of tbe separate 
individual, if there were such an individual. It belongs 
to 11 man in association11 and the degree of association re-
qu1red for human nature to develop 1 s fully furnished in 
the primary groupa.3 Speaking of the degree and kind of 
association that human nature requires, Cooley asserts; 
11 In short the family and neighborhood life is essential 
to its genesis and nothing more is. 114 
For Cooley, the term social self means what is ordinar-
ily meant when personal pronouns are used. The social self 
is simply the empirical self. It is not to be construed 
as contrasting with the individual self. As a matter of 
fact, there is no individual self in Cooley's theory. The 
individual and society must always be conceived together. 
1. so, 30. 
2. Ibid., 30 • 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 31. 
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One does not exist apart from the other; therefore the self 
and social self mean the same thing. The only difference 
is that when the term social self is used, emphasis is 
meant to be placed upon the social aspects. In the simplest 
of terms, the self and therefore the social self refers to 
"self-feeling".1 A i f cone se ormulation of the meaning of 
the social self is expressed thus: 
The social self is simply any idea, 
or system of ideas, drawn from the 
communicative li f e, that the mind 
cherishes as its own. Self-feeling 
has its chief scope within the 
general life,. not outside of it, 
the special endeavor or tendency of 
which it is the emotional aspect find-
ing its principal field of exercise in a 
world of personal forces, reflected in t~e 
mind by a world of personal impressions. 
George H. Mead takes issue with Cooley regarding the 
inception of the self.3 Mead says that the self arises 
through language and communication, but Cooley holds that 
4 
the feeling of the self is an instinct. He says however 
that self-feeling is a more general instinct rather than 
a specific one. In his book, Human Nature and the Social 
Order, Cooley describes self-feeling in this manner: 
It seems to exist in a vague though 
vigorous form at the birth of each 
individual, and, like other instinct-
ive ideas or germs of ideas, has to 
be refined anddeveloped by experience, 
becoming associated, or rather in-
corporated, with muscular, visual and 
other sensations; with perceptions, 
apperceptions and conceptions of every 
degree of complexity and of infinite 
variety of content; and especially, 
1. Cooley, HNSO, 136-138. 
2. Ibid., 147. 
3· See section 'C' of this chapter. 
4. Cooley, HNSO, 139· . 
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with personal ideas. 1 
Although Cooley speaks of this feeling or emotion as an 
instinct, he says that the feeling itself uundergoes 
differentiation and refinement just as does any other sort 
of crude innate feeling". 2 In the experience of a person, 
the feeling of the self breaks up into various self-
sentiments; nevertheless, even in the midst of the myriad 
self-sentiments, the feeling itself maintains something of 
its characteristic 11 tone". Thus, persons can always 
experience the feeling of 11 I 11 , uMe", and uMy" • 
. 
2) Communication and Human Nature 
A fuller development of this point involves the ques-
tion of communication, to which Cooley devotes careful 
attention. Speaking of co rrmunication and its relation to 
human nature, Cooley defines communication as the "mechanism 
through which human relations exist and develop--all the 
symbols of the mind, together with the means of convey-
3 ing them through space and preserving them in time". More-
over, Cooley says: 
Without communication the mind does 
not develop a true human nature, 
but remains in an abnormal and 
nondescript stat~ neither human nor 
properly brutal. 
He believes further that it is through communication that 
1. HNSO, 139 • 
2. Ibid. 
3· so, 61. 
4. so, 62. 
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human nature is enlarged and enfranchised, thought and 
feeling are awakened, and mental growth takes place. Not 
only does the individual depend upon communication for 
the enlargement of his human nature, but the social group 
itself depends upon it for structure and growth. 
B. George H. Mead 
From Cooley to George H. Mead is not a great leap 
because their theories of human nature have much in common. 
However, some interesting differences between their theories 
will be discussed in the course of this dissertation • . 
Mead was a social behaviorist who dif f ered radically 
at certain points from J. B. Watson. If Watson threw the 
mind, as traditionally conceived, out of the window, then, 
Mead brought mind, as behavioristically conceived, back 
in the door. In a word, Mead exp l a ins the mind, the self, 
and society in terms of functions and not as substantives. 
In order to give a clear exposition of Mead's social theory 
of human nature, we propose to discuss his conception of 
mind, self, and society, and from the discussion to draw 
conclusions about human nature • . 
1) Mind As A Social Emergent 
For Mead the mind is not a psychical entity, a sub-
stantive in the traditional sense. Ra ther, the mind is a 
function. And it can be explained only in behavioristic 
terms. 1 Mead does not even seek to reduce mind to a 
1. Mead, ~IDS, 10. 
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non-mental entity; he simply explains how mind arises out 
of the complications which take place in non-mental be-
havior. He states specifically: 
Mental behavior is not reducible to 
non-mental behavior. But mental 
behavior or phenomena can be ex-
plained in terms of non-mental be-
havior or phenomena, ~ ~ising out 
of, and as resulting from complications in, 
the l a tter.l 
The phrase non-mental behavior refers to the native 
sensitivity and activity of the human organism. Start-
ing with sensitive individuals, Mead develops a social 
theory of mind. 
According to Mead, at birth the individual has no 
mind; he ha s only a sensitive organism that is capable 
of making gestures and responding to stimuli, especially 
to the gestures of others. Through the use of gestures, 
the individual is enabled to take the role of others and 
eventually to recognize meaning in gestures. As he plays 
the role of others the individual is stimula ted to the 
point of recognizing symbols. Hence significant symbols 
are developed through the interplay of gestures. Eventually 
language is developed and the individual through the use 
of gestures and language and by means of communication in 
general acquires mind. The individual responds to the 
gestures of others and controls his own response, select-
ing, and pointing out meanings to himself and to others • . 
1. MSS, 11. 
Mead declares that mentality appears in the individual 
only when the organism is able to indicate meanings to 
himself and to others. He says: 
Mentality in our approach simply comes 
in when the organism is able to point 
out meanings to others and to him-
self. This is the point at which 
mind appears, or if you like, emerges. 1 
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Unlike Watson, Mead's main interest, as regards mind, 
is in describing the conditions under which the individual 
gains control over the relationships between the organism 
and its environment and not in the behavior of the nervous 
system per se. He points out that the organism selects 
its environment through its own sensitivity, and has re-
lationships with it before there is a mechanism to enable 
the organism to control those relationships. The mechanism 
which the individual develops to control these relation-
ships is the important phenomenon that needs explanation. 
The human infant is not born with it; he is born a sensi-
2 tive organism. However, Mead states, 
The human animal ••• has worked out a 
mechanism of language communication by 
means of which it can get control. 
Now, it is evident that much of that 
mechanism does not lie in the central 
nervous system, but in the relation of 
things to the organism. The ability 
to pick these meanings out and to in-
dicate them to others and to the 
organism is an ability which gives 
peculiar power to the human individual. 
The control has been made possible by 
language. It is that mechanism of 
control over meaning in this sense which 
has, I say, constituted what we term 'mind' .3 
1. Mead, MSS, 132. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid •, 133 • 
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Cautiously Mead remarks that the processes of mind reside 
not in words nor does the intelligence of the organism lie 
in the nervous system. For Me ad , "Both are part of a 
process that is going on between organism and env1ronment." 1 
The mind, in other words, is a social resultant, 
arising out of social processes. To Mead: 
It is absurd to look at the mind 
simply from the standpoint of the 
individual human organism; for, 
although it has its focus there, 
it is essentially a social phenom-
enon; even its biolog ical functions 
are primarily social. The subjective 
experience of the individual must be 
brought into relation with the natural, 
socio-biological activities of the 
brain in order to render an acceptable 
account of mind possible at all; and 
this can be done only if the ~ocial 
nature of mind is recognized. 
While Mead recognizes that mind has its focus in the 
individual organism, he declares that it is not located 
there. He says, "The locus of mind is not in the individual. 
Mental processes a re fragments of the complex conduct of 
the individual in and on his environment. " 3 
Mead's conclusion is that mind is a social phenomenon 
that develops in the individual through communication with 
others. And while the individual is not the locus of 
mind, "the physiological mechanism underlying experience 
is far from irrelevant--indeed is indispensable to "the 
1. MSS, 133 • 
2. Ibid. 
3· Mead, PTA, 372. 
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development of mentality. Nevertheless Mead places 
emphasis constantly upon the social process that gives 
rise to mind and not upon the physical mechanism under-
lying it. He gives a definitive statement of his position 
on this question thus: 
We must regard mind, then, as arising 
a nd developing within the social 
process, within the empirical matrix 
of social interactions. We must, that 
is, get an inner individual experience 
from the standpoint of social acts 
which include the experiences of 
separate individuals in a social 
context wherein those individuals 
interact. The processes of experience 
which the human brain makes possible 
are made possible only for a group 
of interacting individuals; only for 
individual organisms which are mem-
bers of a society; not for the individual 
organism in isolation from other individ-
ual organisms .2 
There is a final point which is always essential to 
the social emergence of the mind. It is the fact that 
the individual must reflect or turn his experience back 
upon himself. Without reflection, the social process 
does not give rise to mind. The ind-ividual has to take 
the attitude of others toward himself in the social process 
in order to develop mentality. ''Reflexiveness, then, is 
the essential condition, within the social process, for 
the development of mind. 11 3 
Through this argument for mind as a social emergent, 
Mead presents a definite theory of human nature. For him, 
1. Mead, MSS, 1. 
2. MSS, 133 • 
3. Ibid., 134. 
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therefore, the rational aspects of human nature are socially 
developed. But not only are they socia lly developed, they 
are also socially acquired. This means that human nature 
is a social product. 
2) The Genesis and Development of the Self 
Closely related to Mead's theory of mind is his social 
theory of the development of t he self. Mead says, 
It is by means of reflexiveness--the 
turning back of the experience of the 
individual upon himself--that the whole 
social process is thus brought into the 
experience of the individuals involved in it; 
it is by such means, which enable the 
individual to take the ~ttitude of the 
other toward himself ••• 1 
In accounting for the genesis and development of the self, 
he reveals even more clearly his social conception of 
human nature, and makes very clear the point at which he 
differs radically from Cooley • . 
In opposition to Cooley's view that a feeling of self 
is present in the human infant at birth, 2 Mead describes 
how the self arises through the soc~ process. For Mead, 
the self, which is more of a cognitive than an affective 
phenomenon, arises in the individual after birth.3 It is 
regarding the beginning of the self that Mead differ s 
fundamentally from Cooley, who holds t hat self-feeling is 
an instinct with which the child is born.4 Mead writes, 
1. MSS, 134. 
2. Page 22 of the dissertation. 
3· MSS, 173• 
4. Page 22 of the dissertation. 
The self has a character which is 
different from tbat of the physiological 
organism proper. The self is some-
thing which has a development; it is not 
initially there at birth, but arises in 
the process of social experience and 
activity, that is, develops in the given 
individual as a result of his relations 
to that process as a whole and to other 
individuals within that process.l 
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While discussing the presupposition that Wundt made, namely, 
that selves are antecedent to the social process, Mead 
asserted that Wundt's presupposition was an error and said 
that "selves must be accounted for in terms of the social 
process, an:i in terms of communication." 2 Therefore for 
Mead selves are not antecedents; they are resultants. 
In Mead's theory of the self, the term communication 
is very important. Here, as in his theory of the develop-
ment of the mind, the individual acquires a self through 
gestures, language, and by carrying the role of others • . 
Before acquiring a self, the individual plays the role of 
the other and becomes the other. Mead says, 
In the process of communi cation the 
individual is another before he is a 
self. It is in addressing himself 
in the role of another that his 
self arises in experience.3 
The manner in which communication is carried out in 
Mead's theory is that the individual makes a gesture, another 
individual responds, and the first individual gives a 
reaction to the response ma de by the second 1ndividual.4 
1. MSS, 135. 
2. Mead, ~ffiS, 49. 
3· PTP, 168. 
4. MSS, 146-151. 
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In this way an individua l first becomes conscious of the 
other and then becomes conscious of himself while taking 
the role of the other. Self-consciousness comes as a 
result of reflection. For Mead , the locus of reflection 
is the objective environment. 1 Neither reflection nor 
consciousness is in the brain; they belong to the environ-
ment. What takes p l ace in the brain is the physiological 
process whereby an individual either loses or gains con-
sciousness. 2 
Children carry on this process of communication in 
simple play, then in f ormal games.3 By way of this 1 m-
portant process of communication, which includes gestures 
as well as language, children play the roles of others 
and eventually learn to carry the role of the "generalized 
4 
other". 
Speaking further about the development of the self, 
Mead says, 
In a word, the self as an object 
becomes a part of the individual 
through his having assumed the 
generalized attitude of a member of 
the group to which that self be-
longs, a group tha t widens until it takes in 
a ll rational individuals, tha t i s , all 
individuals who could indicate to one 
another universal charact~rs and objects 
in co - operative activity. 
1. Ibid., 112. 
2. Mead, MSS, 112. 
3· Ibid., 151. 
4. MSS , 154. 
5. Mead , PTP, 375. 
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The individual broadens his attitude to include not only 
a member of his social group but also to include the 
"generalized other", which is an abstraction drawn from 
the group. Mead says the "generalized other" may be 
called 11 the organized community or social group which 
1 gives to the individual his unity of self". Therefore, 
Mead contends that there are two stages in the development 
of the self. First, there is the stage when the individual 
assumes the attitudes of others. Second, there is the 
point when the individual takes the role of the "general1 zed 
other". 2 
The self is an object before it is a subject, accord-
ing to Mead. The fundamental characteristic of the self 
is that it is reflexive. It can be both object and 
subject, but it must be an object first.3 The individual 
experiences himself as an object first and then he ex-
periences himself as a subject. To know oneself as a 
su8ject is to become self-conscious. And self-consciousness, 
for Mead, is gained only after one has taken an impersonal 
objective attitude toward himself. 4 He says: 
The individual experiences himself as 
such, not directly, but only in-
directly, from the particular stand-
points of other individual members of 
the same social group, or from the 
generalized standpoint of the social 
group as a whole to which he belongs. 
1. MSS, 154. 
2 • WLSS , 158 • 
3· MSS, 136. 
4. MSS, 138. 
For he enters his own experience 
as a self or individual, not 
directly or immediately, not by 
becoming a subject to himself, 
but only in so far as he first 
becomes an object to himself 
first as other individuals are 
objects to him or in his exper-
ience ••• l 
From being an object to himself, the individual 
moves on to becoming conscious of himself as a subject. 
Self-consciousness is acquired by reflection and through 
communication with others. For Mead, self-consciousness 
11 refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of 
definite responses which belong to the others of the group". 
It is "an awakening in ourselves of the group of attitudes 
which we are arousing in others".2 Speaking further 
about the meaning of self-consciousness, Mead says: 
The taking or feeling of the atti-
tude of the other toward yourself 
is wha t constitutes self-conscious-
ness, and not mere organic sensa-
tion of which the individual is3 aware and which he experiences. 
When the individual reaches self-consciousness, he 
structures his experiences and organizes them into a 
whole. Through communication he receives and organizes 
in himself the attitudes of others, and thus he becomes 
a human self. Mead states, 
What goes to make up the organized 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 163. 
3. Mead, MSS, 171. 
self is the organization of the 
attitudes which are common to the 
group ••• There a re certain common 
responses which each individual 
has toward certain common things, 
and in so f ar as those common re-
sponses are awakened in the indi-
vidual when he is af f ecting other 
persons he arouses his own self. 
The structure, then, on which the 
self is built is this response 
which is common to all, for one 
has to be a member of a community 
to be a self.l 
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Developing this point further, Mead sta tes categorically 
that "it is a structure of attitudes, t hen, which goes to 
make up a self, as distinct from a group of habits 11 • 2 
For Me ad, a ttitudes are "organized sets of responses 11 .3 
Yet Mead does not hold that the self consi sts "simply in 
the bare organization of social attitudes". 4 He recog-
nizes t hat there is a subjective side of self-experience 
that must be accounted for in giving the total picture 
of the self. He distinguishes carefully between what he 
calls "feeling-conscious ness 11 which is subjective, and 
consciousness as "reflective intellig ence", which is main-
ly social but contains an element of sub j ecti vi ty .5 
Feeling-consciousness which is mere physical sensation 
is on a dif f erent level from reflective intelligence and 
is entirely distinguishable from it. Hence when Mead 
speaks of the self, he refers to tha t consciousness which 
1. Ibid., 162. 
2. Ibid., 163. 
3. Ibid., 161. 
4. Ibid., 173• 
5· MSS, 164-166. 
commonly means reflective intelligence as distinguished 
1 
from feeling. VVhile reflective intelligence is pri-
marily soci al, it includes a subjective element. This 
subjective element is commonly referred to as the 'I'. 
Mead believes, therefore, that a complete explanation of 
the self must account for both the 'I' and the ' Me', 
the private as well as the social aspects of the self. 2 
Mead distinguishes the 'I' from the ' Me' mainly 
for purpo ses o f clarity. However, he holds that in 
reality they are not sep ar a te but e xist together. He 
claims tha t the ' Me' is social; it arises through the 
individua l's taking the role of others and assuming the 
attitude of the group. The ' Me' is the voice of the 
communi ty in which the individu~l lives.3 At one point, 
Mead declares: 
The 'me' is essentially a member 
of a social group, and represents, 
therefore, the value of the group , 
that sort of experience which the 
group makes possible. Its values are 
the values that belong to society. 4 In a sense these values are supreme. 
On the other h and, the 'I' is an unpredictable and 
incalculable activity which is never experienced immediate-
ly. Only when the 'I' has become the 'me' can it be 
viewed objectively. Mead states that "the 'I' is the 
response of the organism to the a ttitudes of the others".5 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 167-173. 
3· MSS, 173-174. 
4. Mead , MSS, 214. 
5. Ibid., 175. 
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According to him, we can know the 'I' only after the re-
sponse, never before. An individual's 'I' is therefore 
unique and is generally manifested as action against the 
social 'me'. Mead expresses, 
The 'I' is his action over against 
that -social situation within his own 
conduct, and it gets into his ex-
perience only after he has carried 
out the act.l 
Both the 'I' and the 'me' are inseparable in the 
experience of the self. Only for purposes of analysis 
can they be separa ted. The self is a social product 
which involves both the 'I' and the 'me'. Together the 
'I' and 'me' constitute a personality as it appears in 
~ocial e~p erience. 2 
Once selves a re developed through conununication, 
they become the instruments for further personal and 
soci a l developments. The complex social organization 
tha t we see in present society is the result of both 
the rudimentary selves developed through simple gestures 
and the more complex pe rsonalities which have evolved from 
them throug h communication and further d1fferentiat i on. 3 
Mead asserts, 
1. Ibi d . 
The social process •.• does not depend 
for its origin or initial existence 
u·oon the exi stance and interactions 
of selves; though it does depend upon 
the latter for the higher stages of 
complexity and organization which it 
reaches after selves have arisen 
2. Ibid. , 178. 
3· Me ad, MSS , 240. 
within it. 1 
And he says further: 
the rate of development or evolution of 
human society, since the emergence of 
minds and selves out of the human social 
proce ss of experience and behavior has 
been tremendously accelerated a s a 
result of that emergence.2 
In Mead 's opinion: 
Socia l evolution or development and 
self-evolution or development are 
correlative and interdependent, once 
the self has arisen Qut of the 
soci a l life-process.) 
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Hence in Mead's philosophy, the self, like the mind, 
is a comp lex product of communication and social processes. 
It is 11 no t so much a substance as a process in which the 
conversation of gestures has been internalized within an 
organic f orm11 • 4 Human nature is t herefore a social result-
ant. 
3) The Bases of Human Society 
To conclude his social theory of the na ture of man, 
Me ad explains his view of society. According to him, the 
complex human society that we know could not exist apart 
from individuals who have mind s and selves; and yet 
individuals with minds and selves could not have e merged 
except out of "the human social process in its lower 
stages of development--those stages a t which it was 
1. Ibid., 226, footnote. 
2. Ibid., 227, footnote. 
3· Ibid., footnote. 
4. Ibid. , 178. 
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merely a resultant of, and wholly dependent upon, the 
physiolos ical differentiations and demands of the individ-
ual organisms implicated in it 11 • 1 Even those physiological 
differentiations were social in character. Mead claims, 
'' There is no li vine; organism of any kind v1hose nature or 
constitution is such that it could exist or maintain 
itself in complete isolation from all other living 
organisms ."2 He concludes therefore t hat the basis of 
human society consi sts of two fundamental aspects. The 
first is the socio-physiological impulses and needs of 
the individual organism, and the second is the responses 
of "the individuals to the identical responses of others, 
that is, to class or social responses. 11 3 These two aspects 
not only form the basis of human society but they also 
constitute the poles about which social differentiation 
and evolution take place.4 Mead calls them the 'physiolog-
ical' and the 'institutional' poles of society.5 He states 
that "the fundamental biological or physiological impulses 
and needs which lie at the basis" of human behavior and 
indeed of all behavior of living organisms "are social 
in character or h ave soci al implications ••• "6 Among the 
important socio-physiological impulses and needs which are 
basic to social behavior and social organization in all 
1. MSS , 227. 
2. Ibid., 228. 
3· Ibid., 229. 
4. Ibid., 229-230. 
5. MSS, 230. 
6. Ibid., 227-228. 
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living organisms, the one that is mo st important for human 
social organization, according to Mead, is the sex or 
1 
reproductive impulse. Associated with sex are the 
"parental a ttitude" or impulse and the 11 attitude of 
nei ghborliness". These three, sex, parental attitude, 
and the attitude of nei ghborliness, constitute the main 
social physiolog ical impulses t hat underlie the develop-
ment of society. And since the parental attitude and the 
neighb orly attitude ar e very closely associated with the 
sex impulse, the family is therefore the fundamental unit 
of all forms of human social organization.2 
Although the family is an expression of the socio-
physiological impuls es and although it is the fundamental 
unit o f social organization, Mead holds that the human 
social organism is nevertheless uniquely the result of 
the responses of individuals to other individuals through 
communication. The social responses are t he bases of 
social institutions especially.3 Speaking of the import-
ance of gestures and communication in the evolution of 
society , Mead says, "It is out of this capacity for being 
influenced by our own gesture as we influence others that 
114 has arisen the peculiar form of the human social organism ••• 
For Mead , then, the b a ses of human society are the 
socio-physiological impulses and the various responses 
1. Ibid. , 228 • 
2 • Ibid • , 2 29 • 
3· MSS, 230. 
4. Ibid. , 235 • 
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made by minded selves to other minded selves. These re-
sponses are made possible by communication. 
4) Mead's Conception of the Nature 
- Of Human Nature 
Underlying Mead's social theory of the mind, self, 
and society is his conception of human nature. He 
implies throughout his discussion tha t the na ture of man 
is a social resultant. The social process is prior to 
mind and the self; therefore human nature arises in and 
is a definite product of society. 
Mead recognizes the difference between the raw 
ma terials of human nature and the human nature which has 
developed in the social process. While discussing the 
socio-physiological impulses and needs of man, he says: 
They are the essential physiological 
materials from which human nature is 
socially formed; so that human na-
ture is something social through 
and through, and always presupposes 
the truly social individual. Indeed, 
any psychological or philosophical 
treatment of human nature involves the 
assumption that the human individual 
belongs to an organized social 
community, and derives his human na-
ture from his social interactions and 
relations with that community as a 
whole and with the other individual 
members of it.l 
Discussing this point further and emphasi zing the import-
ance of t he raw biological materials of human nature, 
Mead says : 
All social interrela tions and inter-
actions are rooted in a certain common 
1. MSS, 229. 
socio-physiological endowment of 
every individual involved in them. 
These physiological bases of social 
behavior--which have their ultimate 
seat or locus in the lower part of 
the individual's central nervous 
system--are the bases of such be-
havior, precisely because t hey in 
themselves are social; that is, be-
cause they consist in drives or in-
stincts or behavior tendencies, on 
the part of the given individual, which 
he cannot carry out or give overt ex-
pression and satisfaction to without 
the cooperative aid of one or more 
other individuals. The physiological 
processes of behavior of which they 
are the mechanisms are processes which 
necessarily involve more than one in-
dividual, processes in which other in-
dividuals besides the given individual 
are perforce implicated. Examples of 
the fundamental social relations to 
which these physiological bases of 
social behavior give rise are these be-
tween the sexes (expressing the repro-
ductive instinct), between parent and 
child (expressing the parental instinct), 
and between nei ghbors {expressing tbe 
gregarious instinct). -These relatively 
simple and rudimentary physiological 
mechanisms or tendencies of individual 
human behavior, besides constituting 
the physiological bases of all human 
social behavior, are also the funda-
mental biological materials of human 
nature; so that when we refer to 
human nature, we are referring to a 
something which is essentially social. 1 
To conclude, human nature for Mead is social, both in 
44 
its r aw physiological aspect and in its developed cultural 
aspect. 
C. Edgar Sheffield Brightman 
Brightman, like Cooley and Mead, has a definite 
theory as to the nature of human nature. In order that 
1. M~ad, MSS, 229. 
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we may be able to perceive and understand Brightman's 
view with a fair degree of clearness, we shall analyze 
certain fundamental concepts contained in his theory of 
man. The following concepts will be considered: 
Consciousness, The Minimum Self, The Personal Self or 
Personality, Imperative Normst Freedom, and Reason. 
Then a discussion of the civil war in human nature will 
be given. 
1) Consciousness 
In Brightman's phi losophy, consciousness is the 
s tarting point for understanding man's nature. A person 
is a conscious individual and an adequate understanding 
of consciousness is therefore necessary to a full account 
of man. Brightman holds tha t while consciousness cannot 
be defined precisely, it can be understood definitely; and 
1 it is the most fundamental fact of life. Stated simply 
consciousness may be defined as awareness, but this is 
not sufficient; hence Brightman foregoes definition and 
gives certain familiar characteristics of the experience 
of consciousness. He says, "Every one knows, by immediate 
awareness, what it is to be conscious and gradually to 
lose consciousness on falling to sleep. 112 And he points 
out that every one experiences "thoughts, feelings, 
percept ions, memories, imaginations, choices and the like ••• 11 3 
1. AIP, rev. ed., 323. 
2. JP, 167. 
3· Ibid. 
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wh ich are charac t eristics of consciousness. Finally he 
conclude s wi th the statement: 
We may thus desi gnate what we mean 
by consciousne s s; we may na me its 
parts; we may contrast it with the 
unconscious; but we are unable yo 
g ive a formal definition of it. 
Nevertheless, consciousness, for Brightman, is the founda-
tion of personality and life. From Brightman's personal-
istic view point, consciousness must be viewed as a whole. 
It should not be considered in terms of its elements as 
associationistic psychology does. It comes in clusters, 
states or processes, and it should be studied as states 
or processes; for "a state of consciousness does not con-
tinue to exist if separated from the cluster in which it 
occurs 11 .2 
2) The Minimum Self 
According to Brightman, the fact that consciousness 
always experiences itself 11 as belonging together and as 
belonging with pa st (and even future) clustersu is very 
important.3 Consciousness, thus understood, is what is 
meant by the term self. Brightman says: 
1. Ibid. 
This fact of experiencing conscious-
ness as belonging together in a 
unique way is called self-experience; 
A self (or person) is conscious life 
thus experienced; and so far as we 
know consciousness from the lowest 
2 • Ibid • , 190 • 
3· Ibid., 191. 
to the hig hest forms is always 
thus exp erienced.! 
Eence through studying the nature of consciousness, 
Brightma n arrives at the meaning of the concept self. 
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For him, then, a self is any consciousness or self-exper-
ience. He says, "The word self is used for any and every 
consciousness, however, simple or complex it may be." 2 
However, he points out clearly that selves defined as 
consciousness or self-experience may be found on different 
levels, ranging from unicellular animals to rational men.3 
Therefore he makes a distinction between a minimum self 
and a persona l self.4 A minimum self would include any 
consciousness, ranging perhaps from the amoeba to the 
anthropoid apes. Yet a personal self is limited primarily 
to persons. Brightman adds however that "the various levels 
of self-hood and personality merge into each other and defy 
classi fi cation11 • 5 
For purposes of clarity and in order to give a more 
precise explanation of the meaning of personal selves, 
Brightman enumerates and describes wh at he calls uthe 
chara cteristics of a minimum self 11 • 6 They are: 
(1) Self-experience--a unified complex-
ity of consciousness ••• 
(2) Qualia--distinguishable qualities, 
at least sense qualities and perhaps 
1. IP, 191. 
2. APR, 350. 
3 • NV, 53. 
4. APR, 350. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 351. 
( 3) 
f l.J.) \ . 
( 5) 
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other qualities of feeling. 
Time and space. All selves must necessarily 
experience time because this is a world of 
process; it is highly probable that some kind 
of space-consciousness is also universal. 
Transcendence of time and space. The com-
plexity of the specious present and memory ••• 
elevate every self above time to some extent; 
and probably the humblest self transcends space 
both by its ability to aim at distant spaces 
and by its non spatial experiences ••• 
Process and conation. All selves are in con-
stant process of change, which includes striv-
ing for ends (conation); to be a self is to 
experience a desire for future experience, if 
only the eating of food and the continuance of 
life. 
(6) Awareness of meaning. The simplest self treats 
its experiences as signs of further experience; 
thus it is in an elementary way aware of meaning. 
(7) Response to environment. Every self lives in 
an environment which is constantly stimula ting 
it. A minimum self ••• is not conscious of a 
difference between itself and its environment. 
Yet its 11 animal faith" leads it to respond to 
the effects of the world in its experience. 
(8) Privacy. Every self is directly experienced 
only by itself ••• A minimum self is not aware 
of this property of its experience, since any 
understanding of the concept £f privacy pre-
supposes reasoning processes. 
While Brightman lists these characteristics as inhering 
in minimum selves, he adds tha t they are also characteristics 
of personal selves or persons; however, in persons, each of 
the eight characteri sties has been "developed to a higher 
2 
level". 
1. APR, 351-352. 
2 • Ibid. , 352 • 
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3) The Personal Self or Personality 
This brin~ us to a consideration of persons or 
personal selves and leads to a more specific account of 
what Brightman holds to be the nature of human nature. 
While describing personality or personal selves, Brightman 
reveals his philosophy of human nature. 
In his book, A Philosophy of Religion, Brightman 
expres ses the view that persons, having tbe same character-
istics as minimum selves, develop those characteristics 
to a much more refined level. ,He says that in persons: 
(1) Self-experience is far more complex 
and highly organized; reference to 
past and future plays a much larger 
part in the present experience of 
the self. 
(2) New qualia emerge, such as feelings 
of moral obligation, which come to 
be recognized as imperative norms. 
(3) The range of time and sua ce exper-
i ence is vastly extended. 
(4) Time-transcendence is extended by the 
development of a .more comp lex field 
of attention and of a richer and more 
accurate memory accompanied by recog-
nition. The self of the present is 
thus i dentified with the self of past 
and future. 
(5) Space-transcendence is increased by 
a multip lic a t i on of non-spatial 
interests in sp iritual values and 
abstract ideas • . 
(6) Cona tion rise s to the level of free 
purposive self-control and control of 
environment. 
(7) Awareness of meaning becomes conceptual 
thought and reasoning. Refle ctive 
self-consciousness ••• arises on 
this personal level. 
(8) The response to environment is in-
creasingly a response to a social 
and ideal environment, and the re-
sponses are more freely selective 
rather than mechanical. 
(9) Although nrivacy is transcended by 
l anguage and by understanding, it 
remains a fact that all communica-
tion is sent by and r eceived in pri-
vate experience; and developed per-
sons respect the fact and the rights 
of privacy .1 
For Bri gh tman, the factor of re f lective self-
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consciousness is found only in personal selves, never in 
a minimum self. He states, 11 Reflecti ve self-consciousness 
happens only occasiona lly in our introspective moments.tt2 
A personal self is however always potentially self-
conscious. Self-consciousness is one of the unique 
charac teristics of a person. Of tue emergent quali t ies 
of personality found in their developed stas e only in 
persons , uconsciousness of imperative norms", 11 freedom", 
and "reason'B are exceeding ly important. These will be 
~reated more fully in the course of this chapter . 4 
In Brightman's philosophy , the terms person and 
personality are synonymous, except that personality re-
fers more precisely to the qualities of a person. Hence 
in this discussion, the terms personal self, person, 
1. Bri ghtman, APR, 352-353· 
2. I TP , rev. ed., 204 . 
3. APR , 353 • 
4. Page 54 f. 
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and per s onality are used interchangeably. 
To get at the problem of human nature, we must ask, 
what does Brightman mean precisely by the term personality? 
Brightman answers this question by fi rs t pointing out that 
pe rsonality is not an entity that is stationary and un-
chang ing . He says, rather, that personality is 11 a life--
a changing , actively fu nctioning experience in constant 
interaction with its environment". 1 Then he adds that a 
philosoph ica l definition of personality "must be consistent 
with all the truths about personality whic h are necessarily 
present in all contexts ••• 112 And he states f urther that 
such a definition must distinguish personality from 11 all 
other possible ob j e cts--such as abstractions or material 
t h ings". 3 Brigh tman then defines personality in the 
followin3 manner: 
A personality is a complex but self-
identifying , active, selective, 
fe e ling , sens ing, de veloping , exp er-
ience, which remembers its pas t (in 
part), plans for its future , inter-
acts with its subconscious p rocesses, 
its b odily organism, and its natura l 
and social environment, and is ab le to 
judge and guide itself and its oEjects 
by r a tional and ideal standards. 
A person, personal s elf, or personali ty need not manifest 
all the above experiences at one time; :nevertheless, it 
must be able to give rise to them at some time. Finally, 
1. NV, 52. 




Brightman offers a condensed definition of personality in 
these ·words : 
A persona lity is a unity of complex 
conscious changes, including all its 
experiences--its memories, its pur-
poses, its values, its powers, its 
activities, and its experienced inter~ 
actions with its environment.l 
Brightman emphasizes the point constantly that 
personality (the person) is a unity--a unity of complex 
conscious changes. The factor in personality which main-
tains this unity is memory. Hence memory is very essential 
to persona l life. Brightman says, 
The experience of being a self or 
person is essentially the experience 
of memory. A person is the same person 
from day to day, despite all the 
changes in his experience, because he 
remembers that he is the same. Memory 
always includes the experience of self-
identification.2 
Brightman dramatizes the importance of memory by saying: 
When there is no memory, personality 
ha s disintegrated. wnenever there is 
personality there is some memory, 
binding present experience with past 
thought or feeling or perception or will. 
Each person is a remembering identity, 
binding a multi~licity of experience into 
personal unity.5 
Yet Brightman do e s not imply that a personality is 
alw{:loys a complete unity or that the whole self is in-
volved in every situation or every moment of consciousness. 
1. Ibid., 56. 
2. NV, 63. 
3· Ibid. 
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He says that "it is evident ••• that the actual experience 
of ourself which we enjoy at any moment is far from 
being our whole self 11 • 1 He holds, rather, that although 
every empirical situation is an experience of wholeness, 
every present or datum self "contains signs of a larger 
lf t hi h ; t b 1 II 2 se o w c ~ e ongs ••• . Unity in the self is there-
fore maintained through memory and through anticipation. 
In Brightman's words: 
memory and anticipation assert the 
identity of the present person 
with a person that has been and a 
person that will be. Thus the whole 
self, or person, is a total con-
scious process which is never 
present to itself in one single ex-
perience, but which is aware of its 
identity and wholeness by means of 
its backward-looking memories and 
its forward-looking purposes.3 
Every study of person must give some attention to the 
nature of the body in relation to the qualities of mind, 
such as, consciousness, imagination, and reason. One 
might easily conclude from a casual reading of Brightman's 
works that he does not rel ate consciousness and the body; 
however, such a hurried conclusion would be erroneous. 
While his major emphasis is placed upon consciousness and 
traits of personality, he gives careful attention to the 
relation of body and mind. 
For Brightman there is constant interaction between 
1. APR, 358. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Brightman, APR, 358. 
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the mind (consciousness) and the body. He says the 
problem of the interaction of body and mind is explained 
when the body is perceived as an expression of the Supreme 
Mind or God and viewed as mental. According to Brightman, 
the body is not metaphysically dif f erent from conscious-
ness, and t h erefore interaction of mind and body creates 
no serious intellectual difficulty. Speaking of the inter-
action between the body and the mind, Brightman says that, 
the mind (the consciousness or the 
personality) both affects and is 
affected by bodily changes. The 
body is that organ of the universe 
which creates a personality, al-
though the spiritual and the 
intellectual life are proof that 
a personality has powers that a 
merely material body does not 
possess and could not explain.l 
In the foregoing statement, Brightman implies that the 
body is the condition under which God creates a personality. _ 
Although George H. Mead sought to explain how mind 
arises in the person, Brightman is interested not in how 
mind arises but in its na ture and reality. In his book, 
Nature and Values, Brightman says, 
If we take our personality to be 
just what we experience it to be, 
we can identify our personality with 
our consciousness and also reasonably 
infer the interaction of personality 
with its surrounding world of body 
and nature and God, as well as their 
interdependence.2 
He adds that "every human person is dependent not only on 
1. -NV, 55 • 
2. NV, 56. 
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his body, but also on all the natural forces of his environ-
ment".1 But from Brightman's personalistic point of view 
personality is more fundamental than materiality. Accord-
ing to Brightman, personality "may well be fundamental to 
all reality 11 • 2 Perhaps the body, nature, and the world 
are all personal energy. Therefore, for Brightman, 
interaction between the mind and the body presents no 
major problem. It would follow, then, that the fundamental 
aspects of human nature are mental rather than material. 
Instincts or impulses do not play the most important role 
in his conception of the nature of man. 
Strictly speaking, Brightman says that persons are 
really invisible. He says, 
The visible (and all the sensible) 
consists of experience patterns 
within consciousness • . In this sense, 
the visible itself is invisible to 
any external observer; only I can 
see and feel exactly what I do see and 
feel. The visib l e is strictly speak-
ing, visible only in and to the person 
seeing.3 
In Cooley and Mead, we noted that the body, through 
its native impulses and sensitivity, plays a very signi-
ficant role in the formation of persons. Especially 
through its capacity to communicate with other persons, 
the bodily nerves played an important role in the develop-
ment of personality. Communication was exceedingly 
1. Ibid. , 58 • 
2. NV, 57 • 
3· NV, 59. 
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significant for both Mead and Cooley. Brightman also 
discusses the place of communication in personality and 
human nature. He believes that although each person is 
private and is "himself only 11 , each person is also a 
social being. He asserts: 
It is true that a person e~oeriences 
only himself, remembers only him-
self, and, of course, is only him-
self and no one else. But this 
very private person is also a social 
person.l 
In Brightman's philosophy, every person interacts and 
has social rela tions with other persons. Communication 
is the process of this interaction. And he states that 
11 
••• communic a tion and social experience are entirely con-
sistent with self-identity and privacy as defined". 2 To 
be a social person does not destroy the privacy of the 
individual. Every person experiences social conscious-
ness, but all social consciousness is within individual 
persons. 
According to Brightman, private persons have ex-
periences with other persons and communicate with them, 
but through all social relations the individual ma intains 
his priva cy. A person's priva cy is inviolate. Brightman 
says emphatically, 
God has made me a person and res pects 
my privacy; but any person, and God 
1. Ibid.~ 64. 
2 • Ibid. , 65. 
most of all, may communicate with 
me without breaking d.own my ideJ:ti ty 
and my personal responsibility. 
Since Brightman regards the whole universe as a 
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society of persons, communication, for him, is one of the 
connecting factors in social life. 2 And although persons 
are dependent upon each other and upon their total environ-
ment, each person is nevertheless a private individual. 
4) Imperative Norms, Freedom, and Reason 
Regarding human nature, Brightman p l aces particular 
stress upon three traits that arise in personality. He 
calls these traits "imperative norms", "freedom", and 
"reason11 .3 By imperative norms Brightman refers to the 
feelings of moral-obligation, to the consciousness of 
esthetic tastes, and to the awareness of religious obliga-
tion. He asserts: 
The consciousness of imperative norms is man's 
experience of his destiny as obligation 
to pursue the ideal values; personality 
grows as these ideals are transf~rmed 
into concrete value experiences. 
Accordi ng to his view persons are inveterate seekers after 
ideals. "Far from being unreal, spiritual ideals are 
wha t make men human, as well as akin to the divine." 5 And 
he adds that "wherever humanity exi sts, there moral, 
scientific, philosophic al, artistic, and religious ends are 
1. NV, 65. 
2. IT.P , rev. ed. 
3· Page 48 of the dissertation. 
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soughtu.l The recognition and pursuit of moral, esthetic, 
and spiritual values are unique chara cteristics of human 
nature. 11Wi thout these spiritual values man would be 
depersonalized a nd dehumanized; he would be a mere brute. 11 2 
Brightman holds rigidly to the view that freedom is 
essential to and is a definite trait of personality. He 
says that 11 freedom is the power of choice";31t is the 
exercise of will. He proclaims that 11 ••• will is a fact 
whatever our theory of it may be". Developing this point 
further , he says, 
It is the experience of choosing 
from among real or supposed possi-
bilities one which becomes the 
actual purpose or goal of conduct.4 
When a person exercises his will and thus demonstra tes his 
5 freedom, he thereby reveals the depth of human nature. 
Brightman says: 
Will is even more truly our essential 
self than are our feelings, which we 
think of as peculiarly intimate ••• A 
feeling is not central in our life 
until it is approved and chosen by our 
will.6 
Reason occupies a very prominent place in human na-
ture according to the theory under discussion. One of 
the chara cteristics of the minimum self is awareness of 
1. APR, 361. 
2. Ibid., 362. 
3· Ibid., 353· 
4. ML, 74. 
5. API, 84. 
6. Brightman, ML, 100. 
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meaning. In the personal self, awareness of meaning is 
developed greatly until it "becomes conceptual thought and 
reasoning".l Brightman asserts that, 
by reason is meant the power of 
testing truth-claims by logical 
and empirical standards; the prin-
ciples· of deduction and induction; 
and, above all, the perception of 
the relations between parts and 
wholes. Coherence, the principle 
of reason, is identical whether 
its subject matter be the physical 
world ••. , the realm of values ••• , 
or social relat1ons ••• 2 
Although reason is not unique to persons, as it is 
slightly present in apes and other forms of life, it is 
the hi ghest trait of personality. Through reason, the 
personality can "guide and judge itself and its objects 
by rational and ideal standards 11 .3 And it is also through 
reason tha t every self is self-transcendent. By self-
transcendence, Bri ghtman means "the fact that the mind 
necessarily explains itself as present datum by referring 
beyond that mere datum self to something which transcends 
it 11 .4 Speaking of the part which reason plays in enabling 
the person to transcend himself, Brightman states the 
relationship succinctly: 
It is reason that drives conscious-
ness beyond itself, and that commands 
every self to be self-transcendent; 
for a complete view of a human self 
cannot possibly be a coherent view 
unless it be assumed that there is 
some explanation for the experiences 
of the self in realities that lie 
1. Brightman, APR, 352. 
2. Ibid., 353· 
3· Brightman, 1~, 54. 
4. API, 22. 
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beyond it.1 
Imperative norms, freedom, and reason constitute an 
important part of human nature. They enter uinto every 
higher personal experience, especially into religion." 2 
5) Civil War in Human Nature 
11 A fundamental f a ct of human nature is its civil 
war, 11 Brightman declares.3 Constant struggle and terrible 
division a r e daily experiences of persons. Even William 
James' "healthy-minded souls" do not furnish any "evidence 
against the view that conflict is the fundamental fact of 
life 11 • 4 Mankind speaks with a common voice of the em-
pirical fact of strife within human na ture. Brightman 
voices this fact in the following manner: 
The quality of life--the goals of our 
highest aspirations and the obstacles 
in the way to achieving them--has been 
felt by everyone. There is no human 
being who does not suffer and who does 
not sin.5 
Commenting upon the biblical doctrine of original sin, 
Brightman asserts: 
Whatever one may think about the tech-
nical theology involved, the Christian 
doctrine of original sin expressed 
the truth that there is something 
fundamentally unreasonable about man.6 
But he adds quickly that it is an error to over-emphasize 
1 • P.H.,. 27 • 
2. APR, 353. 
3. NV, 15. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 16. 
6. l\iiL, 69. 
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1 the tendencies to irrational lawlessness in human nature. 
Likewise he says that it is a violation of truth to over-
emphasize the tendencies to be guided by rational laws.2 
The correct view is to recognize both sets of tendencies 
in human nature. "Sometimes, if not always, rational 
processes control the irrational," according to Brightman. 
Yet the fact remains that "it is not difficult for human 
na ture to want a moral holiday". 
In all this, the important thing is the fact that 
moral problems and moral goals emerge because each person 
is a unity t hat experiences variety and struggle. While 
discussing moral laws, Bri ghtman says: 
Our moral problems and our moral 
goals both arise from the fact that 
each one of us is an individual with 
conflicting tendencies in his nature 
yet, in all the conflict, experiencing at 
the same time an imperative need for 
self-consistency.3 
The moral person is the individual who controls himself 
and guides himself towards the best goals of which he is 
capable. He points out tha t ordinary observation reveals 
clearly the magnitude of social damage done by uncontrolled 
impulses and the vast amount of social benefits produced 
throu3h moral control. 4 
The reason for inner conflicts in human nature is 
1. -Ibid. 
2 . Ibi d . 
3· Ibid., 207. 
4. Ibi d ., 232. 
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the persona lity's desires, knowledge, i gnorance, am-
bitions, fe ars, prejudice, weakness, strength, ruthlessness 
and conscience. 1 In the modern capitali sti c and militar-
istic wor l d , there exist simultaneously in the same per-
sonality a highly refined technological intelli gence and 
a beastly morality. Modern man needs very much to be 
saved--to be "saved from himself as he is, in the interest 
of himself as he may be"? Religion of f ers man just such 
salvation. 
D. Reinhold _Niebuhr 
The last representative view of human n ature to be 
presented in this dissertation is that of Reinhold Niebuhr. 
We shall discuss Niebuhr's theory along the following 
lines: namely, The Individual or the Self, Man as a 
Sinner, The Individual and the Group, and Man as Image 
of God. 
1) The Individual or the Self 
In his book, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr 
describes man a s a problem, a problem to himself. He 
says that if man is a child of nature, an animal , then he 
is a curious kind of animal; ~nd if man is viewed as a 
unique r a tiona l animal, then man becomes anxious because 
he re a li zes that he is akin to the brutes. 3 
Nevertheless, Niebuhr says that man is a self that 
1 • . NV, 66. 
2. Ibid. 
3· NJ,mJ, ·vol . I, 1. (All subsequent references to NADM 
~e- in Vo 1 • I • ) 
possesses indivi du a lity . The self i s a child o l ' both 
nature and spirit. This f act a ccounts for man's crea ture-
l iness and hi s uniqueness. The basis of s elf-hood lies 
i n the body , and t he f act that the self is grounded in a 
particular physical organism make s the self an obvious 
sepa r a te individual. 1 Niebuhr says tha t it is only in 
organi c li f e t hat na ture produces or ganisms that po ~ se s s 
a par ticul ar , interdependent, a nd indestructible unit. 
And i t i s in human li f e that na ture produces the highest 
degre e o f individuality. He says, "Genuine individuality, 
embodying both discreteness and uniqueness, i s a character-
istic of human life. 112 The individual, or at least his 
individuality, is therefor e a product of na ture and spirit. 
According to Niebuhr man's particularity comes from nature 
but his individua lity is a product o f t h e freedom of the 
sp irit.3 
Man, unlike other animals , is able to make himself 
an object. He has t he capacity to look beyond himself. 
Thi s capacity to look beyond himself is his self-tr~n s -
cendence, and it is the real basis f or man's discrete 
indivi dua lity. Ma n has the ability of se lf-consciousness 
and thi s enables him to view the world a s the other. 
Ni ebuh r asserts t hat 11 human consciousness involves the 
sharp distinction between the self and the totality of 
1. Ibi d ., 54. 
2. NADM, 55. 
3· I bid. 
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the worldu.l 
The individua l because of his capacity for self-
trans cendence and his c apa city to transcend the natural 
proces s can modify his own na ti ve impulses, extend, repress, 
and combine them in countless vari a tions. Ye t man is a 
limited creature who cannot transcend his own creature-
liness nor change some of the forces in na ture. 2 He is 
subject to development because he is a child of both 
na ture and spirit. Niebuhr adopts the Christian view of 
the individual by claiming that 11 the human spirit in its 
freedom is fina lly bound only by the will of God, and the 
secret o f its he art i s only fully known and judged by the 
divine wi sdom11 • 3 
Niebuhr observes tha t in primitive life the individual 
is absorbed with ease into the 11 primeval we 11 of the 
group's life. Yet the individual does not really lose his 
particularity. According to Niebuhr, 
He emerges from this group conscious-
ness only gr adually a s an individual. 
But what emerges is an original e~d ow­
ment, present from the beginning . 
Here Niebuhr disagrees r adically with George H. Mead who 
holds tha t the mind is developed through communication. 
Niebuhr says that Mead 's 11 efforts to explain the emergence 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 56. 
3· Ibid., 57 • 
4. NADM , 56. 
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of 'mind' •.• in purely sociologica l terms are self-
contradictory ••• "l For Niebuhr, then , the individual is 
born a self; he does not have to a cquire it after birth. 
Accep ting and interpreting the biblica l view of man, 
Ni ebuh r stresses the point that the individua l is finite, 
dependent, and insuf f icient. Apart from God, the individ-
ual is an insignificant creature. However, Niebuhr says 
that the Chri sti a n view, which he accepts, holds that man 
has 11 infinite possibilities which cannot be fulfilled 
within terms of this temporal existence 11 .2 Even though 
the individual has infinite possibilities, he is forever 
regarded as fi ni t e, though his finiteness is never viewed 
as an evil. The individual is regarded as a self that is 
anxious for his life because he is aware of a "universal 
perspective" and also of a 11 here and now" relation to his 
body.3 Niebuhr writes, 
Though it surveys the whole world 
and is tempted to regard its partial 
transcendence over its body as 
proof of its canditature for divinity, 
it re~ains in fact a very dependent 
self.4 
2) Man as a Sinner 
In describing man as a self that is finite, dependent, 
and insuf f icient, Niebuhr stresses the point that man is 
capable of transcending the na tural process as well as 
1. Ibid., 56n. 
2. Ibid., 170. 
3· Ibid. 
4. NADM, 17 0 • 
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transcending himself. Man's consciousness ana self-
consciousne ss give him freedom, and this free dom involves 
man in a contradiction. Man i s involved in the contradic-
tion of being a free spiritua l personality and of being 
a fini t e individual r e stricted by na ture. This predica-
ment of being bound and free is the occasion for sin. 
Niebuhr analyzes man's predicament in this manner: 
Man is insecure and involved in 
natural contingency; he seeks to 
over come his insecurity by a will-
to-power which over-reaches the 
limits of human creatureliness. 
Man is i gnorant and involved in the 
limitations of a finite mind; but he 
pretends that he is not limited. He 
assumes that he can gradually trans-
cend finite limitations until his 
mind becomes ident ical with universal 
mind. All of his intellectual and 
cultural pursuits, therefore, become 
infected with the sin of pride.l 
In Niebuhr's view, man is a sinner a nd his sin is 
both rebellion against God and injustice toward man. 2 The 
psychology of man's sin involves insecuri t y, anxiety, pride, 
and sensua lity. 
( 1) Insecurity 
Engulfed in the problem of finiteness and freedom, 
man is therefore insecure. He is "both strong and weak, 
both free and bound , both blind and far-seeing. He stands 
a t the juncture of na ture and spirit; and is involved in 
both freedom and nece ssity".3 This condition makes man 
1. Ibid., 17B-179. 
2. I bid. , 179. 
3· NADM, 181. 
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very insecure. Niebuhr believes that mankind is therefore 
seeking after security. He says, "Therefore all human 
life is involved in the sin of seeking security at the 
expense of other life. 111 
(2) Anxiety 
Niebuhr points out that man's sense of insecurity 
is accompanied by a deep sense of anxiety. And anxiety 
is the p re-condition for sin. He s a ys, 
In short, nan being both free and 
bound, both limited and limitless 
is anxious. Anxiety is the in-
evitable concomitant of the para-
dox of freedom and finiteness in 
which man is involved. Anxiety is 
the internal precondition of sin. 
It is the inevitable spiritual 
state of man, standing in the 
paradoxical situation of freedom 
and finiteness.2 
And he a dds tha t the Christi an answer to tha t anxious 
situation is to have faith in God. Faith in God's love 
would remove the anxiety.3 
Although Niebuhr perceives anxiety as the precondition 
of sin, he says that it of itself, is not sin. He writes, 
Yet anxiety is not sin. It must be 
distinguished from sin partly because 
it is its precondition and not its 
actuality, and partly because it is 
the basis of all human creativity 
as well as the precondition of sin.4 
Anxiety i s t herefore, in Niebuhr's thought, both constructive 
1 • Ibid. , 182. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 183. 
4. NADM, 183. 
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and destructive. And Niebuhr thinks it is exceedingly 
h ard to make a simple separ a tion between t he two aspects 
of anxiety. He points out that a p ar ent who, from anxiety 
over the well-being of his child , looks beyond the grave 
and provides an economic inheritance for him is demonstrat-
ing bo t h crea tive and destructive elements. He exhibits 
crea tiveness by seeking on the one hand to a chieve the 
perfection of love, and on the other, he "revea l s a will-
to-power reaching beyond the gr ave a nd seeking to defy 
death 1 s annulment of par ental authority '' .1 And he adds 
tha t the statesman is concerned both over the welfare 
of the n ation a s well a s his own presti ge. The philosopher 
is a nxious to f ind the truth, but he i s a lso concerned 
about proving t ha t h i s particular truth is the t r uth. 2 
Ther efore , in ma n, the r e is anxiety over perf ection a s 
well a s over insecurity. The crea tive and destructive 
aspects o f anxiety are bound together inextricably.3 
Moreover, according to Niebuhr, the errors which man 
makes in hi s pursuit of perfection are due not merely to 
i gnorance but a l s o to man ' s tendency to "hide hi s own 
limits , which he knows only too well11 • 4 He b elieves t ha t 
11 anxiety, as a permanent concomi tant of freedom, is thus 
both the sour ce of creativity and a temptation to s1n".5 
1. Ibid., 184. 
2. I bid. 
3· Ibid., 185 . 4. I bi d . 
5 · I bid. 
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The basi s of the temptation to s in, however, is man's 
inclina tion 11 either to deny the contingent ch ar acter of 
his existence •.• or to escape from h is freedom ••• "1 And 
man's crea tivity is t herefore stimula ted by t he end 
t owards whi ch he strives and by the uabyss of nothing -
ne ss into which he may f all". 2 Moreover, Niebuhr believes 
tha t man's "creativity is t h erefore a l ways corr upted by 
some eff ort to overcome contingency by raising precisely 
what is contingent to abs olute and unlimited dimensions''. 3 
Therefor e , the crea tive and destructive aspects of anx iety 
are ''inext r icably b ound together b y re a son of man 's . being 
anxious both to reali ze his unlimited pos sibilities and 
to overcome and to hide the dependent a nd contingent charac-
ter of his existence".4 
( 3) Pride 
According to Niebuhr's philosophy, there are two ways 
in which man attempts to reli eve himself of t he anxiety 
that a rises from hi s finiteness and freedom. One is his 
ef f ort to hi ae his f initeness by trying to comprehend the 
world into himself; the other is his attemp t to "hide his 
freedom by losing himself in some asp ect of the world's 
vi tali ties '' .5 When man attempts the other, he commits 
the sin of pride; and when he attempts the other, he 
1. NADM, 185 . 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 186. 
5. Ibid ., 179. 
commits the sin of sensuali t y. Niebuhr expresses the 
point in these words: 
Man falls into pride, when he seeks to 
raise his contingent existence to un-
conditioned significance; he falls into 
sensuality, when he seeks to escape 
from his unlimited possibilities of 
freedom, from the perils and re-
sponsibiliti es of self-determination, 
by immersing himself into a 'mutable 
good', by losing himself in some 
natural vitality.l 
And Niebuhr thinks that according to the Bible and 
Christianity the sin of pride is more fundamental than 
2 
the sin of sensuality. 
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For purposes of analysis and understanding, Niebuhr 
distingui shes three types of pride which it is man's 
na ture to manifest, even though these types a re never com-
pletely distinct in actual human behavior.3 lhe types of 
pride are: "pride of power, pride of knowledge, and pride 
of virtue or s~lf-righteousness."4 The pride or virtue 
becomes a fourth type when it manifests itself as an ex-
treme form of spiritual self-glorification. 
In Niebuhr's opinion, there are two forms of pride 
of power. The first is that pride which is expressed by 
persons who feel themselves to be secure in their present 
status. They have a sense of self-mastery which indicates 
that they do not recognize the contingent character of life. 
The second is that pride which is displayed by persons who, 
1. Ibid., 186. 
2. NADM, 186. 
3· Ibid., 188 . 
4. Ibid. 
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because of a feeling of insecurity, lust for greater power 
in order to gain a sense of well-being. In such people, 
"the d t f l d th f f ego oes no ee secure an ere ore grasps or 
more power in order to make itself secure".~ A broad 
distinction between these two types of pride of power is 
this; namely, one is the pride o f those who are already 
established while the other is the pride of those who 
are seeking to establish themselves. However, Niebuhr 
says tha t thi s is a "provisiona l distinction 11 because 
in a ctual human behavior the person mos t firmly established 
often exhibits a great will-to-power over others. He says, 
We have provisiona lly distinguished 
between the pride which does not recog-
nize human weakness and the pride which 
seeks power in order to overcome or 
obscure a recognized weakness; and we 
have sought to attribute the former to 
the more established and traditiona lly 
respected individuals and groups, while 
attributing the latter to the less se-
cure, that i s , to the advancing rather 
than established groups in society. 
This distinction is justified only if 
regarded as strictly provisional. The fact 
is that the proudest monarch and the most 
secure oligarch is driven to assert him-
self beyond measure partly by a sense of 
insecurity.2 
And Niebuhr supplements the point by saying that "the 
more man establi shes himself in power and glory, the greater 
is the fear of tumbling from his eminence, or losing his 
treasure, or being discovered in his pretensionu.3 
1. Ibid. , 189 • 
2. NADM, 192-193. 
3· Ibid., 193. 
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In concluding his a na lysis of the sin of pride, 
Niebuhr points out tha t it is human nature to genera te 
new and additional insecurities even when the more 
imme diate dangers of life h ave been destroyed. He s ays, 
The will-to-power is thus an expression 
of insecurity even when it has achieved 
ends which, from the p erspective of an 
or dinary mortal, would seem to guarantee 
complete security.l 
And he writes further, 
The fact that human ambitions know no 
limits must therefore be attributed not 
mere ly to the infinite capacities of the 
human imagination but to an uneasy rec-
ognition of man's finiteness, weakness 
and dependence, which become the more 
apparent the more we seek to obscure 
them, and which genera te ultima te perils, 
the more immedi a te insecuri t ies are elim-
inated. Thus ma n seeks to make himself 
God because he is betrayed by both his 
greatness and his weakness; and there 
is no level of greatness and -power in 
which the l~ sh of fe ar is not at least 
one strand in the whi p of ambition.2 
The t wo f orms of the pride of power are t herefore inter-
mixe d with each other, even though the a dvancing persons 
may exhibit a l a r ger degree of will-to- power than those 
a lready established. 
The second type of pride tha t Niebuhr discusses is 
intellectual pride. In some respects intellectual pride 
is a form of t he pride of power. Niebuhr says that 
"sometimes it is so deeply involved in the more brutal 
and obviou s p r ide of power th::~ t the t wo ca nnot be 
1. Ibi d., 194. 
2 . NADivi , 194. 
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1 
distinguished ''. By intellectual pride , Nieb uhr means 
"the pri de of reason which forgets t b...a t it is involved 
in a tempora l process and imag ines itself in complete 
transcendence over history" . 2 Intellectual pride, accord-
ing to Ni ebuhr, is derived in part from i gnorance of the 
finiteness of the human mind a~d in part from an attempt 
to disregard the contingent character of all human know-
ledge. Rulers, philosophers, a nd ordina ry people are al l 
guilty of the pr ide of rea son.3 The roots of intellec tual 
pride ar e insecurity and freedom. Niebuhr states it thus: 
There is in short no manifestation of 
intellectual pride in which the temptations 
of both human fre~dom a. nd human insecurity 
are not apparent.4 
And he makes this point more cogent by saying: 
I f man were not a free spirit who trans-
cends every s itua tion in which he is in-
volved he would have no concern for uncondi-
tioned truth and he would not be tempted 
to claim absolute validity for his partial 
perspectives. If he were completely im-
mersed in the contingencies and necessi-
ties of nature he would have only his own 
tr~th and would not be tempted to confuse 
his trut h with the truth • . But in that 
case he would have no truth at all, for 
no particula r event or value could be re-
lated meaningfully to the whole.5 
Man, in the opini on of Niebuhr, illustrates intellectUal 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid ., 195. 
3. Ibid., 194. 
4. Ibid., 197. 
5. NADivi , 197. 
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pride whenever he takes his pa rtial knowledge and 
attempts to make it universal. For instance, the leader 
of a na tion might seek to impose the ideology of his 
country upon the rest of the world, or the relig ious 
missionary might say in one breath tha t his culture is 
just one among many cultures a nd in the next breath seek 
to make his culture dominant over all inferior cultures.l 
The third type of pride which Niebuhr discusses is 
the pride of virtue or moral pride. Niebuhr defines moral 
pride as ''the pretension of finite man that his highly 
conditioned virtue is the final ri ghteousness and that 
his very relative moral standards are absolute" .2 Under-
lying moral pride is intellectual pride, for man uses his 
own concepts of truth as criteria for judg ing his own be-
havior as well as the behavior of others. And since man 
judges himself by his own standards, he finds himself good. 
But since he judges others by his own standard, he finds 
them evil, when they fail to live according to his standard.3 
Such is the nature of self-righteousness or moral pride. 
"Moral pride thus makes virtue the very vehicle of sin ••• , 
Niebuhr declares. Man mistakes his standards for God's 
standards, and judges all non-conformists as evil. And 
then he fails to see himself as a sinner. This is the 
quintessence of self-righteousness and the final proof that 
1. Ibid., 198. 
2. I bid., 199. 
3· Ibid. 
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man does not know God. 1 
The sin of moral pride issues into a more ultima te 
sin; namely, the sin of sp iritual pride in which the 
"self-deification implied in moral pride 11 becomes explicit. 2 
Niebuhr discusses spiritual pride as a fourth type of pride 
but he says that it is only an ultima te form of moral pride. 
Spiritual pride is reached "when our partial standards and 
relative attainments are explicitly rela ted to the uncondi-
tioned g ood, and claim divine sanction".3 Niebuhr points 
out that religion is not 11 an inherently virtuous human 
quest for God", as it is generally believed.4 '~tis merely 
a battleground between God and man's self-estee~. tt5 Man's 
reverence for God often turns into a kind of self-assertion 
at the end of which man either makes himself God or claims 
God as his exclusive ally.6 
Spiritual pride, however, is not an exclusive sin of 
strictly religious people, according to Niebuhr. So-called 
non-reli gious people also manifest relig ious pride. He 
claims tha t whenever any person, whether he is strictly 
religious or not, makes an unconditioned claim, he is 
guilty of spiritual pride. Niebuhr says that "it is not 
necessary to be explicitly religious in order to raise moral 
pride to explicit religious proportions".7 





6. Ibid., 201. 
7. Ibid., 202. 
Man's sin of pride involves some deception of man 
himself. Niebuhr says that this is true because of man's 
very nature. He iterates, "Man loves himself inordinate-
ly, 11 and says that this deception or dishonesty "must be 
1 
rega :.: ·ded as a concomitant ••• of self-love". Man has such 
a great devotion for himself that he mu s t find some ground 
for such devotion. Self-deception is his answer • . Al-
though man seeks to get others to accept his high regar d 
for himself, his main object is to convince himself of his 
own high importance. Hence man deceives himself, even 
before he is able to deceive others. And even as he de-
ceives others, he is primarily interested in deceiving 
himself. 2 
Such dishonesty is not born of ignorance merely, nor 
does it involve a conscious lie in every instance. Rather 
it is "a general state of confusion from which individual 
acts of deception arise 11 • 3 It involves some ignorance 
or i l lusion, for 11 the self as knower, finding its self-
consciousness at the very center of the world which it 
beholds 11 , tends to regard itself as the whole world. 4 
11 Yet the self as a determinate existence is obviously not 
5 the center of the world," Niebuhr says. Then he adds, 
11 The pretensions of the self therefore can be maintained 
only by wilful decept1on ••• "6 
1. NADM, 203. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 204-205. 
4. Ibid., 204. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 205. 
Niebuhr concludes his discussion on the relation 
between pr ide and dishonesty by pointing out that even 
as ma n tries to deceive himself he pays tribute to the 
truth. He says, 
This truth, which the self, even in its 
sin, never wholly obscures, is that the 
self, as finite and determinate, does 
not deserve unconditioned devotion.l 
Then he adds, 
All efforts to impress our fellowmen, 
our vanity, our display of power or 
of g oodness mu s t, therefore, be regarded 
as revela tions of the fact that sin in-
creases the insecurity of the self by 
veiling its weakness with veils which 
may be torn aside ••• Thus sin compounds 
the insecurity of nature with a fresh 
insecurity of spirit.2 
(4) The Sin of Sensuality 
In his effort to interpret the nature of man from 
a Christian point of view, Niebuhr holds tha t man is a 
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sinner and that his two chief sins are pride and sensuality. 
We h ave already g iven an exposition of Niebuhr's view of 
the sin of pride; we now present an interpretation of his 
idea of the sin of sensuality. 
Niebuhr raises the question as to whether sensuality 
is just another form of self-love. He then concludes that 
while self -love and sensuality are greatly mixed, they 
must nevertheless be provisionally distinguished from 
each other.3 
l. NADM, 206. 
2. Ibid., 207. 
3. Ibid., 228. 
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To explain the sin o !:' sensuality which is so much 
a part of man's nature, Niebuhr formula tes and then seeks 
to answer this question: 
Is sensuality ••• a form of idola try 
which makes the self god; Jr is 
it an alterna tive idolatry in 
which th e self, conscious of the 
inadequacy of its self-worship, 
seeks escape by finding some other 
god?l 
He answers this question by first analyzing the following 
forms of sensuality, namely, extravagance, drunkenness, 
and sexual license; and then by reaching certain conclu-
sion s from this analysis .2 
Speaking of "luxurious and extravagant li ving11 as 
a form of the sin of sensuality, Niebuhr says that some-
times extravagance is an attempt to display povver and to 
i~crease prestige. Or it may be a simple expression of 
the freedom which power secures. If extravagance is this, 
then it is a form of pride or self-love.3 But he adds 
that sometimes extravagance is a "frantic effort to escape 
from self". He says, moreover, 
The self, finding itself to be 
inadequate as the center of its ex-
istence, seeks for another god amidst the 
various forces, processes and impulses 4 of na ture over which it ostensibly presides. 
Niebuhr concludes tha t luxurious living as a form of 
1. Ibid., 233· 
2. NAD11, 234-240. 
3· Ibid., 234. 
4. Ibid. 
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sensuality reve als that the sin of sensuality is a mixture 
of self-love and an attempt to escape from the self. It 
is a form of idolatry in which the g od is either the self 
or some other idol. 
An analysis of drunkenness reveals the "same am-
bivalence of purpose", according to Niebuhr.l There are 
times when a drunkard desires the effects of alcohol 
"in order to experience a sense of power and importance 
which normal life denies him 11 • 2 Such intoxication is an 
attempt to make the self the center of the world in a 
manner which the normal reason will not allow. It is 
therefore a form of self-love. But there are other times 
in which the drunkard seeks alcohol and its effects in 
order to escape from himself' and from the world. 'I'hi s 
latter form of intoxication arises from a "sense of guilt, 
or a state of perplexity in which a sense of guilt has 
been compounded with the previous sense of insecuri ti'. 3 
And it is an effort to escape consciousness alto5ether. 
Niebuhr concludes that drunkenness shows the logic of sin 
which every person reveals: 
Anxiety tempts the self to sin; the 
sin increases the insecurity which 
it was intended to alleviate until 
some escape from t~e whole tension 
of life is sought. 
Turning his attention to sexual passion as a form of 
1. NADI~I , 234. 
2. Ibid. 
3· NADM, 235. 
4. Ibid. 
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or as an occasion for sensuality, Niebuhr points out that 
the sexual impulse is a very complex factor in human life. 
It is "subject to and compounded with the freedom of man's 
spirit" •1 Therefore it is involved in man's highest 
point of spirituality as well as in his lowest depth of 
insecurity. Sex is thus both an "instrument of compensa-
tion11 and an "avenue of escape". 2 Niebuhr implies that 
sex in man, looked at on a purely instinctive basis, is 
a peculiar phenomenon that involves the self and the other. 
The individual looks beyond himself to the preservation 
of the species. And Niebuhr adds that since the self 
and the other are involved in sexual passion, the spirit 
is able to use sex as an "assertion of the ego and the 
flight of the eg o into another" .3 He summarizes w1 th 
these words: 
The sexual act thus becomes, in 
human life, a drama in which the 
domination of one life over the 
desires of another and the self-
abnegation of the same life in 
favor of another are in bewilder-
ing conflict; ~nd also in baf f ling 
inter-mixture.4 
Yet involved in this drama is a ttcreative discovery of 
the self through its giving of itself to another''. And 
"thus the climax of' s e xu a 1 union is also a climax of 
creativity ani sinfulness", Niebuhr declares.5 
1. Ibid., 236 . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. NADM, 236. 
5. Ibid. 
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Sex in a nd of itself is not sinf ul. The sin arises 
from the fact that self-love, which originally disturbed 
the h a rmony of nature, is deeply involved in the sex 
impulse and sex instincts are very "effective tools" 
for self assertion a nd the escape from the self.l In 
this sense sex in man is an instrument of "self-deification" 
and also "the deification of another". 2 
Idolatry, either of the self or of another, is not 
the only sin involved in sex, according to Niebuhr's view. 
There is a further sin of escape into unconsciousness. 
Speaking of sex, Niebuhr says, 
It may serve as an anodyne. The ego, 
having found the worship both of self 
and of t he ot her abortive, may use the 
passion of sex, without reference to the 
self and the other, as a form of escape 
from the tension of life.3 
Commer ciali zed vice is an example o f such an esca pe from 
life or a t least from personal considera tion in the satis-
f action of the sexual desire. Sex, in Niebuhr's thinking, 
is a definite form of sensuality and sin. It is not a 
sin in itself , but it is a sin nevertheless because it 
involves self-love, deification of another, and as escape 
from both. Niebuhr expresses it thus, 
Thus sex reveals sensuality to be 
first another and fina l form of self-
love, secondly an effort to escape 
1. Ibid. , 237 • 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
self-love by the deification of 
another and finally as an escape 
from the futilities of both forms of 
idolatry by a plunge into unconscious-
ness.l 
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The conclusion which Niebuhr reaches regarding the sin 
of sensuality of which man everywhere is guilty is that 
sensuality in any form is: 
(1} An extension of self-love to the 
point where it defeats its own ends; 
(2) An effort to escape the prison house 
of self by findi ng a g od in a process 
or person outside the self; 
(3) And finally an effort to escape from 
the confusion which sin has created 
into some form of subconscious 
existence.2 
3· The Individual and the Group 
Thus far we h ave been considering the na ture of man 
as an individual apart from his relationships with the 
group. We now take up the problem of the nature of man 
in groups. We ask the QUestion whether Niebuhr thinks 
there is any difference in the nature of the individual 
as an individual . and the nature of the individual in 
groups. 
In The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr distinguishes 
group pride from the pride of individuals and thus implies 
that there is a difference between man as man and man in 
a group.3 He believes that group pride attains an authority, 
1. NADM, 239· 
2. Ibid., 240. 
3. Ibid., 208. 
over the individual th a t personal pride in one 1 s self is 
never quite capable of doing . Group pride a s it is ex-
pressed through the will of the state makes unconditioned 
claims upon individuals and for itself which an individual 
a s an individual could not make for himself . Hence group 
pride ha s a distinction which individua l pride ca nnot 
claim. 1 
The ver y na ture of socia l li fe i s such that individuals 
in group s make greater pretensions and larger claims than 
individuals as private persons. From this Niebuhr as serts 
unequivoca lly that group morality is lower t h an individua l 
morality. 2 He says th e group is even mo r e self-centered 
than ar e individuals. He s ays, 
The group is more arrogant, hypo-
cri t ical, self-centered and more 
ruthless in t he purs~it of its ends 
t han the indivi dual.) 
Thi s f a ct, according to Niebuhr, sets up a n ineluctable 
te nsion between individua l a nd group morality. Individ-
uals as individuals are endowed by n ature with symp athy 
and a concern for others. And through the use of the i r 
r a tiona l f aculties they broaden these na tive endowments 
to the point that they a re incline d t oward justice. But 
group s d o not h ave a s much reason a nd as much s elf -
transcendence as indi vi duals; hence they do not h ave as 
1. NADM, 208 . 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid. 
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much control over na tive impulses and as much ability to 
understand the needs of others. 1 Niebuhr expresses the 
point in this manner: 
In every human group there is less 
reason to guide and to check impulse, 
less capacity for self-transcendence, 
less ability to comprehend the needs 
of others and therefore more unre-
stra ined egoism than the individuals, 
who compose the group , reve al in their 
personal r ela tionships.2 
Speaking of the state as a social group , Niebuhr 
points out that the factor of will is more fundamental 
to the state than is the factor of mind. He ho lds that 
the state is often the organ of will for national egotism 
and racial bigotry. Because of its povvers of coercion 
and force, the state has a powerful will , but it has a 
mi nimum of mind in the sense of not being able fully to 
cri ti ci ze i ts elf and to transcend itself. Niebuhr calls 
the 11 prophetic minori ty11 the 11 mind11 of the state. 3 This 
11 minori ty 11 ;l.s therefore the organ of self-transcendence 
for the state, but its prophetic voice is often very weak 
and inarticu l a te. Because of this f act, the state ha s 
very little capacity for self-criticism; and it is there-
fore incapable of making high moral decis i ons. The state's 
morality is inevitably much lower than the individual's 
morality. On this point, Niebuhr points out that, 
1. W.US , xi. 
2. Ibid., Xi-xii. 
3· NADM, 210. 
the nation is a corpora te unity, held 
together much more by force and emo-
tion, t han by mind. Since there can 
b e no ethica l action without self-
criticism, and no self-criticism with-
out the rational capacity of self-
transcendence, it is natural that 
national attitudes c an ha rdly 
approxima te the ethical.l 
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And he states further that t he voice of criticism which 
the state does h ave i s often hushed before it is made 
ef f ective. He says, 
Even those tendencies toward self-
criticism in a na tion which do ex-
p ress themselves are usually thwarted 
by the gov erning classes and by a 
certain instinc~ for unity in 
society itself. 
In the state, g roup pride re ach es tre mendous hei ghts. 
It attains unto idolatry. Even the very forces that make 
for cohesion in the state--the forces of fe ar of power 
and reverence for ma jesty, lead toward the sin of idolatry. 
Especially does reverence for majesty reach religious 
levels a t times. And according to Niebuhr, such reverence 
is an inevitable concomitant of statehood.. Niebuhr insists 
that na tional pride can never be adequately expla ined on 
purely "na tural" grounds; rather it can be interpreted 
properly only in 11 spiritual" terms. He s ays, 
The most conducive (sic) proof that 
the egotism of nations is a character-
istic of the spiritual, a nd not 
1. M.MIS, 88. 
2 • IvUH S , 88 • 
merely an expression of the natural 
·impulse of survival, is the fact 
that its most typical expressions 
are the lust-for-power, pride ••• , 
contempt toward the other ••• , 1 hypocrisy, and ••. moral autonomy ••• 
The state makes inordin~te claims of being the 
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sustainer of ultimate values in a more plausible manner 
than the individual can make for himself. While the 
individual can and does make such claims for himself, he 
does not make the claims in a convincing manner, not even 
to himself. Therefore the state is an organ in which 
individual egotism reaches its greatest heights by 
making claims for the group which it hesitates to make 
for itself. It seems plausible to the individual for the 
state to pretend to be the final value. And Niebuhr says, 
It is plausible ••• only because the 
social unit, particularly the nation, 
to which the individual belongs, 
transcends the individual life to 
such a degree in power, majesty, and 
pseudo-immortality that the claim of 
unconditioned value can be made f~r 
it with a degree of plausibility. 
But when the nation pretends to be God, Nieb.uhr holds 
that it makes an ambiguous claim that involves a demand 
upon the individual and a demand which the individual 
makes upon himself in the name of the group. And he 
concludes that "collective pride is thus man's l ast, and 
in some respects most pathetic, effort to deny the determinate 
1. NADM, 211. 
2. NAD:tVI , 212. 
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and contingent character of his existence".l Moreover he 
writes, 
In its whole range from pride of 
family to pride of nation, collective 
egotism and group pride are a more 
pregnant source of injustice and 
conflict tha n purely individual 
pride.2 
In Niebuhr's final analysis, he concludes that the 
individual as such is a far more moral per son tb..an are 
individuals taken collectively. In his opinion, this is 
true b ecause of the very nature of man himself. It is 
impossible for collective man to be as moral as individual 
man. Human nature itself will not allow groups to be as 
moral as individuals.3 
3) Man as Image of God 
In Niebuhr's view of the nature of man, the 
concept of man as the image of God is very essential •. 
We therefore turn now to a consideration of his treatment 
of the view that man is created in God's image. 
(1) The Meaning of the Image of God 
After surveying and recording what the Bible and 
early Christian theologians had to say on the subject 
4 
of man as the ima ge of God, Niebuhr then sets forth his 
own view. Admitting that man is created in the image of 
God and accepting the biblical teachings on the fact of the 
1. Ibid., 213. 
2. Ibid. 
3· MlV1IS, xxiv, 9, 83. 
4. NADM, 150-166. 
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Fall, he rejects the theolog ical teaching that this image 
was destroyed by the Fall and rejects also the view that 
the Fall was an historical event. He states his rejection 
as follows: 
The rela tion of man's essential na ture 
to his sinful state cannot be solved 
within terms of the chronological 
version of the perf ection before the 
Fall. It i s , as it were, a vertical 
r a ther than horizontal rela tion. When the 
Fall is ma de an event in history rather 
than a symbol of an aspect of every 
historical moment in the life of man, 
the relation of evif to goodness in that 
moment is obscured. 
Upon making such a rejection, Niebuhr then interprets the 
meaning of the image of God by distinguishing 11 the essential 
na ture a nd structure of man" from "the virtue of conformity 
to that na ture" • 2 He asserts that "nothing can change 
the essential nature and structure"; never the less, he 
writes that '' the freedom of man creates the p:ossibili ty 
of actions which are contrary to and in defiance of the 
requirements of this essential nature" .3 Hence he holds 
that this fact makes the distinction justifiable. 
On the one hand, Niebuhr says that "the essential 
nature of man contains two elements". One of these 
elements consi sts of the following factors: man's 
"natural endowments and determina tions , his physical and 
social i mpulses, his sexual and racial diff erentiations, 
1. Ibid., 269. 
2. Ibid. 
3· NAD~ , 269. 
in short his character as a creature imbedded in the 
na tural order". The other element consists of 11 the 
freedom of his spirit, his transcendenc~ over natural 
process and finally his self-transcendence" •1 
On the other hand, Niebuhr believes the original 
virtue or perfection of man also contains two elements. 
The first element of his perfection is natural law. This 
law defines "the proper performance of his functions, the 
normal harmony of' his impulses and the normal social 
relation between himself and his fellows within the 
limitations of the natural order. "2 For Niebuhr, the 
na tural l aw is necessary only because of man's freedom 
and it distinguishes man's requirements 11 as a creature 
in the natural order from the special r equirements of his 
nature as free spiri t 11 .3 The second element of man's 
original perfection is faith, hope and love. And just as 
the virtue of na tural law corresponds to man's character 
as a creature of the na tural order, so his virtue of 
faith, hope and love corresponds to the freedom of his 
spirit.4 Therefore in Niebuhr's thinking, the concept 
of the image of God involves the essential na ture and 
structure of man and the original righteousness or per-
fection of man. For emphasis, we r epeat that man's essen-
tial nature consists of his na tural endowments and freedom, 
1. I bid ., 270. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 271. 
4. NADM, 270-271. 
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and his original perfection involves tbe n a tural l aw , 
faith, hope, a nd love . Taken together, man's essenti al 
nature and his origina l perfection constitute the image 
of God i n him . 
Niebuhr holds t hat the image of God was not destroyed 
by the Fall. He says rather t hat sin corrupted the image 
but it does not destroy it. He writes, 
This analysis of the matter leads 
to the conclusion that sin neither 
destroys the structure by virtue of 
which man is man nor yet eliminates 
the sense of obligation toward the 
essential n ature of man, which is 
the remnant of his perfection.l 
By disvowing the view which pl aces original perfection at 
a time before an historical Fall, Niebuhr believes tha t 
he corrects both Protestant and Catholic points of' view 
regarding the nature of original human nature and original 
perfection. Against Protestant thought, he maintains 
that 11 the image of God is preserved in spite of man 1 s 
sin". Aga inst Catholic thought, he eliminates "the 
unwarranted distinction between a completely lost original 
justice and an uncorrupted natural justice 11 • 2 
(2) The Locus of Original Perfection 
The original jus tice or perfection which is involved 
in Niebuhr's conception of Man's essential n ature is not 
located in a period before an historical Fall. It is 
located in empirical history, in the "now11 of every man's 
1. Ibid., 272. 
2 • Ibid. , 276 • 
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life. 1 It is loca ted in ma n not as a p os session but as 
consci ousness and memor y. Man does not pos se s s perfection; 
he h a s a memory or consciousness of perfection. It is 
in the 11 momen t of self-transcend ence t hat the conscious-
ne s s and memor y of original perfection ari se 11 • 2 Self-
transcendence, f or Niebuhr, means th at "the s elf makes 
itself its own object in s uch a way t hat the ego is 
finally a l ways subject and not. o bject". 3 The self, in 
its moments of self-transcendence, is aware of perfection; 
but when the s elf acts, the action is always sinful be-
cause it is never completely disinterested. Therefore, 
for Niebuhr, ''perfection before the Fall is ••• perfection 
u4 T before the act... . he act is interpreted broadly to 
include bo t h covert and overt action. Every time the 
anxious self thinks or moves, it a cts, but its action 
i s sinful.5 Niebuhr holds that this interpreta tion of 
the locus of the original perfection is in harmony with 
the biblical view wh en the F'all is understood symbolically • . 
He says, 
In p lacing the consciousness of 
original ri ghteousness in a moment 
of the self which transcends history, 
though not outside of the self which 
is in history, it may be relevant to 
observe that this conforms perfectly 
to the myth of the Fall when interpreted 
symbolically ••• Adam was sinless before 
1. Niebuhr, NADM, 211· 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 13-14. 
4. NADM, 278. 
5· Ibid. 
he acted and sinful in his first 
recorded action.l 
Niebuhr concludes the point with these words: "The 
original righteousness of man stands, as it were, 
outside of history. Yet it is in the man who is in 
u2 history ••• 
(3) The Content and Character of Perfection 
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Discussing the content of man's original perfection 
Niebuhr makes a tentative distinction between natural 
law and the law of man's freedom. He says that the 
natural law governs man's requirements as a creature while 
faith, hope, and love constitute the law of man's freedom 
and are his special requirements as a free spirit.3 He 
then points out that such a distinction should be tenta-
ti ve because, 
what is known as 'natural law' and what 
is known as 'original righteousness' are 
intimately related to each other not 
only by reason of a common involvement 
in sin but by reason of the fact that 
human freedom places the requirements of 
'original justice' as ultimate possibili-
ties pver the requirements of the 'natural 
law' .4 
The virtues of faith, hope, a nd love represent the 
original perfection of man in Niebuhr's conception of 
human nature.5 . According to him, faith, hope, and love 
are definite requirements of man's freedom. Faith in God 
1. Niebuhr, NADM, 279-280. 
2. Ibid., 280. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 285. 
5. Ibid., 280. 
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is necessary because without it man, through his freedom, 
is tempted to think of himself as self-sufficient. 
Without hope the future would appear as blind fate or 
caprice. Love is necessary because man's social life 
cannot exist merely up on man's gregarious impulse. 1 
Niebuhr says, 
Since men are separated from one 
another by the uniqueness and in-
dividuality of each spirit, however 
closely they may be bound together by 
ties of nature, they cannot rel ate 
themselves to one another in terms 
which will do justice to both the 
bonds of nature and the freedom of 
their spirit if they are not related 
in terms of love.2 
And he asserts that these requirements are "basic and not 
supplementary requirements" of man's freedom.3 Original 
righteousne ss , as faith, hope, and love, is present with 
sinful man now, but it is present as law or requirement.4 
Speaking of original righteousness as present in 
sinful man as law, Niebuhr says, 
The original righteousness which 
sinful man has supposedly lost is in 
reality present with him as the 
ultimate requirement of his freedom. 
Because man is not merely creature 
but also free spirit, and because 
every moral norm stands under higher 
possibilities by reason of his freedom, 
there is no moral standard at which the 
human spirit can find rest, short of 
the standard of faith, hope and love .5 
1. Ibid., 271. 
2. NADM, 271. 
3· Ibid., 272. 
4. Ibid. , 28 0 • 
5. Ibid., 286. 
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~. Emergent Issues. 
From the representative views of human nature that 
have been presented, three fundamental problems h ave 
emerged. They are here formulated in terms of three 
quest ions: 
(1) Wha t is the nature of the self? 
(2) What is the role of society in 
the development of the self? 
(3) What are the possibilities and 
limitations of individual and 
social morality? 
To compare a nd contrast Cooley, Mead, Brightman, and 
Niebuhr on these problems will be the task of this section 
of the dissertation. 
1) The Problem of the Self 
On t he one h a nd, Brightman claims that a self can 
be defined best in te r ms of consciousness, and on the other 
hand , Me ad agrees. But in the next breath Mead rej e cts 
Brightman's initial point that any consciousness is a self. 
To Brightman's statement: 
The word self is used for any a nd 
every consciousness, however simple 
or complex it may be. A self is any 
conscious situation experienced as a 
whole. Each 'empirical situation' is 
a self. All consciousness is self-
experience; but self-experience is not 
properly called self-consciousness (re-
f lective self-consciousness) unless the 
self in question h a s the special attri-
bute of being able to think about the 
fact that it is a self in addition to 
the fact t haf it experiences sensations 
and desires. 
1. PR, 350. 
Mead says: 
It is unfortuna te to fuse or mix up 
consciousnes s , as we ordinarily use that 
term, and self-consciousness • . Conscious-
ness, as frequently used, simply has 
reference to the field of experience, but 
self-consciousness refers to the ability 
to call out in ourselves a set of definite 
responses which belong to the others of 
the group. Consciousness and self-
consciousness a re not on the same level.l 
Bri ghtman differentiates consciousness from self-
consciousness by calling consciousness self-experience 
and defining self-consciousness as reflective self 
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consciousness. However, he decla res t ha t the term self 
can be properly u sed for both. Mead, however, limits the 
term self to mean the human self. For him lower animals 
ar e not selves. He says, "The intellig ence of the lowe r 
forms of animal ltfe •.• does not involve a self. 11 2 But 
Br igh t man d.Lse.gree s and says that "compa rative psychology 
makes it probable that self-experience, if not self-
3 
consciousness, extends to the lowest forms of animal life 11 • 
And he states further that while man cannot presume to 
understand just how consci ousnes s feels to the lower anima ls 
that have it, nevertheless he does say "there is g ood 
reason to believe that every living being experiences 
itself as a self" •4 Brightman does however call animal 
consciousness a minimum self and human consciousness a 
1. MSS, 163. 
2. Ibid., 135· 
3. PR , 350. 
4. Ibid. 
1 persona l self. 
For purposes of thi s disserta tion, the term self 
from this point forward will be limited to the human self 
because the main problem is the nature of huma n nature. 
Befor e presenting the points of agreement and disa-
greement among the representative views on the question 
of t h e n ature of the self, the question of the origin of 
the human self will be discussed. On the ma tter of the 
orig in of human selves, Cooley assumes t ha t the infant is 
born with a substantive soul which i s developed and re-
fined through the social process. He says, 
The emotion or feeling of self 
may be regarded as an instinct, 
doubtless evolved in connection 
with its important function in stimula ting 
and unifying the special activities of 
individuals • •• It seems to exist in a 
vague though vi gorous form a t the birth 
of each indivi dual, and ••• to be refined 
and developed by experience • • • 2 
Commenting on Cooley's idea, Mead says, 
Cooley ••• endeavors to find the basis of 
the self in reflexive affective ex-
reriences, i.e., experiences involving 
self-feeling ' ; but the theory that the 
nature of the self is to be found in 
such experi ences does not account for 
the origin of the self, or of the self-
feeling which is supposed to characterize 
such experiences. 3 
Then Mead adds that Cooley is committed to an individual-
istic or substantive view of the orig in of the human self 
in spite of his grea t emphasis upon the role of tbe social 
1. Page 48 of this dissertation. 
2 . Cooley, HNSO, 139· 
3· MSS , 173• 
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process in the development of human personality.l Mead 
declares th at Cooley's social psychology is 'inevitably 
introspective' and tha t in his psychological method 
11 
society really has no existence excep t in the individual 1 s 
mi nd, and the concept of the s elf as in any sense intrin-
sically s oci a l is a product of imagina tion11 .2 
In contradistinction to Cooley, Mead asserts that the 
human self is a social product which .is never initially 
present a t birth.3 He says, tti have been presenting the 
self and the mind in terms of a social process ••• ••4 And 
then a little l 3ter Mead supplements his point with, 
Wha t I want particularly to emphasize 
is the temporal and logical p re-
existence of the social process to 
the self-consgious individual that 
arises in it.? 
In other words for Mead, the social process is prior to 
the development of selves; but for Cooley, the individual 
is prior t o the social process. 
Although Brightman rejects the view that individuals 
possess substantive souls, he nevertheless believes that 
selves as consciousness are prior to the social process 
6 . 
as well as prior to everything else. He says that mind 
or consciousness is immediate and that 11 consciousness is 
l • . Ibid., 224. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Mead, MSS , 135· 
4. Mead, MSS, 186. 
5. Ibid. 
6. PI, 13 • 
given as an unescapable fact 11 .i And he writes, 
We may even go further and say that 
not only is mind immedi ate, but also 
nothing but mind is immediate.2 
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Therefore, for Brightman, mind is the datum; a nd for him, 
mind is also consciousness and consciousness is the self. 
Hence t h e s elf is g iven at birth an~ is therefore prior 
to the social process. He rejects the view that the bio-
log ical situa tion is the given or datum of man's psycho-
logica l history. He says, 
The very knowledge that we have a body 
and tha t there i s an environment i s the 
outcome of thought about our experience. 
Biology is a scientific achievement; 
it is a system and not a datum either for 
an infant or for a biolog ist. The notion 
that we start with biological situation 
is a sophisticated ou t come of scientific 
reflection, not an account of the ex-
perienced datum with which we are presented 
at the start.3 
To supplement this point, Brightman writes t hat, 
self-experience is a name far a trait of all 
consciousness and is to be distinguished 
from reflective self-consciousness, a 
relatively infrequent process in which 
we think about ourselves. The da tum is 
always self-experi ence, but only rarely 
does it contain reflective self-conscious-
ness. We exist even
4
when we do not think 
about our existence. 
Brightman believes that the datum self develops in and 
through its environment and that many qualities of 
personality emerge during its growth.5 Ther e is correlation 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 15-16. 
4. Brightman, PI, 18. 
5. P . 49 of the dissertation. 
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between Brightman and Mead as regards emergent qualities 
of the self and personality. ·when Mead speaks of the whole 
self, including the "I" and the ''me 11 , his conception of 
the self is equivalent to Brightman's meaning of person. 
However t here i s disagreement between Brightman a nd Mead 
relative to whether self-experience is a trait of all 
consciousness. Mead feels that the term self should be 
used to refer only to that consciousness which is reflective 
intelligence.1 Consciousness as the subjective experiences 
of the individual such as pain and pleasure should not be 
called self-experience. For Brightman, all consciousness 
is self-experience. 
In Niebuhr's view, the human self is present at 
birth. And although it is subject to development through 
the social process, it is not a social product. Speak-
ing of human life in a primitive society, Niebuhr points 
out that primitive man is at first engulfed in the 
"primeval We " of the life of the group. But eventually 
the primitive individual emerges from the group with a 
deep sense o f self-hood that, 
he emerges from this group consciousness 
only gradually as an individual. But 
what emerges is an original endowment, 
present from the beginning.2 
Therefore for Niebuhr, in diametrical opposition to Mead, 
the self is an original endowment, subject to development 
1. MSS , 165. 
2. Niebuhr, NADM , 165. 
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and modification. 
Regarding Mead's social theory of the mind, Niebuhr 
says, 
Efforts to explain the emergence of 
II i d 11 ' m n , tnat is of human freedom, in 
purely sociological terms are self-
contradictory, sometimes to an 
amusing degree.l 
Th en he observes that while Mead's view has 11 nothing to 
commend 1 t but rigorous consi stency 11 , Mead even sacrifices 
this consistency by pointing out that only the human nervous 
system makes possible the kind of social rela tions and 
social interactions in which selves can arise. 2 
Consequently, of the four representative views of 
human nature presented in this dissertation, only that 
view given by Mead holds that the social process is prior 
to the self or consciousness. And even Mead recognizes 
that the "I" or the "biologic individual" is primordial.3 
Cooley, Brightman, and Niebuhr place the self first and 
then describe the social process which aids in the develop-
ment of the self. 
Turning from the discussion of the origin of the human 
self to a consideration of its nature, the point that 
stands out most prominently is the importance which is 
given to consciousness. Brightman asserts emphatically 
that the human self is consciousness which also includes 




reflective self-consciousne ss . Hie viev is therefore 
fundamentally cognitive, though it includes all feelings 
as well a s sensations because for Bri ghtman the t erm 
consciousness reaches from the rawest sensation to the 
1 
most complex thought. Mead agrees with Brightman that 
the fundamental aspect of the self is cognitive. Mead says, 
Emphasis should be laid on the central 
position of thinking when considering 
the nature of the self. Self-conscious-
ness, rather than affective experience 
with its motor accompaniments, provides 
the core and primary structure of the 
self, which is thus essentially a 
cognitive r~ther than an emotional 
phenomenon . 
Even though Brightman and Mead agree on the primacy of 
consciousness, they disagree on what the term consciousness 
should include. For Mead , in respect of the human self, 
consciousness refers to reflective intelligence that is 
able to take the attitude of the other to ward itself.3 
For Bri3htman, in respect of the personal self, conscious-
ness not only includes reflective intelligence but also 
all the characteristics of the personal self.4 Along 
with Mead and Brightman, Niebuhr stresses the importance 
of mind or consciousness as constituting the nature of 
the self. However, he does not minimize the place of 
bodily feelings and impulses in human nature. Cooley em-
phasizes the affective aspects5of human nature, stressing 
1. Brightman, PI, 5. 
2. Mead, MSS, 173. 
3· Ibid., 165. 
4. Brightman, PR, 352-353· 
5. Cooley, HNSO, 139. 
what Mead calls feeling-consciousness.l Cooley says, 
There ca n be no final test of the 
self except t he way we feel; it is 
that toward which we h 3.ve the "my 
attitude".2 
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In a simila r manner, Bri ghtman writes, 11 The whole mind ••• 
is a ll consciousness which belongs to what I call 'me'; 
all my experience 11 • 3 This includes the experience of 
past, present, and future. In opposition to Brightman, 
Mead, a nd Niebuhr, Cooley claims that the primary aspect 
of the self is a n instinctual feeling . 
In Niebuhr 's statement that man is both a creature 
of · na ture and s~1rit, 4 he raises the question of the rela-
tion of consciousness to the body or more sp ecifically 
to the nervous system . He cl aims that the self or con-
sciousness is grounded in a physical organism which gives 
the self its vitalities and its particula rity. And although 
man is c apable of viewing the world as an other and of 
making himself an object to himself, his self-transcendence 
is a l ways limited by and closely rela ted to his animal 
nature. Niebuhr always discusses mind and body together, 
only distinguishing them for purposes of further under-
standing but never separ a ting them completely. 
Mead claims that mind as he conceives it is not 
limited to the nervous system. He says: 
1. Mead, MSS, 164. 
2. HNSO, 140. 
3. APOI, 5. 
4. Page 62 of the dissertation. 
In defending a social theory of mind 
we are defending a functional, as 
opposed to any form of substantive or 
entitive, view of its nature. And in 
particular, we are opposing all intra-
cranial or intra-epidermal views as to 
its character and locus. For it follows 
from our social theory of mind that 
the field of mind must be co-extensive 
with, and include all the components of, 
the field of the social process of 
experience and behavior, i.e., the matrix 
of social r e l ations a nd interactions among 
individuals, which is presupposed by it, 
and out of which it arises or comes into 
being. If mind is socially constituted, 
then the field or locus of any given 
individual mind must extend as far as 
the social activity or apparatus of 
social relations which constitutes it 
extends; and hence that field cannot be 
bounded by the skin of the iniividual 
organism to which it belongs. 
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For Mead , a lthough the mind or self is a product solely 
of the social process, the capacity in the individual for 
developing a mind is a product of biological evolution. 
Niebuhr says th at it is at this point that Mead sacrifices 
the consistency of his theory. Mead describes the import-
ance of the body in relation to the mind in these words: 
The human being's physiological capacity for 
developing mind or intellig ence is a 
product of the process of biological 
evolution just as is his whole organism; 
but the actual development of his mind 
or intelligence itself, given that capacity, 
must proceed in terms of tbe social situation 
wherein it gets its expression and import; 
and hence it itself is a product of the 
process of social evolution, the process 
of social experience and behavior.2 
1. MSS, 223n. 
2. MSS, 226n. 
Brightman's personalistic point of view assumes 
that there is interaction between the mind {self) and 
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the body. 1 Brightman not only holds that there is inter-
action between the mind and the body but that in a sense 
the mind depends on the ner vous system. He expresses this 
rela tionship thus: 
The unity of human personality must 
be due to a cause beyond man. The 
nervous system is the area where 
that cause operates. If the nervous 
s ystem is known to be ma terial sub-
stance, independent of anw mind, then 
personality is an "epiphenomenon" and 
its unity is only that of a shadow. 
But if the nervous system is what 
i dealism and theism take it to be, 
namely, an expression (or creation) 
of mind, then the dependence of 
human personality on its nervous 
system is an instance of the dependenc e 
of human mind on cosmic mind. The choice 
between these two explanations will ul-
timately be determined by the rel ative 
coherence o f each with all the empirical 
facts of personal experience.2 
In the fina l analysis, Brightman subscribes to a theory 
of interactionism.3 And he holds tha t the body a nd 
especially the central nervous system is a f a ctor in the 
mind's environment. He says, 
The physiological organism, es-
pecially the brain and central 
nervous sys tem, seems to be the 
nearest environment of mind. That 
brain and nervous s ystem are environ-
ment and not mind itself is evident 
from the fact that mo st of the time 
1. Bri ght man, PR , 357. 
2. Ibid ., 354n. 
3. Bri gl.1. tman, I P , 207. 
the mind i s not even conscious of 
having a brain and nervous system; 
that they are actual environment 
is shown by physiological psychology .l 
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Cooley holds tha t the mind or self i s not tbe b ody, even 
thoug h people tend to attach the self to the material body. 
He writes, 
As many people h ave the impression that 
the verifiab le self, the object that we 
name with 11 I 11 is usually the ma terial 
body, it may be well to sa~ that this 
impression is an illusion. 
And l ater he adds tha t the term "I'', in ordinary usage, 
refers "chiefly to opinions, purposes, desires, claims, 
and the like, conc erning matters that involve no thoug ht 
of the body 11 .3 Yet in as much as Cooley defines the 
self in terms of self-feeling or sentiment, i t is true 
to say t hat for him the bo dy and the self are closely 
rela ted . 
In its true nature, the personal self, according to 
Me ad , is an organ i zation of attitudes which are taken from 
the othe r s and from the total community. It is more 
cognitive than affective. This organization cons titute s 
the "me". But the self not only includes the social "me"; 
it a lso involves an ''I'' which. is creative and responsive 
and is not a s ocieta l construct. The 11 I 11 as capaci t.y to 
react and respond originates wi th the inception of the 
organism . However in Co oley' s theory, tr~ personal self 
1. Bright man, PI, 25. 
2. Coole y , HNSO, 144. 
3. Ibid. 
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is a n~tive affective entity whose sens~ of self-feeling 
grows and expands through social processes. Then accord-
ing to Bri ghtman, the p ersonal self is a complex conscious-
ness t hat is self-identifying, selective, purposive , sensi-
tive, and rationa l. Through memory and anticipation, the 
self is a rela tively unified whole. ~or Niebuhr, the 
personal self is a product of nature and spirit whose 
creature lines s is grounded in nature and whos e freedom 
is rooted in spirit. It is transcendent of the world 
and it is al so se lf-transcendent. Self-transcendence is 
a cha r acteristic of human consciousness in Niebuhr's 
philosophy, as well as in Brightman's and Meads. 
2) The Individual and Society 
Thi s section of the dissertation answers the 
question: Wha t is the role of society in the development 
of the personal self? 
In Mead's social theory, the self is a direct result 
of the soci e. l process and t:part from society there is not 
even a rudimentary self. Biologic individuals are creatures 
of biological evolution; yet biological individuals are 
endowed with capacities of reaction ~~d response which 
show that life involves both physical and psychic qualities. 
However, personal selves are products of the social process. 
Mead writes, 
Our contention is that mind can 
never find expression, and could never 
h ave come into existence at all, ex-
cept in terms of a social environment; 
that an organized set or pattern 
of social rela tions and inter-
a ctions (especially those of commun-
ication by means of gestures functioning 
as significant symbols and thus creat-
ing a universe of di s course) is necessa rily 
presupp osed by it and involved in its 
nature.l 
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In rel ation to this point, Brightma n s a ys, 11 The private 
self is in active interrela tion with its environment. 
The priva te self is social and the social self is private . 112 
Opp osing the view that mind is prior to the social 
process, Mead says that "the mind presupposes, and is a 
product o f , the social p~ocess 11 • 3 For Mead , the self 
emerges aEi the human organism responds and reacts t brough 
gestures and communication and thereby takes the role of 
others. ~~he individual is an other before he is a self, 
for the sE~lf is gained by taking the attitudes that others 
have of tile individual and seeing oneself as they see 
him. Mead says that the self can only become an object 
to itself by being able to take the attitudes of others. 
For him, the social self is an organization of the 
attitudes of the other and the generalized other which 
the individual carries with himself. The locus of the 
social s elf or mind is therefore as extensive as the social 
processe;;, out of which the self arises. 4 
In Cooley's view the individual begins life with a 
vague feeling of self-consciousness. But this 
1. Iv1SS , :223 . 
2. PAR, :37 . 
3· MSS, '224 
4. Mead, MSS, 223n . 
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undif f erentiated feeling or sentiment is developed 
through th e social process until full personal;\. ty is 
achieved. Although the infant is born with a sense of 
self-feeling, he is a soci a1 creature, for only in 
society ca.n his self-feeling be expanded and differentiated 
in to various sentiments. Thus, for Cooley, no sharp line 
of demarcc:.t ion can be drawn between the individual and 
society. For him, the individual is social and society 
exists in the imaginations of individuals. He says, 
Self-feeling has i t s chief scope within 
the general life, not outside of it ••• I 
Cooley states that the self in its relation with society 
develops what may be called a "reflected or looking 
2 glass self 11 • The looking glass self involves three main 
elements; namely, 
the imagination of our appearance 
to the other person, the imagina-
tion of his judgment of that appear-
ance, and some sort of self-feeling, 
such as pride or mortification.3 
The reflective self is a phase of social consciousness 
about whtch Cooley states: 
Social consciousness, or awareness of 
society, is inseparable from self-
consciousness, because we can ha rdly 
think of ourselves excepting with 
reference to a social group of s orne 
sort, or of the group e~cept with 
reference to ourselves. 
Accordine; to Cooley, the self is developed in primary 
1. Cooley, HNSO, 147. 
2. Ibid., 152. 
3· Ibid. 
4. so' 5. 
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groups. The primary group, being a face to face social 
unit, offers the individual a close intimate type of 
association in which he "lives in the feeling of the whole 
and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling 11 .1 
Although, for Cooley, society presupposes the individual, 
nevertheless it is in society that the individual develops 
himself into a real person. The chief primary groups 
are the family, the play ground, and the neighborhood. 
And these groups constitute the nursery of human nature. 2 
The instincts that are born in the individual and the 
sentimente. which the individual has gained fran society 
are woven together in the individual by the primary 
group in Eluch a manner that it can be said that human 
nature i tEl elf is a product of the primary groups. The 
uni versalj. ty of primary groups accounts for tbe universal-
i ty of certain traits of human nature. 3 Thus in Cooley' s 
view the Belf which begins as mere self-feeling in the 
infant bec~omes the social self in the adult. 
Whil•:: Mead certers his discussion on the manner in 
which the social groups produce selves by enabling individ-
uals mentally to take the attitudes of others and thereby 
become selves, Cooley gives attention mainly to the role 
which social groups play in helping individuals to broaden 
their n e. ti ve fee lings and to use their imaginations in 
1. Ibid., 23. 
2. Ibid., 30. 
3. Ibid. 
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developing and refining themselves. Hence while Mead's 
theory is completely social, accounting for both the rise 
and development of selves in a social ma nner, Cooley's 
theory is only pa rtially social, grounding self-feeling 
in the nature of the organism and accounting for the 
growth of the self through the social process. 
Bri ghtman, approaching the problem of the role of 
the group in the development of the individual, takes a 
philosophical rather than a socio-psycholog ical attitude 
toward the question and says th at there are six factors 
in the self's environment. They are: 
(1) the biological 
(2) the physical 
(3) the social 
(4) the subconscious (5) the logical and ideal 
(6) the metaphysicall 
Regarding the influence of the social environment upon 
the mind, Brightman says, 
Other minds, as individuals or groups, 
communicate with ours chiefly by means 
of behavior which affects our organism 
through physical media. But minds ac-
quire the ability to understand other 
minds more and more intelligently and 
sympathetically as they interpret 2 
their attitudes, purposes, and beliefs. 
The prope r way to interpret the rel~tionship between the 
social environment and mind is to describe the relation 
"in te rm s of stimulus and response, or adjustment, provided 
these ter ms are not defined in a narrowly biological 




sense". For Brightman, a stimulus is any power that 
affects minds, whether it affect the organism is 
irrelevant . Hence for him, the adjustments that count 
are those tha t make a difference in consciousness. 2 
When social groups act as stimuli to the mind , the mind 
resp onds because the mind is active . Moreover, in social 
and reli gious rela tion s the environment is always mental 
and therefore the social environment. undoubtedly af f ects 
the minds of others. In his book, Nature ang Values, 
Brightman writes that, 
within myself I find many ex-
periences which I can explain only 
as due to the aetion on me of other 
persons in my environment . I am 
aware of sights and sounds and 
feelings which , although they are 
my experience, are certainly not 
produced by my effort or choice and 
which cannot be explained as a re-
sult of my experience up to this 
time.3 
Individuals do communica te with each other and thereby 
influence each other. In the l ast analysi 8 , Brightman 1 8 
personalistic theory holds that 11 reality is social through 
4 
and through 11 • According to Brightman, 
every personal e~perience includes 
something which the person did not 
invent or create, but which he re-
ceived from his interaction and 
communication with other person8 .5 
In as much as Brightman regards the entire universe as a 
1. Brightman, PI, 28. 
2. Ibid ., 29. 
3 · l\TV , 65. 
4. Ibid. , 117 . 
5 . Ibid. 
society of persons, he undoubtedly recognizes that 
society plays an important part in the development of 
personality . 1 
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When Niebuhr talks about the rela tionship of society 
t o the individual, he points out first t hat man is tied to 
man by the very nature with which he is endowed. He 
says , "Man is endowed by nature with organic relations to 
his fellow men ••• 112 Be cause of the long infancy of the 
child and the gradual development of intelli3ence and 
imag ina tion, man, spurred by the necessi ties o f social con-
flicts, has a lways lived in social groups and has constant-
ly increased the size of the groups. 3 Secondly, he empha-
sizes t he point tha t man achieves his l a r gest self-
realization as well a s his greatest sin within the ma trix 
of social living . In Niebuhr's thinking , "The society in 
which each man lives is a t once the b asis f or , and the 
nemesis of, tha t fulness o f li f e which each man seeks ."4 
Only in society can man practice t he relative virtues of 
which he is cap able, and only in society can man give ex-
pression to his capacity for self pride in its ultimate 
de gree. On the one hand, Niebuhr writes, 
One must conclude that the real 
structure of life, the dependence 
of man up on his fellowmen for in-
stance, which requi r es both organic 
1. I P , 211. 
2. MMIS, 2. 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 1. 
and loving relations between them, 
asserts itself, in spite of all 
errors, against the confusion which 
human egotism and pride introduces 
into the rela tions of men.l 
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And on the other hand while referring to the na tionalistic 
state, Niebuhr says, 
Collective egotism does indeed offer 
the individual an opportunity to lose 
himself in a larger whole; but it also 
offers him possibilities of self-
aggrandizement beside which mere in-
dividual pretensions are implausible 
and incredible.2 
While Niebuhr recognizes the close rela tionship between 
the individual and the group, he approaches this relation-
ship from the point of view of the individual and works 
out to society. This is in direct opposition to Mead who 
starts vnth society and works toward the individual. 
3) The Problem of Individual and 
Social Morality 
For Niebuhr, individual morality is on a higher 
plane than social morality. He says, 
Individual men may be moral in the 
sense that they are able to con-
sider interests other than their 
own in determining problems of con-
duct, and are capable •.• of preferring 
the advantages of others to their own ••• 
But •.• these achievements are more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for human 
societies and social groups.3 
Niebuhr believes that an individual will commit immoral 
acts in the name of the group which he would not commit 
1. NADivi , 275. 
2. NADM, 212. 
3· MMIS, xi. 
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in the name of himself. But on the othe r hand Cooley says 
that, 
if the life of the group is delib-
erate and sympathetic, its expression 
may be morally hi gh, on a level not 
merely of the averas e member, but of 
the most competent, of the best.l 
Cooley believes th at the group may act on as high a moral 
level as the best individuals in the group because it is 
possible through communication and organization to expand 
social sympathy to a great degree and to increase social 
consciousness (wha t one thinks of others) and public con-
sciousness (a collective view of the latter) to include 
the whole community however extensive. After analyzing 
the way in which the primary group ideals may be extended 
to the l a r ger society, Cooley writes, 
The present epoch, then, brings with 
it a l arger and, potentially at least, 
a higher and freer consciousness. In the 
individual aspect of life this means that 
each one of us has, as a rule, a wider 
grasp of situations, and is thus in a 
position to give a wider application to 
his intelligence, sympathy, a nd con-
science. In proportion as he does this 
he ceases to be a blind agent ani becomes 
a r a tional member of the whole.2 
And in Cooley's view persons whose minds (using the term 
mind in a broad sense to include sympathy and conscience) 
have been thus extended by and within the social process 
are neither better nor worse than the institutions of 
which they are a part • . Cooley says empha tically, 
1. so, 124. 
2. so, 116. 
It is a mistake to suppose that 
the person is, in general, better 
than the institution. Morally, as in 
other respects, t here are advantages on 
each side. The person has love and as-
pirations and all sorts of warm, fr esh, 
plastic, impulses, to which the insti-
tution is seldom hospitable, but the 
latter has a sober and tried goodness of 
the ages, the deposit, little by little, 
of what has been found practicable in the 
wayward and transient outreacbings of 
human idealism.l 
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And in regard to the way in which nations treat nations 
and individuals behave toward other individuals, Cooley 
writes, 
A similar line of reasoning applies to 
the popular ~allacy that a nation is of 
necessity less moral in its dealings 
with· other nati one than an individual 
with other individuals. International 
morality is on a low plane because it 
is recent and undeveloped, not from 
any inevitable defect in its nature ••• 
If we set our hearts on having a 
righteous state we can h ave one more 
righteous than any individual.2 
For an illustration of states acting moral ly, Cooley gives 
the following: 
The treatment of Cuba by the United 
States and the suppression of the 
slave-trade by the British are ex-
amples of nations acting upon gen-
erous principles which we may rea-
sonably expect to extend as time 
goes on. As the need of interna-
tional justice and peace becomes 
keenly felt, its growth becomes as 
natural as the analogous process in 
an individual.3 
1. Ibid., 322 • 
2. Coole y , SO, 322-323· 
3· Ibid., 323. 
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Over against Niebuhr's sta tement, 
Since there can be no ethical action without 
self-criticism, and no self-criticism 
without the r a tional capacity of self-
transcendence, it is natural t ba t na-
tional attitudes c an h ardly approximate 
the eth ical.l 
Cooley has t h is to say: . 
The central fact of history, from a psy-
cholog ical point of view, may be said 
to be the gradual enla r gement of social 
consciousness a nd r a tional cooperation. 
The mind constantly, though perhaps not 
regularly, extends the sphere within 
whi ch it makes its higher po wers valid. 
Human n a ture , po ss e ssed of ideals mould ed 
in the fa mily a nd the commune, is ever 
striving, somewhat blindly for the most 
_part, with tho se dif f iculties of COlTh'TI Un-
ication a nd organization which obstruc t 
their realization on a l a r ger scale.2 
Then Cooley comments that a ll exceptions to t he rule may 
be 11 explained as cases of irregu l ar growth 11 .3 
Wt;.en Mea d approa ches the p roblem o f individual ani 
soci al morality, he points out fir st that tbe individual 
is the instrumen t of moral progress . However, secondly, 
he argues t ha t the individual is alway s an "I" and a "Me ". 
The "I 11 is the resp onsive incalculab le phase of the self, 
while the " Iv~e" i s the organized attitudes of the othe rs , 
constituting the social control of t he individual. Ordin -
arily the " 1 11 re sponds in simple conformity t o the "Me '', 
and thus the morall ty of the individual is the morality 
of the g r oup . Howeve r , t here are times when the 11 1 11 of 
1 . Ibid ., 113. 
2 . I bid ., 114 . 
3· 
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the ind i v i du a l acts on a higher l evel of mora lity than 
is ind ic a te d by the soci al 11 Me 11 of tha t indivi dual. And 
there ar-e other times when the 11 1 11 behaves on a lower 
p l ane of morality t han t he s oci al ":DJ1e 11 wo uld sanction. 
According to l ead, the expla nation for each of these re-
spon ses is to be f ound in the community, and not to be 
found in any theory of pure individuality. In the fi rst 
p lace, when the individual acts on a moral level which 
seems higher t he.n his community, Mead points out that the 
ind ivi du a l is not acting as a n individual per se, but he 
is ac ti ng in reference to a higher social 11 Me 11 • . And he 
claims that this higher social 11 Me 11 is always imp lied 
but not adequately exp ressed in the community of which 
the indi vidual is a member. For instance, Mead claims 
tha t Jesus, Buddha, · ocrates, and all other unusual 
persons c an be exp l ained in t e rms of their taking t he atti-
tude of t he l ar ger society, 1 acting in reference to it 
instead of resp ondi n g merely to the ordinary attitudes of 
his society . Speaking of Jesus, Budaha, and Socrates, and 
the l a r ger social 11 Me 11 to which they resp onded, Mead writes, 
Wha t has g iven them their unique im-
portance i s that they have taken the 
attitude of living with reference to 
a l ar ger society. That l ar ger state 
was one which was already more or 
less imoli ed in the institutions of 
the community in which they lived. 
Such an individual is divergent from 
the point of view of what we would 
call the prejudices of the community; 
but in another sense he expresses the 
principles of the c omrnuni ty more com-
pletely than any other.2 
1. Mead, MSS, 217. 
2 . IV'J.SS , 217 . 
Therefore the p erson who is hi ghly moral is merely ex-
pressing t he principles already implied in his community 
but is disregarding the prejudices of his social group. 
Likewise the individual who lives on a low plane of 
mora lity is acting according to the prejudices and the 
low implied standards of the society. However, Mead 
holds that every individual and especially the genius 
or unusual person helps to change the society in which 
he lives. In Mead's words, 
New conceptions have brought with 
them, through great individuals, 
attitudes which enormously enlarge 
the environment within which these 
individuals lived.l 
In Mead's view, then, moral changes take place through 
individuals who have taken the attitude of a l arger social 
order and become 11 the instrument, the means, of changing 
the old into a new order 11 • 2 He holds that the social order 
can be changed and changed in the direction of a more 
moral society. However, social r econstruction and person-
ality reconstruction must be achieved together, according 
to Mead. He states the point thus, 
1. Ibid. 
The changes we make in the social 
order in which we are implicated 
necessar ily involve our also making 
changes in ourselves. The social con-
flicts among the individual members of 
a given organized human society, which, 
for their removal, necessitate con-
scious or intelligent reconstructions 
and modifications of that society by 
those individuals, also and equally 
2. Ibid., 386. 
necessitate such reconstructions 
or modific a tions by tho se individ-
uals of their own selves or p er-
sonalities.l 
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Bri ghtman discusses individual a ni social morality 
in terms of v alues. He approaches values from the point 
of view o f' reason and love, a nd holds that persons can 
cultiva te the growth of reason a nd love. For Brig htman, 
the degree of s ocial morality practiced in a community 
is an e xp ression of the degr Ge o f moral attainment of the 
individua ls ma king up the community. He says th at it is 
difficult f or both the individual a nd the social group 
to practice the moral norms which can be conceived. Even 
though to live on a high moral plane is difficult, Brightman 
believes tha t both individuals and societies can practice 
brotherhood. Believing that a world of values can be 
achieved even though such a world of values does not now 
exist, Brightman says there is, 
One method by which a world of values 
can be built. It is what Plato called 
11 persuasion11 and what Christianity 
calls "conversion"--the change of men 
by appeal to sp iritual forces. It is 
the application of rational love in ed-
ucation. This method rests on the 
appeal to the best in every man--to his 
sense of fairness and his ability to 
think.2 
The world of value is in a sense an achievement of the 
future; it is an ''eternal task" •3 Brightman says that 
1. Mead, WSS, 309. 
2. NV, 86. 
3· Brightman, NV, 87. 
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while there is much failure on the part of individuals 
and groups to apply the standards of morality, there is 
hope in the fact that there is a great deal of agreement 
on the norms th at should be applied. He writes, 
Everywhere, in some way or other, 
tribute is paid to the norms of 
truth, goodness, beauty, and holi-
ness; everywhere there is some vision, 
however distorted, of reas~--love 
which is the norm of norms. 
Brightman believes that the agreement on norms, buttressed 
with a personalistic philosophy of life, should lead to 
a practice of values. He thinks that the principles of 
personalism--namely, respect for personality, involving 
self-respect, love and reason; n ature as a revelation 
of Divine personality; and spiritual liberty--are grounds 
of real hope for an ordered world. He says, 
Any philosophy or religion or political 
theory that treats personality serious-
ly and sacredly has in it the seeds of 
hope--hope that humanity may see that 
nature and values are one world, a 
world which c a n be realized effectively 




Brightman therefore believes that both the individual and 
society can be more moral than either is at present. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 166. 
CHAPTER III 
ROBERT MORRISON MACIVER (1882 --): 
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE A!ID WRITINGS 
A. The Story of Maciver's Life 
Robert Morrison Maciver was born in Stornoway, 
Scotland on April 17, 1882.1 He was educa ted at Edinburgh 
University where he received an M.A. degree in 1903 and 
a Ph.D. degree in 1915. 2 In 1907 he was given an honorary 
3 B. A. degree by Oxford University. Howard W. Odum says, 
"He wa s lecturer in political science at Aberdeen University, 
1907, and in sociology in 1911. 114 
From 1915 to 1922, Maciver was professor of political 
science at the University of Toronto in Canada, 11 when he 
became he ad of the department and remained there until 
1927 11 • 5 Also in 1927, he left Toronto am came to Barnard 
College of Columbia University as professor of social 
science, a position he held until 1929. "He was Lieber 
professor of political philosphy a nd sociology at Barnard 
and Columbia from 1929 , and chairman of the Department of 
Sociology, 1940 to 1949. 116 And in 1950 Maciver was special 
lecturer in public law and g overnment at Columbia University. 7 
1. Cattell, DAS. 
2. Odu m, AS , 194. 
3· Cattell, DAS. 
4. AS , 194. 
5. Ibi d ., 194-195. 
6 . Odum, AS , 195. 
7. Cattell, DAS . 
Rob er t Maciver s erved a s vice-chairman of the 
Dominion of Canada Wa r Labor Board during World War I 
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and he ha s been fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. 
He has been a member of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, the American Philos ophical Society, the Institut 
Inte rnationa l de Sociologie, and the American Sociological 
Society , of 1Nhich he served as the t hirtiet.l1. president in 
1940. In 1929 Columbia University conf erred upon Maciver 
the h onorary degree of Litt . D. Harvard University 
honored him with the Litt. D. degree in 1936 and Princeton 
University so h onored him in 1947. Maciver gave "the 
Louisiana St a te University Citizenship Lectures in 1938, 
pub lished as Leviathan and the People, and the Wei1 
Lectures in American Citizenship at the University of 
North Carolina in 1949, published in 1950 as The Ramparts 
\' e Guard". 1 From 1946 Maciver has been very active in 
various "national conferences on intercultural rela tions 
and on world order ••• "2 Esp ecially has Maciver been 
active in the conferences sponsored by the Institute for 
Relig ious a nd Soci a l Studies. 
B. The Development of His Ideas 
Maciver says, in referring to his own work, tha t his 
studies " involve our getting beh ind the descri p tions of 
relations to the dynamics. Unless we do this, we are 
helpless in dealing wi th the most pressing issues that come 
1. Odum, AS, 195. 
2 . Ibid. 
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before sociolog ists, those concerning social change and 
its interpretation" .1 
In his first book entitled Community, Maciver ex-
plores the dynamics of human rela tionships which persons 
display in their common life. Thereafter, he wrote a 
volume called Labor in a Changing World, and then 
another book called Elements of Social Science. In these 
t wo volumes, he was interested in labor organizations and 
population changes. Maciver l a ter came to the conclusion 
that the most effective manner in w~tch to develop the 
principles of personal and communal life which he had 
outlined in his first book was to write on the subject 
of political sociology. 2 Pursuant to this conclusion, 
Maciver wrote The Modern State • . Some years l a ter he 
wrote the Leviathan and ~e People and The Web of 
Government to express in a completer way the ideas which 
3 he had already begun to develop in The Modern State. 
In reference to the manner in which Maciver has de-
veloped his ideas, Odum says, 
His earlier studies were in ancient 
history, in political science, and 
in economics, but he had the rest-
less feeling that underneath the 
matters usually treated in these 
areas there was a social matrix 
without the exploration of which 
these subjects- were cut off from 
their roots.4 
1. Quoted in Howard w. Odum's book, AS, 197. 
2. Odum, AS, 196. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 194. 
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Out of his interest in the 11 social matrix 11 under-
lying social rela tionships, Maciver pu blished his s ociety: 
It~ Structure and Changes in 1931. In thi s book, 
Maciver investigates the rigiditie s a nd changes within 
society and the dynamics of the whole system of social 
relationsh i ps. 
Aft er develop ing hi s principles of community, his 
t heory of the place of the state in the community, and his 
t heory of the structure and changes of society, Maciver 
then turned his attention to the matter of inter-group 
and inte r cultural rela tions. Toward an Abiding Peace, 
The More Perfect Union, and The Ra moa rts We Guard came 
from Maciver's pen in response to his interest in under-
standing and improving inter-human relations. Throug h 
his books as well as through articles published in pro-
fessional journals, Maciver has established himself as 
an eminent sociologist and political scientist and has 
ma de secure 11 hi s enduring high place among soc ie.l 
scientists" •1 
1. Odum, -AS, 197. 
CHAPTER IV 
ROBERT M. MACIVER'S CONCEPTION OF HUNWill NATURE 
AS REVEAlED IN HIS THEORY OF COMMUNITY 
In Maciver's analysis of community, there is a 
definite conception of human nature. Even in his defini-
tion of community he speaks of man as a social being. He 
says community is "any area of common life", and he adds 
that "a community is a focus of social life, the common 
living of social beings ••• " 1 For Maciver the primary 
mark o f a community is that a person's life may be lived 
entirely within it. There may be communities within a 
community, reaching to an ever-widening scale; but always 
there are two central aspects of a community--namely, 
territory and esprit de corps • . Maciver remarks, 
A community then is an area of social 
living marked by some degree of social 
coherence. The bases of communit~ are 
locality and community sentiment. 
Therefore a community is characterized by common living 
which 'involves an awareness of sharing a way of life am 
by a common area that may be large or small. 
The term society, for Maciver, includes the whole 
complex system of man's social relationships. Society 
involves the integrative and the disintegrative aspects 
of social life; therefore society is wider than communttu, 
Maciver says, 
1. Maciver, COM, 23-24. 
2. Maciver and Page, SAIA, 9. 
Society is a system of usages and pro-
cedures, of authority and mutual aid, 
of many groupings and divisions, of 
controls of human behavior and of 
liberties. This ever-changing, complex 
system we call society. It is the web 
of social rela tionships. And it is 
a lways changing.l 
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Society is therefore organized social relations hips that 
liberate and set limits to the activities of men. 
A. Individuality, Sociality, and Personality 
For Maciver, individuals involve society and society 
involves individual s ; they cannot be sepa r a ted. Individ-
uality a nd sociality are correla tive qualities that do 
not exist as isola ted f acts. Maciver says individuality 
is "th at quality and power of self-determina tion and self-
expression which is as ne cessa ry to the gro v1th of person-
1 t 112 ali ty as is the socia environmen ••• . For him, individ-
uali ty is "not the whole na ture of the 1ndi vidual, but a 
certain aspect of i t 11 • 3 The o tiler aspect is sociality. 
Sociality i s t he quality of 11 adaptation to soci a l life in 
4 
any form and any degree ••• 11 Maciver says, 
sociality a nd individua lity develop 
pari passu, sociality and individual-
ity bei ng the qualities corresponding 
to the processes of socialization and 
individualization.5 
Ther efore, for him, the whole na ture of the individual is 
11 a unity whose factor s are individuality and sociality 11 • 6 
1. Maciver and Page, SAIA , 5. 
2. COM, 221. 
3· Ibi d ., 221-222. 
4. Ibid., 220. 
5. Ibid . 
6 . Ibid ., 225. 
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The unity of the individual taken as a whole is person-
ality, character, or self which is "woven of indi vi duality 
and s ociali ty 11 • 1 Maciver writes, 
Personality is the substantial reality 
and end which individuality and social-
ity together determine, and any doc-
trine which exalts either of those 
aspects a t the expense of the other, or 
either of them at the expense of their 
unity in personality, is partial and un-
true to the facts of li fe . 2 
The question of whether the self is prior to so-
ciety or society is prior to the self is, a ccordi ng to 
Ma civer , based on 11 false abstractions11 • 3 · He contends, 
Society is not prior to its members ••• 
for society exists only v.ri thin its mem-
bers . For the same reason the members 
o f society c annot be prior to their 
s ociety ••• 4 
Individuals do, however, hi:.i.ve both e.n organic and a 
psychical development . During the psychical gr;-owth of' 
individuals certain qualities of personality emerge. 
Maciver does not present an exhaustive list of s uch qual-
1 ties but gives those which he considers important for 






'Ne might cite, for example, the 
abili ty to meet new situations, 
tbe oower to reason or synthesize, 
to conceive and express ideals, the 
power to control passion by the idea 
of permanent life--ends and to 
221 . 
C01·l , 221 . 
Ibid . , 244. 
Maciver, COM, 244. 
contro l im a~ination by rel-
evant fact.! 
Then h e :L:'ollows this statement with , 
But our concern is with the 
directly social cr iteri a o f de-
velopmen t, and of thes e the most 
important discoverable •.• are perhap s 
the f ollowing : the power to under-
stand and estima te the clai ms of 
oth ers in c ompa rison with our own , 
the power to enter into more and 
more complex rela tions, the autonomy 
attai n ed by the individual in the s e 
r el ations with h is fellows, and his 
sense of r e sponsibility towards ot hers 
within these r e l a t1ons.2 
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Th ese qualit ies, a ccording to Maciver, are not present 
in the earlier stages of the individual's conscious life, 
but they are slowly a cquired a s the ind ividual develops . 
Moreover , he says the se qualities a re the first to dis-
integra te in old age and also when serious forms of 
mental derang e ment oc cur. 3 But even t hough certain 
personality traits emerge and expand as the individual 
grows , in every cas e the ind1 vidual and society develop 
together. The individual and society are inseparable . 
Because a civer believes in a close interrela tionship 
between indi vidua l and society, he dismisses the various 
contra ct theories of society as being at he art too in-
di vidualistic. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, 
and other contra ct theorists, expressed one-sided theories 
of the rela tion between individuals and society. The social 
1. Maciver, COM, 184. 
2. Ibid . 
3 · Ibid . 
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contract theories must be rejected because they rest 
"up on the false assumption tha t human b eings are, or could 
become, huma n beings outside of or apart from society" •1 
Maciver a lso regards the organismic theories of society 
as inade qu ate. He says they a re false because they mini-
mize the individual and maximize society. For Maciver 
society is neither an orga nism nor an inclusive mind. 
Society is social relationships. And according to Maciver, 
the proper way to conceive the relation between the individ-
ual and society is to recognize the interrela tionship between 
them • He says , 
Our essential theoretical understand-
ing of indi vidua 1 and society ••. is the 
understanding of a relationship--a 
relationship involving those processes 
that operate between man and man and 
between man and groups in the constant-
ly changing pattern of social life. 
Society with all the traditions, the 
institutions, the equipment it provides 
is a great changeful order of social 
life, arising from the psychical as 
well as the physical needs of the in-
dividual, an order wherein human beings 
are born a nd fulfill themselves, with 
whatever limitations, and wherein they 
transmit to coming generations the re-
quirements of living . 1Je must reject any 
view of this p attern that sees the re-
lationship between individual and so-
ciety from merely the one or the other 
side. 2 
To support this theory o f interrela tionship , Maciver pre-
sents certain facts from sociolog y, social psychology, 
anthropology, and psychology. To buttress the point that 
1. Maciver and Page, SAIA, 42. 
2. SAIA, 49. 
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personality cannot exist apart from society, he discusses 
certain feral cases, the most widely kno wn one being 
l Kasper Hauser. Then he summarizes the findings of cer-
tain s oci a l psychologists regarding the growth of the 
self, t aking George H. Mead and Charles H. Cooley as out-
standing examples. He di s cusses "man's peculiar dependence 
upon the social heritage 11 , pointing out that "without 
society , without the support of the social heritage, the 
individu al personaU ty does not and cannot come into being" .2 
However, Maciver of f' ers a sharp reminder that only individ-
uals think, feel, and communicate th?ir thoughts and feel-
ings to others. Others can sympathize with the individual 
but they cannot share his feelings or thoughts. Thoughts 
and feelings may be like but not common; "they are ex-
perienced by individuals.§.§. individuals 11 .3 Maciver says, 
4 
"In this sense every self is, as it were, insulated." 
This is reminiscent of Brightman's idea of the private 
self. Maciver writes, 
The only centers of activity, of feel-
ing, of function, of purpose that we 
know are individual selves. The only 
society we know is one in which these 
selves are bound together, through time 
and space, by the rela tions of each to 
each which they themselves create or in-
herit. The only experience we know is . the 
experience of individuals. It is only in 
the light of their struggles, their 
1. Ibid., 44. 
2. Ibid., 47. 
3· Maciver and Page, SAIA, 47-48. 
4. Ibid., 47. 
interests, their aspirations, their 
hopes and their fears, that we can 
assign a~y function and any goal to 
society. 
Then Maciver s ays further, 
And conversely, it is only because 
they are a p art of society that in-
dividuals are endowed with interests, 
with aspirations, with goals. It is 
only in society that human nature can 
thrive. The relationship between in-
dividual and society is not one-sided; 
both a re essential for the comprehension 
of ei ther.2 
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It is cle ar that Maciver seeks to maintain a balance be-
tween individuality and so.ciali ty, between individual 
and society, showing that each is inextricably involved 
in the other and that the whole personality is woven of 
both. 
B. Socialization and Individualization~ 
For Maciver, "socialization and individualization are 
the two sides of a single process". 3 He claims that 
socialization and individualization are processes of per-
sona lity and community development, corresponding to the 
qualities of sociality and individuality.4 Individuali-
zation is therefore the process in which a being becomes, 
"more an autonomous being, more a distinct personality 
self-directed and self-determining , recognizing and being 
recognized as having in himself a worth or value of his 
1. Ibid., 48. 
2. Ibid. 
3· COM, 219. 
4. Page 126 a~ t h e dis sertation. 
1 
own". And socialization refers to the process. 
in which a being strikes deeper root 
in society, in which his social re-
l ations grow more complex and more ex-
tensive, in which he finds the fulfil-
ment of his life in and thrcugh the 
increase and development of his rela-
tions with his fellows.2 
Socialization and individualization thus give rise to 
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individuality and sociality and together sociality and 
individuality are personality.3 An increase in individual-
ity means a correspond ing growth in sociality and vice 
ve r sa. Hence Maciver reformulates his thesis of communal 
development in these words: 
as personality develops, for each 
and for all, it reveals the two-fold 
developmen~ of individuality and 
soci ality. 
For Maciver , this means that personality and its develop-
ment are central and primary. He says, 
that all values are personal values, 
that all social development is the 
development of some kind and degree 
of personality, or secondarily of 
that system of mechanisms and insti-
tutions which are the means of per-
sonality.5 
Even ever y relig ion is 11 but the apothesi s of personality, 
stimulating the finite life by the effecti ve concep ti ons 
of les s finite personality".6 Moreover , in Maciver's 
philosophy, the value of any association or insti tution 
1. Maciver, COM, 219. 
2. Ibid., 219-220. 
3· Page 126 of the dissertation. 
4. Maciver , COM, 224. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 224-225. 
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is estimated in te r ms of the service which it renders 
to huma n personality. 1 He writes that , 
communi ty itself is strongest in the 
measure in which the claim of every 
association is proportioned to the 
service it can render to personality, 
so that each member, obeying all claims 
h~rmoniously, attains the fullest 
h armony and completion of life .2 
Maciver then concludes, 
tha t where personality most exists, 
there will individuality be most ad-
vanced and there too will the social 
rela tions of men be most extensive and 
most profound. This principle is re-
vealed wherever soci al life exists.3 
To illustrate this point Maciver points out that there 
is less indi vi duality in plant li f e than in lower animals, 
less individuality in primitive man than in civilized 
man.4 Maciver also says, "Society is least in the 
lowest and increases with every increase of life. 11 5 
He contends that the larger tbe degree of sociality 
wh ich individuals possess, the gre a ter is their degree of 
individuality. He says, 11 The less a beine; dep ends on 
ins tinct the more it depends upon society§" The ref ore 
human beilli3 S are of all beings most able to benefit from 
society . Both primitive and civilized man has a more 
diversified society than any other being, thot~h the 
1. Ibid . , 225. 
2. Ibid . 
3. Ibid . 
4. Maciver, COM, 225-226. 
5 . Ibid., 229 . 
6. Ibid. , 230. 
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social rela tions of civilized man are far more ramified 
than those of the primitive man. In Maciver's view, 
Community grows more complex and 
differentiated as it responds to 
the demands of autonomous personal-
ity for soci a l fulfilment, and the 
member of the differentiated commun-
ity is of necessity more and not less 
socialized than the member of the un-
dif f erenti a ted.l 
Maciver resta.tes his fundamental l aw of communal develop-
ruent as f ollows: 
The dif f erentiation of community is 
relative to growth of personality in 
social individuals.2 
He demonstrates this law by pointing to the manner in 
which the various associations and institutions of community 
emerge and become distinct, each makin e:; its proper claims 
and finding its proper place according to the common 
interests of persons. He feels that communal dif f erentia-
tions is determined by, and in tum determines, the 11 grow-
ing personality of men which seeks fulfilment by the double 
way of sociality and indi vidua 11 ty". 3 Maciver calls 
attention, first, to the way in which man's political 
life has undergone changes and become complex. He implies 
that in the beginning the state and community were not 
distinct, and he says, 11 No other process in human history 
has been so slow •.• as that whereby community and State have 





grown not separate but distinct. 11 Using l aw as his criterion 
for the character of the state, Maciver says t hat the 
state is a slow development. Laws emerge from customs and 
the distinction between the community and the state is a 
result of tha t emergence. Laws emerge and community differ-
entia tes be cause of 11 the many-sidednes s of huma n na ture 11 .2 
Maciver writes, 
Law emerges from custom, because 
distinctions in the rigor and necess-
ity of SOQial relationships are being 
revealed.) 
Personality destroys the "homogeneity of custom ••• 11 4 'rhe 
state emerges out of community as an organ to protect and 
to further community. 
Acc ording to Maciver, political life is underg oing 
further demarcation today. There is a gi gantic struggle 
on between economic groups to bend the will of the state 
to their will. The Marxists maintain that the struggle 
is simply between two economic classes--the proletarians 
and the capitalists; but the capitalists realize that the 
struggle is between various associations and classes. 
Maciver says that as associa tions arise and fulfill 
various interests, the true pla ce of tbe state is revealed •. 
For him, the state is "by na ture the speci al guardian of 
the general welfare 11 and in the final analysis has the 
1. Maciver, COM, 232. 
2. Ibid., 233 • 
3· Ibi d . 
4. Ibid. 
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widest powers of all associations.1 But the wider the 
dif f erentiation of community associations the greater are 
the limits of the state. 
The second aspect of community dif f erentiation which 
Ma civer considers is "the demarcation of the religious 
life 11 • 2 He says, 11 0riginally relig ion is simply an as-
pect of the undifferentiated communa l life."3 Moreover 
he states that 11 the circle o f community ani the circle of 
religious worship are coincident". 4 But religion under-
goes differentiation and development; the gods cease to 
be many and become one, cease having mere tribal concern 
and become one universal power who cares for all tribes 
and na tions. In other words, 
Religion finds its true significance 
as it reveals itself to the free 
reverence of social beings, in their 
full union as members not simply of 
one community but of one church.5 
Maciver conside r s family development as his third 
illustration of the law that community differ entiation is 
rela tive to the growth of personality in social individ-
uals. He says that although it may seem strange and un-
true to say that 11 the family associ a tion itself becomes 
strengthened and purified as it becomes dif f erentiated 
within community", nevertheless it is true, for "it is 
1. Ibid., 237. 
2. Maciver, COM, 237. 
3· Ibi d ., 237. 
4. Ibid., 238. 
5. Ibi 6. ., 240. 
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only as the family comes to limit itself within a wider 
life that it comes to realize itselfi' . 1 For instance, the 
earliest forms of the family are self-sufficient--almost 
2 
one with the comrrru.ni ty. 11 The first form of community 
may be called a larger family, but it is a confused 
family, 11 according to Maciver.3 The terms father and 
mother are inclusive, not limited to actual father and 
mother, likewise are the terms sister and brother. The 
primitive family is not ''a small intimate unity". 4 
However, as community develops, 11 the family loses 
its self-suff iciency'' , 5 and "yet through the process of 
limitation the family attains a completeness impossible 
before 11 .6 Now its members may realize "that mutual 
affection of husband, wife, and children which alone is 
its exclusive possession11 .7 
According to Maciver, these three forms of community 
differentiation--the political, the religious, and the 
family--are but examples of the universal principle of 
differentiation and communal development . 8 Differentiation 
in other associations follows the same principle. Maciver 
says finally, 
The differentiation of community ••• 
1. Ibid. 
2 . Ibid ., 241 . 
3· Ibid. 
4. Maciver, COM, 242. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid . 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., 243. 
means intrinsica lly the double 
and correspondent development of 
the sociality and the individua lity 
of its members.l 
And he says further, 
The claim of indi1~duality a nd the 
claim of sociality are in the l ast 
resort not t wo but one.2 
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Individua lity means autonomy , self~direction, fulfilment 
of persona lity, s elf-expression and servic e . However , 
Maciver says autonomy is self-defeating, 
except within society , self-fulfilment 
is meani~~ less except in social rela-
tions, and deliverance from servitude 
is vain unless it means a lso deliver-
ance for service.3 
Maciver counsels tha t the claim of indi v idu a lity for 
liberty i s not "liberty of action over other indivi du als". 
He says 11 t h e claim of egotism is se lf-contradi ctory 11 
and the '' es sential cla im o f ind ividuality" i s free of 
thi s contrad iction because it is " a lso the claim of 
soc iali ty".4 The process of indivi du ali zation is in the 
long run a l s o a pro ces s of soci a liz ation. Pers onal values 
ar e more he. rmonious t han conflicti ng , and the development 
of personality i n one per son tends to f urther personal ity 
deve lopment in others. In turn, personality development 
furthers, a nd is furthered by , community. 
C. Soci a lization and Control of Environment 
Ilflaciver thinks that with the gro wth of communi ty 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibi d ., 245 . 
3 · Ibid. 
4. Maciver, COM, 245 . 
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goe s an advan ce me nt of cont rol ov er t he envi ronmen t . He 
hold s t hat when men change the i r r ela t i ons with e ach 
other , they a lso alter the ir relations wit h t he ir environ-
me nt . He a s s erts , 
Me n ca nnot alter their r e l a tions 
to one anothe r without a t t he same 
t ime alt ering their rela tions to the 
who l e uni verse; and, on the other hand, 
in s eek i ng to control to their purpos e 
the world lying out s i de t h em , t hey in-
evitab ly widen a nd deepen their socia l 
rela tions .1 
Fo r Maciver, the world of mind and t he world of 11 nature" 
are ins ep ar able; they are "in t h e end one world11 • 2 
Therefore as men increase in sociality they also transfo r m 
the "mod e s o f their r el E.tionship to the environing world '' .3 
Communa l development not only means l arger cont r ol over 
oute r physic al environment but it means in particular 
11 t h e modification of the relation b etween the organism 
4 
and 1 ts environment". Maciver s a ys, 
Psychical and physic al forces meet, 
though how we ma y not understand, in 
the organism, and the development of 
p sychical forces revealed in the 
growth of pu rp osive rela tions, in the 
development of community, t ransforms 
the mode in which the organism is 
dependent on physic a l forces.5 
1) Factors in Creativity 
According to Maciver, there are two ultimate f actors 
1. Maciver, COK, 373· 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 374. 
5. Ibid. 
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present in a nd determinants of a ll d evelopment. 'rhey 
are 
11 the inner potency •.• or spirit of life ••• 11 and the 
environment. Maciver describes the t wo f a ctors in these 
words: 
( 1) Wh a t we must ca ll, though it 
be merely naming the unknown, 
the inner p otency, tha t energ y 
or sp irit of life which must 
never be i dentified with the 
environment it finds or chooses, 
with the physical nature whose 
l aw s it both comma nds and obeys, 
and 
( 2) a world so v arious, so complex, a nd 
so p l a stic, as to provide a con-
tinuous succession of environments 
corresponding to and making p ossible 
every im£ul s e of life towards ful-
filment . 
The environment, for Maciver, means more t ha n 11 that 
which i s external to life 11 , it means r a t her 11 that ex-
ternal correla tive of life ap art from which life would 
remain an unc oncei ved a nd inconceivable potentiali ty11 • 2 
In othe r words li f e is impossible apart from environment. 
And in Maciver's thinking every dif f e r ence in life makes 
a difference i~ environment. 3 He says that "every change 
whatever in the state of any organism involves some cha ng e 
of t he environment in wh ich it lives" .4 Just as every 
individua l is dif f erent from all o.ther individuals, so 
does every one live in an environment different from 
1. COM, 377 • 




every one else's, for the environment is 11 the external 
world as it is related to life 11 • 1 Maciver defines life as, 
tha t which feels a nd knows and wills, 
that for which values exist and which 
itself exists as value.2 
Each li f e has an environment composed of, 
an organic body • .• an outer physical 
medium of the organism •.• other lives 
likewise incarnated, and • •• the social 
order which together they create.3 
Chang es in life modify the environment and changes in the 
environment modify life . The relationship between life 
and environment is a reciprocal one. Maciver points out 
that it is impossible to say whether life or environment 
is more important, but he says that the mere "inner 
capacity is lo::; ically prior" to environment in the moment 
of creativity or development. 4 He writes, 
Environment gives or withhol ds oppor-
tunity, determines direction, but it is 
the life--capacity which seizes oppor-
tunity, which f ollows this or that 
direction. The way in which life 
responds to environment, changing 
to its every change, is not to be re-
garded as a witness to the cD~racter­
lessness of life , but rather as evi-
dence of its infinite capacity for 
seizing every opportunity which en-
vironment provides . 5 
Therefore a change in the outer environment is always 
an opportunity for "a further reve l a tion of life , wholly 
1. Ibid ., 376 . 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
4 . Ibid . , 377 . 
5· Maciver, COM, 377. 
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incalculable in advancett •1 For instance, in the realm 
of human society, persons may know what kind of physical 
conditions are favorable for the development of new 
energies, but they can never predict with certainty the 
quality and the ideals which the favorable environment 
will actually evoke. 2 
Creativity involves life and its environment in every 
case. Environment alone is not able to precipitate devel-
opment. Maciver says it is not possible to conclude 11 that 
the dif f erences of environment in any given historic 
situation wholly account for differences of character 11 .3 
And he as serts, 
The type, the stock, is already 
formed through endless past pro-
cesses of inter-action between 
life and environment. As life 
appears in each new generation it 
cannot be regarded as some mere 
undirected force, wholly shaped b~ 
the conditions there represented. 
For lvlaciver, 
The reaction of life to environment 
is a true response, not a mere 
follo wing or flowing; the response 
of a nature, not the mere accommoda-
tion of some formless stuff (named 5 psychical) to the impress of a die. 
In reference to creative responses, Maciver says further, 
Life is itself the prior force in 
1. Ibid., 378. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 380. 4. Ibid. 
5· Ibid., 381. 
its own unf olding . Life is itself 
the shaper, not environment. Charac-
ter i s the expression and form of 
life, not of environment . Environ-
ment is the occasion, the stimulus, 
and not the source of character.l 
Yet Maciver does not minimize the part which environ-
ment plays in all development and creativity . He 
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holds firmly to the view tha t environment is always 
correlative of life. 2 He says that "every development 
of life imp lies a nd necessitates the modific a tion of the 
whole environment".3 The physical a s well as the social 
environment undergoes transformation when there is develop-
ment in life . Maciver says, 
The true laws of lif e are laws 
of concomitant variation, l aws of 
concomitance between the growth of 
li f e and the transformcttion of its 
inner and outer conditions.4 
2) The Meaning of Adaptation to the 
Physical Environment 
The concep t of adaptation to the environment is, 
ac cording to Maciver, often miscons trued. He maintains 
t hat the principle of adaption to environment does not 







Mere adaptation to environment may 
mean for the livi n g being either 
COM, 381. 
I b i d ., 355 . 
Ibid . 
I b id., 386 . 
Ibid ., 387. 
progress or retrogression, either 
the increase or the decrease of the 
amount and quality of life . l 
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Furthermore, in regard to the purely physical aspect of 
life, 11 every organism 1 s always adapted to its environ-
ment".2 Even death itself is an adaptation to environment. 
Therefore as regards life in community, adaptation does 
not mean mere conformity to physical condition but sig-
ni fi es tha t, 
every living creature in some de-
gree determines its own enYironment, 
and the more developed the life the 
greater the control of environment. 
This increasing control is secured chief-
ly through the increase of social co-
op eration .3 
Although p l ants have only a mi ni mum a.m ount of power to 
choose between given environments, creature animals h ave 
not only a wider choice of given environments bu t also , 
according to their intelligence, increasing power to 
modify their environments.4 This power makes the prin-
ciple of adaptation relative, because, 
in the degree in which man (or any other 
organic being ) possesses it he becomes 
master no less than servant of circum-
stance ••• 5 
Thus, for Maciver , progress is adaptation to a favorable 
environment and retrogression is adapta tion to a less 
1. Ibid . 
2 . Ibid. 
3 · Maciver, .C OM , 388. 
4. Ibid ., 38~ . 
s. Ibid . 
f avorable 1 one. Man therefore develops community. 
Ma ci ver says, 11 Thus only, by the increase of society , 
does he gain progress ive control over environment. 11 2 
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For Maciver, t hen, there is a definite con~elation be-
tween s oci a lization, a nd the control over environment. 
As men b ecome more s ociali zed, they exercise a larger 
control ov er their envi ronment. 
Maciver points out that in huma n social life mind is 
a great transfor ming element. Mind r eveals a new way of 
success in life--the way of social cooperation. He writes, 
I do not know if' mind tends to 
~ ubstitute altruistic action for 
egoistic. There is altruism and 
egoism at every different level 
of intelligence. But I am sure 
that mind increasingly discovers, 
in ways before undreamed of, the 
dependence of the interest of each 
unon the interest of all. It re-
veals tha t the fund amental needs of 
each are but realized in the commun-
ity of a 11 ••• 3 
D. The Problem of Personality Integration 
In primitive society each individual i s surrounded 
by cl s ingle system of customs a nd regu~ ations which makes 
it easy for him to find his place in socia l life. There 
are not very many alternatives open before him; hence 
the prob l em of choice is relatively sma.ll. This means 
that the individual life finds unity and coherence with 
remarkable facility. But in the mor~ differentiated 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 390 • 
3. Maciver, COM, 397. 
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society where communa l development is on a high level, 
there i s a serious problem of pers ona lity integration. 
The individual experi ences difficulty in trying to unify 
his life. The v arious ase.ociations a ni groups make 
different claims upon the individual and some of these 
claims overlap and even conflict with each other. 
Caught in a web of social rela tionships and &ternative 
claims, the individual seems hopelessly divided between 
conflicti ng loyalties. Maciver phrases the problem in 
these words: 
As community differentiates and 
individuality grows, men lose the 
security, the comfort of conformity, 
and are driven to seek, through perils 
a nd negations, a profounder source of 
unity. This is a necessary episode 
in all transition from tutelage to 
manhood. The social being who formerly 
accepted a principle of unity has hence-
forth to attain it.l 
According to Maciver, the problem of the unity of 
individual life finds solution in the recognition that 
man is more than a member of a profession, or of an 
association, or of a number of associations. He is more 
2 than a citizen; 11 he is a person". He says that "man's 
character se eks to be a unity'', and his personality re-
fuses to be "summed up under a. singl e social rela tion-
ship •.• or a series of social relationships".3 Although 
the extension of social relationships, by an increase 




in individuality, fulfills increasi ng ly the personality 
of men, 11 it never exhausts'' their personalities. 1 Per-
sonali ty cannot therefore be confined to social types. 
Communal development reveals that personality involves 
individual r e sponsibility, and individual responsibility 
is the key to the solution of the problem. As community 
develops, the sense of responsibility for wrong-doing in-
creases and the feeling of corpora te responsibility for 
wrong-doing decreases. Maciver says that the denLal of 
corporate responsibility by Ezekiel (Eze. 18:1-4) and 
Jeremiah (Jer. 31:29-30) was the affirmation of the 
ethical autonomy of the social being . 2 He adds t hat 
ethical autonomy is not in opposition to socialization 
but only in opposition to the reduction of man to uni-
~ 
form types. He asserts that although a genius is ahead 
of his society in certain ways, in other ways he is a 
resultant of his society. Maciver wri tea, 
A genius can no more arise and 
function in a wholly irresponsive social 
environment, unsupported by some degree 
of sympathetic fello wship and understand-
ing, than a living th ing can breathe in 
the void.3 
Moreover, he says "no man can be great unless his society 
is in some measure fitted for his greatness". 4 However , 
1. Ibid. 
2. COM, 305. 
3· Ibid., 306. 
4. Ibid . 
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he adds that "no great man conforms to whatever average 
standards of thought rule within his society" .1 
Likewise as community dif f erenti ates, the attitude 
tha t social conduct must have super social sanctions 
diminishes. And the sense of social obligation itself 
takes on meaning and serves as the guide for individuals. 2 
The transformation of religion reveals the f a ct th at the 
ethical sp irit is primary, even though divine sanction 
3 is recognized. Maciver points out that religion and 
ethics are inseparable and that religion takes the form 
of ideal. And he says that i n the long run there is but 
one ideal--an ethical ideal.4 He holds th at the ethical 
i deal in Christianity is: 
the principle of personal responsi-
bility and obligation, the principle 
that the social individual is the 
judge and the creator and the redeem-
er of social claims ••• The onll' value 
on earth is the value of the souls' 
or lives of men, and that systems and 
creeds are vain and corrupt5except as they fulfil these values ••• 
For Maciver, this ideal points the way towards the so-
lution of the problem of' individual unity . 
Maciver's main point in the solution of the problem 
of the unity of the individual life is his emphasis on 
values and choices. He says, 
All action involves a choice between 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 307 • 
3· Ibi d . 
4. Ibid., 309 . 
5. COM, 310 . 
possible ends of action. If I act 
a t all it i s because I choose action 
before inaction. If I act this way or 
that, the way I choose i s the value I in 
the moment of action prefer . Even if I 
act under some overmastering necessity, 
inner or outer •.• an alternative is never 
excluded; it is still a choice between 
values ••• Conscious activity is always 
preferred activi t y, and all preference is 
between values .l 
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He goes further and says tha t ''every social claim is a 
demand for the maintenance or the realization of some 
value" •2 Ever·y association, every area of community, 
and every interest are in the final analysis determined 
by a sense of value.3 And he adds that "all values are 
4 in practice comp arable 11 • 
Thus by comparing values and choosing ends it is 
possible for persons to integrate their personalities. 
No social claim is absolute, according to Maciver; only 
personality can make an absolute claim. 5 An institution 
or an association may be necessary, but not absolute . 
And because it may be necessary, it may call upon a 
person to sacrifice his life for its ma intenance. Yet 
6 
even so, a person is faced with a choice among values. 
In such a situation, Maciver says, 
right action, the action which also 
conserves the unity of life, is the 
1 • Ibid • , 312 • 





choice and pursuit by the social 
being of the greatest value which he 
can discover to cl aim realization through 
his conduct .1 
Ma civer asserts that there can be no choice between 
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duties, although "there must always be a choice between 
i t 112 n teres s •.• He states th at in a situation of alter-
na tive choices, there is but one duty; namely, 11 the pursuit 
of tb~ hi gh est value the social being is able to conceive 
within the situat1on". 3 Therefore, according to Maciver, 
a p9rson is never f a ced with two choices each of which is 
4 
a duty, each of which is ri ght. Only~ is right. Both 
may involve good and evil, but only one is right. Maciver 
says, 
It is the business of the advocate 
to show that there are good and evil 
results of any course of action; it is 
the business of the judge to consider 
whether the total result is more of 
good than of evil, or more of good 
and less of evil than any alternative 
course of action would bring. As social 
beings we are judges and not advocates.5 
Writing further on this point, Maciver states, 
It is a question of comp ar a tive values, 
the surplus of welf are over hurt, hurt 
over welfare. Here is the rare formula 
for the solution of the conflicting 
social claims of our differentiated 
social world.6 
To make the formula for the achievement of individual 
1. Ibid., 314. 
2. COM, 314. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 314-315. 
5. Ibid., 315. 
6 • Ibi d . , 316. 
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unity exp licit, Maciver strea;ses the point that "every 
f t ttl person is a focus o communi y ••• Hence every person 
"ha s to reconcile within the unity of his lif e the claims 
arising from many social rela tions'' • 2 However, for Maciver, 
a person's life, 
has no unity except i n so far as he 
is able to ap ply a single standard 
of value to all the diverse situations 
within which he is c a lled to act.3 
And Maciver says that, 
the only universal ethics is that which 
c a n be absolutely particularized, and 
the only being who can ever be truly 
socialized is he whos e ethical individ-
u a lity is ~evealed in every social 
situa tion. 
The implica tion of this is tha t in "the developed community" 
the prima ry source of ''law-abidingness 11 is the discernment 
by the p eople of the value of l a w and or der .5 And a 
further implication is that policies which affect the 
whole of an as sociation or community must depend up on the 
will of a ma jority.6 For Maciver, "Thus only can the 
cla ims o f p ersonality be reconciled with the ne cessities 
of a ction. u7 An d he points ou t that the growth of p er-
sona lity wh ich ma kes this principle necess a ry also in-
creases 11 the sens e of responsib ility towards other per-
sona li t ies" •8 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid . 
3· I b id. 
4. COM , 316. 
5. Ib i d ., 317 . 
6 . Ib i d . 
7. Ibid. 
8 . Ibid . 
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In the l as t analysis, Maciver holds tha t the 
solution to the problem of personality integration or 
individual unity of li fe is conscie nce. For him, the 
ultima te guide in morality is the conscience of each 
person , his sense of right and wrong , his sense of values. 1 
Using his sense of values as a guide, a person unifies 
himself, he finds himself. And according to Maciver, 
The more the person finds himself 
the more he finds himself within 
society , the deeper he enters into 
the meaning of life the deener does 
he strike root in society.2~ 
Finally Ma cive r writes, 
It is in the attainment of personality, 
the progressive union of soci a l ity and 
individuality, that community is ful-
filled •.• This i s no do ctrine of egoism 
but the reverse , for the only enduring 
self is a focus of soc ia.l values, and 
the gre ater the self , the more s ocial 
values does it comprehend.3 
Thus, for Maciver, personality is the hig hest value and 
the unity of personality , in society , i s the supreme 
achievement. 
E . Man and Community 
1) Social Relationships 
The roots of community lie deep in the nature of 
man because wl: atever man thinks or does involves both an 
individua l and a social aspect . It involves an individual 
1. Ibid., 318. 
2. Ibid. , 319 . 
3· Ibid ., 333· 
aspect be cau se 11 it can never be adequately exol ained 
simply a s a social product 11 • 1 It has a social aspect 
be caus e, 
a ctions and thou~hts are all re-
sulta nts, the re ~ponses of complex 
beings, havi ng social ori gins ~~d 
socialized characters , to conditions 
of environment themse l ves somehow a~d 
in some degree soci a l ly determined. 
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Indiv i du a ls are constantly ent ering in to re l a t ionsh i ps 
with other individuals. These rela tionship s cons ti tu te 
society. The rela tionships which increase common senti-
ments, which unite individuals, constitute comirmnity. 
Maciver says, 11 Whenever living beings enter in to, or main-
tain wi lled rela tions with one another, there society 
exists 11 .3 ~ illed rel .:1tions a.nd their consequences equal 
society; wille d rela tions an •:: . their conse quences are called 
social rela tionships. When individuals be come mutually 
aware of other individuals, s ocia l r e l 0tionships are born. 
Socia l re l a tionships a re therefore ever-present; they are 
a function o f life itself . Maciver prefers to use the 
term will ed relations to the terms conscious r e l a tions 
and purposive relations. The word purposive is too narrow 
and the term conscious i s not sufficient. Hence wi lled 
relations is the better term becaus e it involves inter-
dependence. "A rela tion becomes social in so f ar as it 
1. Maciver, COM, 4-5. 
2. Ibid., 5. 
3. COM, 5. 
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involves interdependent activity on the part of the 
beings related, 11 M~civer says. 1 · Moreover he says that 
willing is "simply the self-determined acting of a 
livine; thing , its being itself in action". 2 And he 
adds th a t 11 a1l activities of a living being may be called 
activities of will, whethe r the living being be a termite 
or a man or a g od 11 .3 All social rela tions are psychical 
relB.tions and exist within persons. They do not exist 
between persons. 
2) Will, Attitudes, and Interests 
For Maciver, the bases for the gro·wth ani development 
of community and social rela tions are will, attitudes, 
and interests. In his book, 'J~he Community, Maciver says 
that the fundamental psycholog ical elements of community 
are will and interests. In his later book, Society: An 
Introductory Analysis, he continues to use the term interest, 
but he substitutes the term attitude for the term will. 
In the e arlier book, he defines will as "active mind" 
or "mind as active" and say s that willing is 11 self-determined 
activity11 .4 Willing is the subjective aspect of social 
relations and interest is the objective aspect. 5 Again 
Maciver says th a t attitudes are the subjective side of 
social relations and interests are the objective side.6 
l. Ibid., 6. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibi d . 4. Maciver, COM, 5, 98. 
5· Ibid., 98. 6. Maciver, soc, 24. 
He defines attitudes as 11 subjective reactions, states 
of consciousness within the individual human being, 
1 
with relation to objects". Objects may be ma terial 
or imma terial. Again he says, "In actual experience 
attitudes are subtle, complex, and changeful modes of 
consciousness. 112 An attitude is not static. Maciver 
claims, 
It is always a changing valuation: 
a way of regarding persons or things , 
a way of assessing them in rela tion 
to ourselves 3nd ourse lves in rela-
tion to them. 
Although Maciver's definition of will is broa der and 
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seemingly more inclusive than is his definition of attitude, 
a careful scrutiny of his uses of the two terms reveals 
that he employs them as synonyms. In the e arlier book, 
he pre f erred the term will, in the later book , the term 
attitude.4 The term attitude will be followed in this 
dissertation. 
Maciver says that attitudes and interests are correla-
tive. In s ocial rela tionships they exist together. 
Attitudes are subjective reactions to objective interests. 
He defines interests as "the objects of subjective attitudes •.• "5 
And he a lso calls interests "the objects (or objectives) 
of our will ••• 116 Interests are objects which "determine 
1. SAIA, 24. 
2 • Ibid. , 26 • 
3. Ibl d. , 27. 
4. Maciver, COM, 106; SOC, 24. 
5. soc ' 24. 




activity''. Therefore interests are more than desires, 
more t han a n awa reness of something one l acks; they are 
those items or ob jects to which man devotes his attention. 2 
For Maciver interest means, exclusively, "tha t wh ich 
~ctually motives will11 .3 
According to Maciver society and community are out-
growths of attitudes and interests. To indicate clearly 
the way in which attitudes and intere s ts are involved in 
society and community, Macive r gives a detailed analysis 
and classification of attitudes and int erests. He classi-
fies attitudes on the basis of 11 wheth er they tend to unite 
or tend to separa te those affected by tbem 11 • 4 Though 
recognizing the dif fi culties connected with isolating 
and cl assif ying attitudes, Maciver neverthele ss classif ies 
them in reference to the role they play in human relation-
ships. He classifies attitudes vertically as dissoci ative, 
restrictive, and associative. He lists them horizontally 
as involving inferiority feeling or superiority feeling 
or as h aving no such feeling . He says, 
1. lbid. 
Thus we p l ace attitudes in three main 
columns according as they tend to pre-
vent, to limit, or to promote social 
rela tionships. We name these at t itudes 
dissociative, restrictive, and a ssociative. 
And we divide the columns horizontally i nto 
three groups , accordi ng as the attitudes 
2. Maciver, SOC , 24. 
3. COM , 107. 
4 . soc' 25 • 
.. , .......................................... .. 
imply, in the relationships of the 
persons affected by them, inferiority 
fe e ling or superiority feeling or 
h a ve no such implication.l 
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The associ a tive attitudes promote community development , 
g iving vitality to common living. Associative, restrictive, 
and diss oci a tive attitudes are forces in society because 
society includes not only the communal aspects o f life 
but the conf licting aspects as well. In actual life ex-
periences, a ttitudes and interests should never be separ-
ated. For every intere s t there is a corresponding a ttitude 
and for every a ttitude there is a corresponding interest. 
Maciver clas sifies interests into t wo broad types 
a n d t h en makes further d istinctions within these types. 
The t wo broa d types are called d iscre te intere sts and 
common interests. By d iscrete interests, ~a civer means 
individual interests or in his ovm words, 11 interests as 
pursued by e a ch for his own per s ona l or indivi dual ful -
11 2 filment • By common interests, he means shared interests 
or " wh a t we share without dividing up ".3 In ot her words, 
Mac ive r says , 
Wh en •.• a nu mber of people a ll pursu e 
one singl e comprehensive interest 
of t h e m a ll , say the we lfare or 
reput .ation of to wn or country or 
family, or again the success of some 
business in whi ch t hey are all con-
cerned, we may call th a t interest 
1. Maciver, SOC, 27. 
2 . Cl·J.L•1 , 105. 
3 · Maci ver , SOC , 32. 
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a common interest. 1 
Ma ci ve r d i vic:le s discrete interests into three groups , 
name l y , like interests , unlike intere s ts , and comnlemep.tarx 
interests. And he s ays whenever " s eve ral p ersons pursue 
discrete intere s ts which •.• are lik e or i dentical in type , 
we have l ike interests. But whenever sever al p er sons 
"pursue discrete interests which d iffer in type , we 
have unlike intere sts . Then, 
\ihen the interests of t wo or more 
persons , while not wholly a like, 
ar e yet interdependent, invo l ving 
reciproca l service , we may c all them 
comp lementary.2 
Complementary intere sts a re "p artly like and partly 
unlike" .3 The most obvious examples of comp lementary 
interests are sex and division of l abor. 
Within like interests . Maciver points out three 
distinctions. First, when men pursue their like interests 
in soci al isola tion, 0 t heir interests ma y run p ar allel, 
involving , f or the individuals in question, no contact 
whatever ''. In such cases , the like interests would b e 
called nerallel. Secondly, like interests may bring men 
into conf lict with each other. Ma cive r s ays , 
When t wo or more persons pursue an 
ob ject o f such a charac ter t~Bt the 
1. COlVl , 103. 
2. Maciver, COM, 105 . 
3. I b i d. ., 105 • 
.. : .......................................... ... 
atta inment of it by one involves 
in so f a r the f a ilure of the others 
to attain lt' we h ave conflicting 
interests. 
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Thirdly, like interests a re concordan t when t he objects 
men seek a re neither expansive tbrough co-operation, or 
at any r a te such as to be more ea sily attainab le by each 
through the co-operation of all". 2 
Common intere s ts may be further divi ded into primary 
common intere s ts a nd secondary common interes ts, according 
to Maciver. A common interest, such as the vve lfare of 
the community, is primary when men pursue tb. at interest 
for the s ake of the whole. Community welfare is a 
secondary common interest when men work for their community 
mainly to increase their own personal well-being. Maciver 
writes, 
By secondary common interest I mean 
that interest in associational or communal 
welfare which is itself dependent on a 
further exclusive interest, as vmen men 
seek the good of others because of the 
advantage or glory it brings to them-
selves. Primary common interest is that 
vvhich is dependent on no such further 
interest. 3 · 
However, Maciver recognizes tha t prima ry common interests 
are not completely separ ated from secondary common interests 
in actual experience. He states that "even when the primary 
4 interest is predominant, the secondary interest supports it 11 • 
1. COM, 106. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 104. 
4. Ibid. 
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For Maciver, inter es ts are the source of c ommunity. 
he says, 
The interes ts of men •.• ar e t he source 
of a ll soc ial ~ctivity, a nd t he c hanges 
in t heir interes ts are th e source of 
a ll s ocial evolution.l 
Howeve r , in his th inking , no t every interes t le ad s to 
community . Unlike inter e s ts do not promote community; 
t he 1tlo not involve or create any direct soci a l rela tions" 
2 
whatsoever. Even like interests "do not necessa rily 
involv e a ny community, a ny social relationshi p , between 
the beings who will them ••• " 3 In other wor ds none o f the 
dis crete interests, whether they be like, unlike or 
comple mentar y, viewed alone, creates community. Discrete 
intere s t s mus t become common interests before t hey can 
promote community. Maciver says tha t his main concern 
is 11with i nt erests as common and not a s di s crete, for it 
i s common intere s ts which are the sources of community". 4 
But he s t a tes that certa in discrete interests, suc h a s 
like ani com-elementary int er ests, are constantly passing 
over into common intere sts. In proportion as like and 
complementary discrete interests become common interests, 
they become forces making for community. He says that 
"comp lementary intere s ts do mo s t easily a rrl immedi a tely 
create common interests".5 And he says further, 
1. C O:M, 102 • 
2. Ibi d . , 105. 
3. Ibid. , 103. 
4. Ibid., 108. 
5. Ibid., 105. 
All like interests are potential 
common interests; in so f a r as that 
potentiality is realized community 
exists.l 
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Maciver believes that both community ani associa tion 
arise from men's intere s ts. He also ·thinks that men can 
best realize their lik~ intere s ts by pursuing them in 
common. He says tha t '' every like interest ••. is best se-
cured for all when all whom its pursuit brings into contact 
pursue i t in common, under regulated social conditions 11 • 2 
Recognizing that 11 all men are alike in respect of certain 
fundamental inter~sts 11 ,3 Maciver outlines his conception 
of the manne r in which these like intere s ts are transformed 
into ccmmon interests which serve as springs of community 
and associations. Basically men ha ve like organic and 
psychic needs and these needs give rise to orga nic a nd 
psychic interests. In r e spect of the associa tions which 
interes ts crea te, Maciver points out three groups of 
interests; namely, "the Whole complex of communal interests, 
some less extensive group of interests, and single specific 
interests 11 • 4 Corresponding to these groups of interest 
are certain associ ations. For instance, the "whole complex 
of communal interests" creates the sta te. A "less ex-
tensive group of interests" gives rise to social classes. 
And "specific interests 11 serve as the source of particular 
1. Ibid., 108. 
2. Maciver, COM, 109. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
small associations, such as, religicusand educational 
organizations . 1 
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Although Iaciver says that specific interests ar e 
complex and variously mixed one with the other and 
therefore difficult to classify, he neverthele s s divides 
speci f ic interests into what he ca lls ultimate and 
2 
deriva ti ve interests. He writes, 
Refle c t ion on this difficulty leads 
to the first division of specific 
interests, tha t into ultimate a nd 
derivative. For, a lthough any 
specific intere st whatever may be 
derivative, i.e. may exist as an 
interest becaus e it is a means to 
some ultimate interest, yet some are 
essentially derivative and others are 
their proper nature ultimate.3 
in 
Maciver divides derivative intere s ts into t wo b road 
classes, namely, the political and the economic.4 He 
says tha t political interes t s are aimed a t liberty and 
order, 11 the condition of the fulfilment of' all other 
1ntere s ts ••• 11 5 For him, economic interests are a lso 
6 
11 means o f a ll ultimate interests". Economic interests 
are not l imited to industrial and commercia l pursuits 
bu t are conne cted in some way "with the pursuit o f every 
interest'' .7 Ultimate interests, like derivative interests, 
are class i f ie d into t wo gr oups. They are called orga nic 
1. Ibid ., 109-116 . 
2 . Ibid. , 1 11. 
3 · Ibid., 112 . 
4. COM , 112 . 
5. I b id. 
6 . Ibi d . 
7. I bi d . 
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and psych ic interests because they are based on organic 
and psychic needs. Ho·wever, Ma civer says there is no 
clea r llne of demarcation b etween organic and psychic 
interes t be cause in a sens e a ll intere sts are psychic a l, 
"he. intere s ts of mind s •1 But he s ays that "some interests 
are crea t ed by organic nee ds a nd some by non-organic 
needs; "there f ore it is proper f or purposes o f analysis 
to d i vide ultimate intere s t s into organic and psychical. 2 
The orga nic interests <:l.re divided into sexual a.rrl 
non-sexual interest . Here Maciver us es sex i n a broa d 
sens e to include not only sexua 1 love, but a lso 11 family 
affectio n and the sp irit of kinship" . 3 The non-sexual 
intere s ts ref e r to interests in f ood, clothing , she l ter , 
recreat ion, a nd 11 wha teve r fulfils a ll the othe r organic 
needs 11 • 4 Maciver class i f ies psychica l interes ts ac cording 
to the predominant emphasis within t he particula r ment a l 
activi ty. He says, 
We adop t the psycholog ical dis tinction 
between knowing , feeli ng , and willing 
a s as:pe cts o f mental a ctivity, and 
distinguish interests according to the 
predominant aspe ct in each ca se . 5 
He states tha t "there are interests in ·which the 
intellectual a spe ct predominCJ. tes ••• 11 Suc h interes ts 
create scientific, philosophical a nd e ducational 
l. Ibid . 
2 . Ibid ., 113· 
3· Ibid ., 113. 
4 . Ibid ., 113. 
s. Ibi d ., 113 . 
as s ociations . Then he s ays that "there are interests 
in ' rhi ch th e emoti ona l as p ect d ominates •.• "1 These 
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g i v e r i s e to arti s tic a nd reli g i ous associ a t ions . Again 
Ma civer says , '\ve may a dd to these the interests in 1 hich 
the a s pect of will p redominates, the interests in p ower , 
pres t i ge, an d s elf-ass ertion." 2 Although t h ese do not of 
thems elves create any particular ass ociations , they a re 
a lways a t work helping to shape all ass ociations. 
~ aciver says tha t all specific common interests fall 
within th e scheme whi ch he ha s s et forth . And he holds 
t hat any one of the specific interes ts may be pursued for 
the common 3 00d or for the private good ; h ence he claims 
that i t i s an error to add what is called th e egoistic 
11 as a kind of int erest compar a ble with , s ay , the organic 
lntere sts. 11 3 F or Ma civer, "Egoism _and altruism are not 
kinds of interests at a ll, but rathe r way s in whi c r~ we 
relate ourse lves to our intere s ts." 4 More over, he says 
tha t "it is a mistake to p l a ce the 1 ethical interest' 
a longs ide, say, the scientific or a rtis t ic".5 Ethica l 
interests must be viewed as g eneral and not specific, 
11 for the ethical idea works in and through all interests, 
the 1 r universal and final determinant 11 • 6 
1. Ma civer, COU, 114. 
2. Ibid . 
3 · Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid ., 115. 
6. Ibid. 
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3) Oppositions and Hetrmonie s of Common Interests 
i ll social phenomena arise out of the meeting of 
" II I' . I 1 interest-determined wi lls , a ccordi ng to .Vla c ver. These 
wills meet in opposition and in h&rmony, but more o ft en 
in h a.rmony than in opposition. Thus communi t y is inevitab le 
and it i s assured. Maciver says, 
The deepest antagonisms between 
interests are not so deep as the founda-
tions of community. Every opposition 
on analysis turns out to be partial, 
not absolute. What is true of the 
whole universe, that differences prove to 
be but differences within unity, is true 
of our social world.2 
Soci a l opposition a nd social ha rmony are both rooted in 
the n a ture of man, for like interests may lead either to 
opposition or to harmony. But social h armony is primary 
and social oppos ition is secondary. Maciver points to 
t his f act when he says, 
The very fact of individuality creates 
an eternal possibility of opposition between 
the inte rest s of every self and those of 
every other. The correlative fact that 
all individuality is socially determined 
and socially conditioned eternally breaks 
down the absoluteness of such opposition. 
It is instead revealed as partial and 
relative. All oppositions of interests 
are secondary to the common interest of 
an association or a t le as t of a community.3 
To illustrate this point, Maciver analyzes oppositions 
as they occur first, 11 wi thin and between associations", 
l • Ibid • , 116. 
2. COM, 117. 
3· Ibid., 121. 
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second, It between groups within communi ti', and third, 
between communities. First, within associations there is 
never complete agreement a s to means a nd as to the re l t~ti ve 
positions of t he persons who are members of the as s ocia-
tion. He says, "If men are united as to any end, they 
are not thereby united as to the means of its pursuit. 11 1 
However Maciver says, 
But the oppositions fall within 
the associ a tion, they are not so 
great or so powerful in dividing as 
the common interests are grea t and 
powerful to unite, otherwise ~he 
associ ation would not endure. 
Specifically in an economic association, such as a 
f actory or s tore, th e like interest s of the various 
membe r s never QUite become common. The interest of the 
employer is not i dentical with the interest of the em-
ployee and vice versa. Yet there is a common interest 
which holds the associ a tion together; namely, p roduction 
or distribution of goods. It is cle ar therefore t hat the 
oppositi on between employer and employee t akes place 
within order. Even when emp loyee unions are formed to 
oppo se employer as s ociations, they both a re involved in 
a l ar ge r organization of common interests--the economic 
system in which they exist. Even if one industrial order 
is destroye d a nd another set up the ne w one will bring 
its oppositions and h armonies. Maciver writes, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
If we consider the deepest 
antagonisms within the economic 
system, the conflicting like 
interests of competitors, the 
conflicting like interests of 
labor and capita l, of culti va-
tion and manufacture , of invention 
and exploitation, of manufacture and 
distribution, of supp ly and demand, 
we see thdt they are all not only 
partial but secondary, that they 
would not exist at all were there no 
pri or community of Merest. I 
3econdly, opposition between groups within a 
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community is greatest wh en the complex of interests which 
binds the members together and which separ ates them from 
2 others i s l a r gest. Maciver therefore believes that most 
ex treme forms of opposition between groups within a 
communi ty is tha t between castes. Yet the community sur-
vives caste oppositions because there are ''extrinsic 
common interests, traditional a nd relig ious 11 , which serve 
as 11 substitutes for those intrinsic common interests which 
the c:as te-system rej e cts" .3 And Maciver s ays that since 
community outlives caste oppositions, there is no question 
t hat it is greater t han all other forms of intra-communal 
oppositions. He states, 
The common interest of all intra-
communal groups is, we may conclude, 
superior to the d ividing interest. 
The inte r ests on which community rests 
are greater than the interests o~ 
wh ich the groups within it rest. 
1. COM , 122-123. 
2. Ibid., 123. 
3. Ibid., 124. 
4. Maciver, COM, 126. 
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According to Iviaciver, community a lways endures. 
Ma civer t ak es his t hi rd illustration tha t community 
out-lives 1 ts opp ositions from those relc:, t ionsh i p s 
existing between community and community. He p oints out 
th~ t a s t a te cannot limit community to s tate boundary 
lines . He s ays t he only common inte res t which the state 
ca n conf ine with in the limits of the s t ate is the interest 
of ns. tionali t y . 1 He decla res t hat the communit y 11 by its 
very na ture :i. s more extensive t han any State ••• "2 
For Maci ver, intere s ts are prior to community and 
"community come s into being be cause int eres ts are r ealizable 
only in common life 11 • 3 Moreover , he writes that , 
interests ere not external bonds, 
not couplinGs which mig ht be un-
coup l ed or removed while the beings 
remain unchange d ; they are the inte res ts 
of each , not merely be t we en each and 
every other; they exist only a s the 
ob j e cts of men's wil ls, and they 
uni t e men in a -spiritua l ha r mony never 
to be understood in any t erms of phy~­
ical conjunc tion or organic oneness. 
Fina l ly Maciver says interes ts a r e : 
common ~ complementary, antagonistic , 
merged and opp os ed in a thousa nd 
modes , ye t they exist only in the 
a c tivities of individu al m1nds.5 
Therefore because men have intere s ts and because those 
intere s ts can b e fulf illed bes t when pursued in cooperation 
1. Ibid. 
2 . Ibi d . 
3 · Ib i d ., 102 . 4. Ib i d . I 1 27. 
s. Ibid ., 1 27 . 
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with other EJen, community will both endure and expa nd. 
Ivi.an i s thus a community forming bei'ng . 
F . Persona lity and Communal Development 
1) The Me aning of Communal Development 
Personality a nd communa l development a re, accord-
ing to J3civer , very close ly interre l at ed to e ach other. 
To p r esent a clear understand ing of t h i s int er-rela tionship , 
r1aciver defines what he means by communa l development and 
points out t he intric a te ways in which personality is 
involved in it. Communa l development, for lli aciver , means 
the progre ssive fulfilment of t he needs Emd. personalities 
of human b eings through their common li fe . It i s the 
prog r essive ful fi lment of the i dea o f community. And 
Ma civer's i dea of community is t his: 
Community is simply co mmon . life, 
and t ha t common life is more or 
less adequate according as it 
more or less completely fulfil ls in 
a s oc ial ha rmony the needs and per-
sona lities of its members, accord-
ing as it more or les s comp letely 
takes up into it self the necessary 
differences which individuality 
implie s, so tha t they become differ-
enc es within a unity and not contra-
dictions of that unity. Common life 
is thus a ques tion of degrees, and 
all existent communities reali ze only 
in degree the idea o f community.l 
Communa l development refers to the pr ocess in which 
communities preserve human life more b y providing a 
''bette r common life" • 2 
1. Maciver , COM, 171. 
2. Ibid., 173· 
Maciver recognizes tha t communal life inc ludes 
values, and says that al ways in co mmunity study, 
we are brought back to this ethical 
idea l, this i dea l of completer life 
which must nevertheles s be a ssume d , 
never demonstrated ••• The development 
of communi ty is a n aspect of the devel-
opment of life, the development of 
institutions means their tra nsforma-
tion to th e comp leter s e rvice of li fe .l 
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If the problem is rais ed tha t men differ in thei r con-
ceptions of va lues, M:aciver answers it by pointing out 
that t here is 11 general agreement among men in so far as 
there a re certa in universal ends which all men seek and 
thus admit to be g ood or desirable". 2 Br i ghtman also 
concurs with lVaciver on this point.3 Maciver p oints out 
further t h a t the ma jor differences among men "arise over 
t he question h ow f ar certain forms o f co mmunity, certain 
institutions , f urther t h ese ends 11 .4 Thi s latter question, 
according to M~aciver, is scientifica lly answerable. He 
s ays, 
The effect o f institutions on life is 
a sociological question, entirely ob-
jective question, a nd one absolutely 
soluble, i f not today, yet as are-
sult of more pr olonged res5arch into 
social causes and effects. 
To measure the ef f ect of institutions on life is scientif-
ically diff icult but nevertheless scientifically possible. 
1. Ibid., 174. 
2. Ibi d . 
3· Page 57 of t he dissertation. 
4 . ~ ac i ver, COM, 174-175· 
5. Ibid., 175. 
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~ aciver i s concerned with the development of 
co mmuna l li f e and is not very much intere sted in develop-
men t o f communa l institutions. 1 He i s concerned with 
communa l li f e because in one sense li f e outlasts insti-
tutions and a ssoci a tions. For Maciver li f e is continuous 
a nd i s t he s ame. He writes tha t, 
a ssociations may pass away, institu-
tions ma y be rep laced by tota lly 
different ins titutions but life is 
in es sence the s ame wherever it is 
f ound, being present in gre a ter or 
less degree.2 
And Macive r says further, 
The will and intelligence which today 
creates the communities of Western 
Europe is but mor e of the will a nd 
intellig ence wh1 ch integr ated the 
prehistoric horde or . clan. Can we not 
go yet further? Just as the divine 
mind may be conceived to comprehend 
and enjoy the illimitable universe, 
so the blind worm that feels dimly 
towards another of its kind i s in the 
measure of its life comprehending and 
enjoyi ng tha t much of the universe. 3 
Maciver is concerned with life as revealed in community, 
11 as r evealed in th e structures it has built" .4 Therefore 
Maciver is concerned with direction, the direction in 
wh ich life in community takes, for life is never complete.5 
Communa l development denotes, for Maciver, "the whole 
process in which t he forms of life evolve corr espondent 
1. Ibid., 176 • . 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid . 
4. Ibid. 
5. Maciver, COM, 177. 
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to the increase of the powers of life in individual a nd 
race".
1 
2) Criteria of Communal Development 
To clarify the direction which cornrrrunal development 
takes, Maciver outlines certain criteria which communal 
development follows. He deduces the criteria from his 
classification of interests. Taking the s pecific interests 
of men which he divides into ultima te and derivative, 
Maciver says th at deriva tive interests an d the economic 
and political associations which they create do not reveal 
the c r iteria of communal development. Derivative interests 
and their economic and political systems are ''but means 
to the ultim<:i te ends of men" •2 Therefore, according to 
Maciver, 
They derive their value from the nature 
of the ends which they effectively 
serve, and like all means they may be 
applied to the s e rvice of diverse ends, 
even of contradictory ends. Hence the 
only form of development within the 
sphere of derivative interests which 
concerns us here is their development as 
estimated by the service that they 
actually render, i.e. as estimated by 
the development of ultimate ends.3 
Mere perfection of economic and political ma chinery i s of 
little moment to communal development. Ultimate interests, 
however, are the source of the criteria of communal develop-
ment. Ultimate interests are based on organic and psychical 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. , 179. 
3. Ibid. , 179. 
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needs and are called organic and psychical interests, 
although in a strict sense both categories are psychical. 
Therefore, as community provides an increasing fulfillment 
of the organic and psychical interests of .men, it is 
developing, Maciver says, that, 
if we know what psychical development 
is (taking "psychical" in its widest 
sense, the adjective corresponding to 
the substantive 11 11 fe"), we know 
already the meaning of communal de-
velopment; it is psychical develop-
ment as fulfilled through common 
lif'e.l 
Psychical development in the individual is observable to 
all. Every one can perceive the child a s he pas s es from 
infancy to adulthood. Such observa tion reveals develop-
ment. In r e spect of this, Maciver says, 
In the process the whole life develops, 
not this or that aspect or capacity 
a lone; develops not indeed equally in 
all directions but yet as a whole. No 
l ap ses in individual instances, no p er-
versions, no instances of arrested pre -
cocity or of one-sided growth, c a n con-
cea l from us the truth th~t there is a 
rreneral develoument, a develoument of 
0 - 2 -t he whole li f e ••• 
And psychological tests disclose tha t, durin~ this develop-
ment, certa in traits of persona lity emerge. These traits, 
acc ording to Maciver, are criteria of individual develop-
ment as well as criteria of communal development. 3 And he 
adds tha t, 
1. Maciver, COM, 183. 
2 . Ibid ., 183 . 
3. Ibid ., 185 . 
it must foll ow that those communi t i es 
are most developed whose members ar e most 
advanced when measured by thes e standards, 
and whose institutions are mos t c a lcula ted 
to pr omote them.l 
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Maciver f ormula tes the criteria of co mmuna l development 
as follows : 
The r ega r d or disregard of personality, 
and of life and health as the basis of 
persona li ty ... The absence or pre sence of 
arbitrary control, p olitical, religious , and 
general, and t he absence or presence of 
the spirit of servi tude wh ich accepts or 
welcomes arbitrary subjection. The form 
and de gree of the exercise of force. The 
diversity or uniformity of the member s 
vvithin a community, and the correspondent 
lightness or heavine ss of communal custom. 
The simplicity or the comp l exity a nd the 
looseness or the strength of the autono-
mously determined relationship between each 
member and the whole of any co mmunity to 
which he belon3s ••. The multiplicity or 
paucity of associations within community. 
The breadth or narrowness o f the l a r gest 
community of which each individua l is a 
mem be r, the breadth or narro~~ess of the 
bounds wi thin which s ocial life is en-
closed.2 
3) The Reality of Communal Development 
Viewed from the point of view of the above criteria, 
community , according to Maciver, i s constantly developing . 
There is not one continuous development of community, but 
cons t ant deve lopment. Although the r e are r eactions, retro-
gres s ions, aberrations, a nd decadence in community, never-
theless co mmunity is growing .3 Community development in 
1. Ibid., 185. 
2. ~ aciver, COM, 186. 
3. Ibid., 197. 
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its true sense can be recognized only by taldng a broad 
look ;:; t 11 the t 1 n 1 ~ grea s ecu a r movements of human life ••. , 
and t hen see the li fe of real men and women f rom the point 
of view o f 11 i nner culture 11 rather than from the view of 
11 civilization11 • 2 Maciver says, 
In a word, i f we t ake a ll the life-
conditions together, and t ake l a r ge 
enough periods o f time for comparison, 
community is revealed beyond any 
doubt as having already undergone, 
within the era bounded by the limits 
of our knowledge, a vast process of 
development • 3 
Though Maciver is certa .in that t here is definl te co mmunal 
develonment and that there are possibilities o f completer 
development, he is not sure t hat there will a l ways be 
furthe r development . The question of t he future of 
comrrunal development can be answered neither affirma-
tively nor ne gatively . 4 
G. Persona lity and Communal Economy 
Maciver uses the term economy to mean the preserva-
tion and conservation of personality and li fe. Bro adly 










the conservation of values not only 
materi al but spiritual, the con-
servation of life itself , the con-
servation of the means of life , and 
the conservation of personality or the 




Maciver, 00]! , 334 . 
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Measured by the criteria o f communal development,l 
communities stan d on dif f erent cultural levels, some 
h i gher a n Q other s lower. Observa tion a nd comp arison of 
co.mnuni ties in terms of these criteria reveal that the 
activities of the higher communities do not differ so 
much in kind from the activities of the lower communi-
ties. Ra ther, the hi ~ner communities diff er from the 
lo wer comnrunities mainly in the manner in which the 
activities are pursued a nd "the relative prominence 
assigned t o each within the life of t h e whole". 2 As 
communities pass from the lower to the hi gher levels of 
culture, various changes take place in the modes in which 
intere s ts are pursued, as well as the si gni f icance accorded 
to the myriad types of interest. 
As these changes take place, they r eveal a princip le 
which Macive r calls 11 the principle of communal economy" .3 
The hi gher the community, the greater is its economy, 
its conservation of values and pe r sonality. Maciver says 
th at economy is always rela tive t ,o intellig ence ani 
purpose, and "the lower the intelligence, the smaller 
the economy •.• '.4 Intellig ence seeks ends and purposes 
and uses the least wasteful means of securing them. 
Moreover, it reduces and sometimes eliminates chance, 
tb.e :r' eby providing a greater degree o f economy. Intellig ence 
1. Page 128 of t he dissertation. 
2. Maciver, COM, 334. 
3· COM, 334. 
4. Ibid., 335 • 
crea tes community. 1 To the de gree that community de-
velops, chance and waste are decreased and economy is 
increased. 
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As an illustra tion of the principle that the more 
advanced society provides a greater economy, Maciver makes 
reference to the ratio between the birth r ate and survival 
r a te of human infants. He says the f act that the birth-
rate and survival-rate ten d to approximate each other as 
society passes from the primitive to the civilized form 
is an indication that socialization promotes communal 
economy. 2 
1) The Formation of Secondary Common Interests 
, In Relation to Economy 
Attention has already been ca lled to the significance 
which Maciver places on like interests of men.3 Like 
interests are important in Maciver's discussion of the 
relation of socialization to economy or the conservation 
of values. He says that men follow various modes in their 
pursuit of like interest--thdt is, "interests in the attain-
ment of the same or similar objects, material or other, 
regarded not as a common or comprehensive g ood but pursued 
as the separate or discrete good o f the several units 
4 
wh o pursue them 11 • The units that pursue like interest 
may not only be persons but may als o be associations or 
1. Ibid. , 336. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Page 158 of the dissertation. 
4. COM, 340. 
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communities. 1 Maciver says, 
when each of a number of associations, 
or communities pursues as a sepa r a te 
or discrete unit an interest like or 
identical in type to that which every 
other pursues, we may call the interests 
they severally pursue like interests. Within 
the unit there is then a common interest, 
but as between the units we have like 
interests only.2 
As community develops, men and groups of men (associations 
and communities) increasingly transform their modes of 
pursuing like interests. Ma civer believes tha t a formula 
of such transfor mation can be expressed in the following 
manner : 
The development of community involves 
the gradual transf ormation of conflict-
ing and parallel like interests into 
concordant like interests the estab-
lishment of secondary common interests.3 
In other words, as men become more sociali zed, they dis-
tributively and through their associations, tend to trans-
form their like interests into secondary common interests. 
Where such trans formation takes place , t h ere communal de-
velopment advances and values are increasingly cre a ted and 
preserved. 
According to Maciver, there a:ce four f undamental 
methods t.hat men, associ a tions, and communi ties employ in 
pursuing like interests. They are : 
(1) The method of direct antag onism. 
(Interests conflicti ng , no common interest) 
1. Ibid. 
2 . Ibid. 
3· Ibid ., 340~341. 
(2) 
( 3) 
( 4 ) 
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The method of i so lation. 
(Interests parallel, no common interest) 
The method of comp etition . 
Pure competiti on (Specific interest con-
f licting , wi der interests common) 
Modified competition (Specific interest 
p a.rtly conf licting , p e.rty conc ordant; 
wider inte r e sts common) 
The oiethod of co ooerat ion. 
Part ial coopera tion (Spe cifi c interes t com-
p l ement ary , hence parti a l common intere s t) 
Coopera tion ( Specific interest com 11on) 1 
Ma cive r a r r·an e;es the s e methods on the basi s of the absence 
or presence of common intere s t or in th e lat ter cases on 
the degree of common i nterest present . He claims t at 
11 the order so exp res aeu. is also tr~ e order of i ncreas i n0 
e .:::: onomy ••• " 2 He says , 
The mor e a common i n terest i s estab-
lished, the more is society established , 
a nd every increase in s ociety is an 
increase in economy .3 
Therefore in deve lope d societies, men seek more and more 
to secure the values of life t r1rough competiti on a nd 
coop eration ra t he rn than through antagonism and isola tion . 
To summarize the method , Maci ver declares tha t direct 
antagonism is only appropri ate where like interests are 
entirely conf lic ting . But he s ays the. t in soci ety interests 
are not entirely conflicting . Compe tition is appropri ate 
when intere s ts are part ly conflicting and p artly concordant; 
ho wever development o f intellig ence and of society makes 
1. co~ , 343-344 . 
2. Ibid ., 344 . 
3 · Ibid . 
Wo 
interests more concordant and less conflicting. In pro-
portion as like interests can be made concordant, coopera-
tion is appropriate. Maciver holds that these principles 
are true respecting like intere s ts only. As regards 
pri mary common intere sts, cooperation is the only effective 
method that can be used. 1 Then Maciver adds, 
where men are most autonomous, most 
prosperous, and most intelligent, there 
the less economic ways of pursuing like 
interests are most relinquished in favor 
of the more economic; in a word, that 
where men are most advanced, they are 
least isolated in small groups, they 
compete more readily than they fight, 
and they cooperate more than they com-
pete.2 
With the de velopment of community goes transformation of 
like interests into secondary common interests. Such trans-
form ation promotes social economy.3 
2) The Development of Primary Common Interests 
And Economy 
In Mac iver's view of communal development, the culti-
vation of primary common interests leads to further social-
ization. He argues that intrinsic interests, i.e·. interests 
which are pursued for their own sakes and not as mere 
neces s ities of life or means to some other interest, are 
essentially common interests. Moreover since they are 
pursued for their own sakes, they are primary and common. 
Hence Maciver claims that 11antagonism necessarily impairs 
1. COM, 349. 
2. Ibid., 353. 
3· Ibid., 355. 
and coopera tion neces sarily furthers ••• 11 intrinsic or 
prima ry c ammon interests •1 He con tends that whenever 
intrinsic interests can be substituted f or extrinsic 
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interests both c omrnuni ty and economy a re furthered . He 
says, 
Both community and economy increase, 
for instance, whenever the conditions 
of work are so altered that men are 
enabled to t ake joy of their work , to 
expr ess and fin d their n ature in and 
through it.2 
And Maciver writes further, 
The more men are devoted to the common 
interest, the more they rea liz e them-
selves within it. This, too, is 
economy, for the pursuit has value no 
les s than the end attained. It is clear 
tha t in the pursuit of p rima ry common 
interests tha t the greatest social 
economy is realized.3 
H. The Pr oblem of Community Co-ordination 
As community differenti a tes, g iving rise to multi-
tudinous a ssocia tions, institutions, clas ses , groups, 
and n ations, a grave prob lem emerges. Maciver refers to 
it as the problem of how to coordina te the various associa-
tions a nd organizations in such a manner that community 
will be stimula ted instead of stifled. He believes that 
this problem was very acute at th e beginning of community 
differentiation, and he thinks th a t a study of the patterns 
whi ch community coordination h as taken reveals certain 
1. COM, 370. 
2 • I b i d • , 371 • 
3· Ibid., 372. 
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lessons respecting the principles which true coordina tion 
of comlliunity takes.1 Regarding the coordina tion of 
a s s oci a tions within co mmunity, Maciver lists three essen-
ti a l rules which true coordination follows. They are: 
Each form of association h as its 
distinctive place and character 
which cannot without social loss 
be usurped by any other association. 
The more each kind of association 
devotes itself to a sint5le appro-
pri a te type of interest, the better 
its service to community. 
The different types of association do 
not form a hierarchy within community 
but a coordina te series under the organ-
ization of the State.2 
Associ ations h2ve not always followed these rules of 
coordination and even now they viola te them in various 
Vlays. However, Maciver says they are rules wr.dch genuine 
coordina. tion of associations follow • . 
Maciver points out that the extension of the area 
of community also creates a problem--the problem of the 
relation of locality to locality. Localities are joined 
with localities in an ever-widening circle. Community 
extension is at first 11 more or less mechanical", conquest 
being the simplest form of extension.3 Another form is 
voluntary grouping for common defense. But these two forms 
of community extension constitute, except far governmental 
privileges tha t involve superiority on the one hand and 
1. Ibid • , 250. 
2. Maciver, COM, 250-258. 
3· Ibid., 258. 
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subordination on the other, "mere juxtaposition of 
communi ties'' •1 However, a process of unifica tion takes 
place where there was once mere agglomeration. But unity 
does not completely erase the problem of coordination, 
for the unity of the l ar ger community is not the unity 
which the smaller community had already attained . The 
l a r ger community provides unity for the more universal 
interests but at the expense of the warmth and intimacy 
of the sm aller c omrnuni ty. Hence, accord 1ng to Maciver, 
''true co-ordination of localities is hard to attai~ ••• "2 
Whe.ce it is achieved, the smaller community is preserved 
·, 
by the l ar ger community and the co-ordination of locali-
ties includes a t least three definite principles . 
The first principle is th Cl.t "the true relation of 
localities to the whole community may be described as 
federal 0 .3 For Maciver, the term ''federal" signifies 
"the general rela tion of local to national autonomy 11 .4 
Federalism means "the reconciliation of the nearer special-
ized cla im with the more universal claim" •5 Federalism 
implies that the more universal needs of man are met through 
the larger locality and the sectional needs are met by 
the sma ller locality. The second principle is that "under 
such a 'federal ' system there is no contradiction between 
1. Ibid. 
2. COM , 260 . 
3· Ibid ., 262 . 
4. Ibid. 
5 . Ibid., 263. 
the completest activity of the smaller and the 
comp letest activity of the greater community''.l This 
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means that in true community differentiation, e a ch locality 
c arries "its due share of resp onsibili t y a nd cooperation 
wi t hin a common service". 2 The third principle is that 
"where loca lities h a ve built , for the furtherance of a 
specific common interest, a central association, that central 
associa tion should be no longer organized a ccording to 
local d ivisions but a ccordi ng to the intrinsic divisions 
of the s p ecific interests concerned" .3 This principle 
means t h a t as communities develop, becoming larger and 
more centra li zed, locali t y as a unit of organization be-
comes less an d less effective because ma n's interes ts 
c annot b e confined to a s ingle area . Hence the associa-
tions designed to fulfill specific interests should be 
organized a long t he lines indicated by the interests, not 
a long the lines of mere locality. 
The coordina tion o f cla sses vvithin communities is a 
resl p roblem . Macive r s a ys that clas s es ar e ever-p resent 
and thr~t the more cl ass distinction rests up on "intrinsic 
d i ff erences" r a ther .. than on "mere privile ge or status not 
a c qu i red by the pers ona l q_ualities of their p osse ss or s , '' 
t h e more the best interests of commu nity will be served. 4 
He descripes the conditions tha t make for the best 
1. I bi ·:~ • , 266 . 
2 . Ibi d . 
3 . Ibid. , 267-268. 
4 . COI-l , 270. 
co-ordination of cl asses as follows: 
They should be such as would both g ive 
every kind of capacity the opportunity 
to reveal i tself and permit revealed 
c apacity to function a t the h i 6 hest 
level of service for which it i s adapted, 
not debarred fr om tha t servic e by any 
consider ati on of social status other -
wis e determined . l'!o forms of s ocia l 
service , least of all the highest, should 
be the privilege of any pre-determined 
class .1 
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According to ];J:aciver, the greatest obs tacle which stands 
in the vvay of eliminating classes based on extrinsic dis -
tine ti ons is 11 the possession of inc ome-yie l dina; property". 2 
Maciver says tha. t Karl lViarx was right in discerning the 
cleavage betvreen th e economic privileged and the economic 
unprivile ged . But ~aciver asserts tha t Marx was wrong in 
minimizing the forces that modify this cleavage , the 
interests which cross and criss-cross in i ntricate ways 
7, 
the divisions of economic classes._., For Maciver, although 
there is a 11 vital cleavage in community expr essed in the 
anti thesis of capital and lab or ••• :1 , t he division c an be 
united. Revolution is not inevitable. But the cleavage, 
according to Maciver 1 s view, c a n be ef f'e cti vely bri dged 
only by the construction of such a 
system as makes labor no lone;er a mere 
instrument of a productive mecha nism 
controlled by another class for its 
ends, such a system as carries into 
the economic sphere the same libera -
tion of individu a lity (together with ••. 
1. Ibid., 270-271. 
2. Ibi d ., 272 . 
3· Ibid., 272-273 · 
the integration of community) al-
re ady a chieved in respect of other 
interests .1 
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Maciver t hinka that such a s ys tem is already in p rogress 
in a ll industri a l communities where free as socia tion is 
a llowed and l abor is organizing its own as soc i c. tions to 
counter-balance the associations of capital. 
Th e problem of co-ordination of na tions arises be-
cau s e the interests of men c a nnot be stopped even at 
nationa l boundaries. Although the state can regula te the 
rel a tions o f classes and associations within its boundary, 
it cannot ef f ectively govern what takes pla ce outside 
its territorial limits. Hence there is need for co-
2 
ordination among na tions. 
Maciver points out that the na tion is a community, 
the nature of which is like-mindedness and congeniality, 
which like-mindedness and congeni a lity are based on 
common li f e rather than on consanguinity.3 The state is 
the primary association within a nation, although the limits 
of the state and nation are not necessarily c·o-inci dent.4 
Co-ordina tion between nations is achieved tb~ough the states, 
through the cooperation of states. The growth of commun-
ities makes inter-stat e action inevitable. International 
associations must increase. Maciver believes that the need 
for co-ordination among na tions makes the Grotian view 
1. COM, 273· 
2. Ibid., 274. 
3. Ibid., 277. 
4. Ibid ., 282. 
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of the state all the more correct. The Grotian view of 
the state is, 
that the States exist for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of rights, 
that therefore their powers are 
limited and that they have duties 
towards one another, being them-
selves members of a society of 
States.l 
The Groti an view is consistent with the essential nature 
of the state, according to Maciver. This is true, he says, 
because, 
it is l aw that assigns the sphere and 
reveals the meaning and limitations of 
the State. The State exists first of 
• all as the upholder of law, its first 
business is therefore justice, the 
meting out of what is fair and the 
repressing of lawless might. It is 
therefore a 1 juristic person' , and a 
'juristic person' cannot claim arbi-
trary right in respect of another 
1 juristic person' wi~hout denying the 
very nature of both. 
The gro wth of common interests is also making war between 
nations "irrational and vain" .3 Furthermore Maciver believes 
that 11 the same reasons which are the condemna tion of war as 
between churches or classes are in operation to condemn 
warfare between nationalities 11 • 4 
Taking a broa d look at the total problem of community 
co-ordina tion, Maciver advances the theory that federalism is 
the most congenial to communal development. He says that 
1. COM, 285-286. 
2. Ibid. , 286. 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 288. 
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needs of social life cannot be met in one huge community 
or in myri ad autonomous s mall ones. Maciver states, 
decentr alization is as necessary 
as centralization •.• The true prin-
cip l e i s federal, a common organi-
zation f or common int erests, special 
organi za t ions for special interests, 
centrali zation for universal order 
a nd security, decentrali zation for 
the fulfilment of life.l 
An d he believes t hat the principle of federation dis-
closes a law; namely, 
that so f ar as common interest ex-
tends, so far and in so far ought 
community also to extend, not 
isola tion and not absorption, not 
parochialism a nd not cosmopolitanism--
but narrower and wide r cir cles of 
community in due cor r espond ence to 
nar r ower and wider needs.2 
The growth of personality broadens community and community 
dif f erentiati on stimulates the development of the prin-
ciple of f ederation. 
1. COM, 296. 
2. Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
HUMAN NATURE AS REVEAlED 
IN ~~GIVER'S POLITICAL THEORY 
A. The Role of the Family in Human Nature and Government 
1) Personality and the Family 
The family is the primary social unit in wh ich 
personality develops. Maciver says that the family is 
''the primary agent in the molding of the life-habits 
and the life-attitudes of human beings", as well as the 
primary social unit in whi ch government is generated. 1 
He says that, 
man is born the most helpless and 
unwitting of animals, the least 
armed with ready instincts to fit 
him for survival, the slowest to 
develop his potentialities of 
autonomy; and at the same time the 
most receptive, the most imitative, 
the most educable, the most highly 
endowed.2 
The family accepts "this amorphous being", molds its 
mentality into social a ttitudes and imprints upon the 
organism "the habits that become the foundation for all 
its l a te r activities". 3 
Maciver claims that "even before the child is con-
scious o f a self, that self is being molded within the 
family 11 .4 The process which the family follows in 
molding the self has two a spects, according to Maciver. 
1. WOG , 23. 
2. Ibid. , 28 • 
3· Maciver , WOG, 28. 
4. Ibid. 
First, there is 
the subtle unconsciously reg istered 
intera ction of the nascent being 
with the family members, preeminently 
a t the first with the mother, as 
t hroug h the s a tisfa ction of its 
anima l ne eds it a wakens gradua lly to 
a sense of socia l relations , of self 
an d otherne s s, of dependence and dema nd, 
of love and anger.l 
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Second ly, the r·e is the process o f regu l a tion t ha t con-
stant ly g oes on in t he f amily. "This is t he other asp ect 
of the mold ing of the child ,'' Iv aciver decla res .2 By 
converting temp ora ry s ex into the p ermanence of home, 
"the chi l d ma.kes the fir s t coherent s ociety", a ccording 
to Ma civer.3 But the child is also the p roduc t of t he 
s ociety t hu s cre a ted. The home is the world where the 
child 's li f e i s re gula ted, indoctrina ted , an d b ab i tua ted. 
In it t he child le a rns hisspeech a s well a s his values. 
2) Government a nd the Family 
Society cannot exist without some regula tion "over 
th e na ti v e i mpulses of huma n b eings". 4 And , a ccording to 
Ma cive r , t he f amily i s t h e first org ani z ation to b e con-
cerned vri t h socia l r egula tion. Th erefore b efo re t here is 
ever an agency of g ove rnment , the family h a. s alre ady es-
tabli she c1 certain control s which "constitute the e s sence 
of g overnment" .5 Formal g overnment simp ly c ontinues the 
1. I b id . 
2. Ibid., 29 . 
3· Ib i d ., 28. 
4. Ibid ., 22. 
5 . Maciver, WOG , 22. 
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process of regula tion and control already developed 
within life. 
In the home the child is governe d with a uthority 
tempered with affection. Nevertheless the authority is 
absolute. 1 Exceptions to this fact merely prove the 
rule . Maciver points out tha t from the point of view 
of the child , the home is always absolute at first. 
AnC. he declares tha t 11 only the leng th of time through 
which it holds undisputed sway differentiates in this 
respect one form of culture from another'' •2 The ma gic 
of the l aw begins for the child "as soon as it becomes 
aware of others and its relation to others 11 • 3 Maciver 
says , ''Regu l a tion is a universal aspec t of society . u4 
Not only is the family the organ of g overnment for the 
chil d , it is a lso the reg ulator of sex rela tionships . 
The family invo lves the regulation of property too. Hence 
the family is the ma trix of government . 5 Government as 
soci a l reg ula tion the ref ore precedes political government . 
G-overnment within f ami lies extends and expands 1 t self un-
til, in more comp lex societies, the s t ate, with formalized 
g overnment, emerges. 
B . Man as a Myth-making and Te chnique-forming Being 
According to Maciver, man is a peculi a r animal; he is 
1 . Ibid. , 29 • 
2 . Ibid ., 30 • 
3. Ibid . 
4. Ibi d ., 22. 
5. Ibid., 24 . 
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"the kno wing a nimal" •1 ;vi th hi s abili t y to kno1·; , man ha s 
cre a t ed various contriva nces m1ich can b e di vided into 
t wo broad classes. Macive r calls th es e clas s es myths 
and tech ni ques. For Aaciver man i s a myth a nd techni que 
ma king socia l being who re quires government. Macive r be-
lieves t ha t to understan d man's myths and techni ques is 
to understand "ho w the government of man over ma n ha s 
come to be ••. "2 The t erm technique ref ers to 11 the devices 
and skills of every kind th a t enab le men to dis pos e of 
3 
things and of :p ersons ••• 11 A techni que is 11 a way of know-
4 ing tha t 1 s primarily a way of control". Myths mean 
"the value-impregna ted b eliefs and notions th at men hold , 
tha t they live by or 11 ve for" .5 Maciver cla ims tha t the 
unity of every society is based upon a myth-system, a 
myth-complex which determines all its a ctivities. He 
sta tes tha t "all social rela tions , the very texture of 
human society, are myth-born and myth-sustained". 6 Every 
period, eve r y na tion, and every civilization has its 
particular myth-complex . The unity a nd continuity of 
society depend upon it . The myth-complex includes beliefs 
and va luations rang ing from the grossest imaginations to 
the mo s t refined philosophies . And the myth-comp lex 
undergoes constant change, making possible the fact that 
1. ' OG, 3 · 
2. Ibid. , 4. 
3· Ibid . 
4. Ibid. 
5· Ibid. 
6 . raciver, WOG, 4. 
often the myth which gives birth to a relationship is 
not the s ame as t he myth which sustains it. 
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Moreover myths and techniques ar e inter-rela ted and 
interdependent. A chang e in myths creates a change in 
tech nique s and vice versa. For i nstance, uto achieve 
anything man resorts to his techniques ••. "1 But Maciver 
writes, 
what he seeks to achieve, how far 
he cultivates or inhibits one set 
of potential aptitudes or a no"mer, 
how he chooses between the various 
paths a l ways opening up before him, 
what play he gives his sheer organic 
drives as he imposes on their exuberance 
some proportion and limit--that depends 
upon his myths.2 
The myth indic ates the goa l and points out the direction, 
but "the technique builds the road to it".3 In some cases, 
for instance in government , myths and techniques are ex-
ceedingly dependent upon each other; but in other in-
stances , such a s bridge building, the techni ques and myths 
are only relatively dependent upon one another . 4 Maciver 
points out that "the business of governing is inextricably 
bound up with the elaborate a nd ever varying myth-comp lex 
that links the governors and the governed 11 • 5 
1) The Myth of Authority 
Maciver defines authority as, 
1. Maciver, WOG, 6. 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid. 
4 • Ibid • , 12 • 
5. Ibid . 
the established right, within any 
social order, to detennine policies, 
to pronounce judgments on relevant 
issues, and to settle controversies, 
or ••. to act as leader or guide to 
other men.l 
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For him, the characteristic factor in au~hority is the 
idea of right. Authority and power are not the same 
thing . In a strict sense, "an authority is a man or a 
body of men vested with the right to make decisions and 
to maintain the order that prevails w1. thin any system 
or area of social organization'' •2 
According to Maciver, man's central myth is the myth 
of authority. The sense of authority is the most weighty 
element sus taining order in social relationships. He 
says, "The forms and kinds of myths are endless, but at 
the core of every myth-structure lies the myth of 
authority. u3 Myth-complexes can effectively maintain 
social order only with the aid of the sen~of authority. 
J.'.~aciver says, 
Social myth at eve r y level enjoins 
some kind of order among men, and 
enshrines tha t order in a contex of 
value-impregnated lore and legend, in 
tradition and in philosophy. With the 
aid of authority the myth-conveyed 
scheme of values determines the social 
order. Hence the central myth in the 
maintenance of any4social system is the myth of authority. 
1. WOG, 83. 
2. Ibid., 84. 
3· Maciver, ~OG, 39. 
4. Ibid. , 42. 
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Man ha s a sense of the authority of government as 
well as a sense of the authority of the social order. 
Maciver says, 11 There is authority beyond the authority of 
. l 
government • 11 He means the authority of the social 
order which is more fundamental than the authority of 
government. However Maciver claims that apart from simple 
homogeneous communities, the authori ty of g overnment is 
11 absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the fundamental 
order 11 • 2 The reason is that human na ture requires govern-
ment. He says, 
The reason is that without govern-
ment the impulses of individuals 
toward gain or power and the pressures 
and clashes of group interests cannot 
be sufficiently restrained by the un-
guarded consensus of the community, so 
tha t the consensus itself at length is 
defeated and rent apart.3 
And Ma civer writes, 
The reason is also that without the 
central agency of government the 
community ca nnot guar d itself against 
the perturbations of new conditions, 
cannot readjust itself to the changes 
wrought by its own activities and by 
i mpa cts from wi thout, cannot restate 
its code to make explicit the ne w ob-
ligations and the ne w rights that its 
perception of need and its ~onception 
of value render imperative. 
In order to strengthen and make society more stable 
and secure, the myth of authority is institutionalized 
1 . WOG, 85 . 
2. Ibid., 86. 
3· Maciver, WOG , 86. 
4. Ibid. 
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through ceremonies and institutions . Such institutionali-
zation gives authori ty an added s anctification. Ev e ry 
society h 2. s its charac teristic mode of maintaining the 
sanctity of authority. And the mode of sanctification 
of authority in a simple society is very differ' ent from 
the mode in a modern multi-group society. 
Moreover, Maciver p oints out that the myth of 
authority undergoes transforma tion in t h e social process . 
Be c a lls a ttention to the f a ct th at in simp l e societies 
in s titutions and ceremonies which maintain authority corres-
p ond closely with the mores of the community ; ho wever, 
in the modern more comp lex societies , s pe cia l interests 
an d dive :cse loyalties compete for direction and control 
of communa l ins titutions and governments. In mod ern 
Western society , Maciver asserts tha t "re lis ious groups 
drove the f irs t gr.e a t wedge into the cracking unity of 
communi ty and culture", a nd t hen states t '_at the uforces 
of economic sp eci a lization" ma de th e next cleavage. 1 Undeor 
the impact o f technology and industry, the sense of author-
ity unde rwent a terrific shock. Men pr ocla imed that "no 
authority ••• wa s needed to regula te the open market--the 
only business of authori ty was to le a ve it a lone •.• or at 
most to ensur e that it remained open and free 11 • 2 As 
c a. pt.talism increased, economic organizations g r ew and became 
1 . WOG, 52 . 
2. I bi d ., 52-53 · 
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strong enough to exercise influence on government and 
a lso t o dicta te to the government of the state. This 
changed the myth of authority and b ecame the occasion 
for some writers to de cla.re t ha t g overnment i s not the 
organ of any communa l interest but is an 11 arena of 
opposi ru; interests" . 1 Ind ividua li s t ic at titudes , 
c:. ccompani ed and gave support to these developments . 
Va lue s a nd philosophi es changed; specia l economic groups 
identified the communal interests "t,'l i th their own. 
Maciver says th a t Marx and Engels nos tula ted the theory 
that, 
economic interests bred in each 
group a corresponding 'ideology', a 
protective web of beliefs t hat he ld 
no intrinsic validity but were the 
realization of their strugg le to 
gain or ma intain place and power. 2 
Although Marx and Engels maintained tha t the ir t he ory 
was scientifically valid, they unconsciously supp orted 
the vi ew of other writers that all theories of government 
are mere 11 ideolog1es 11 • The result wa s that 11 the r e l a tivity 
of social 'truth ' meant also the rela tivity of ethics".3 
In proportion as these beliefs penetra ted society, the old 
myths of authority di sintegrated . But new myths devel-
oped. The condition of anomie did not obtain . Though 
conservatives sought to restore the old orders, they 
failed in the ma in to a ccomplish their mission. Reactionary 
1. :i: aciver, WOG, 53· 
2 • Ibid • , 54 • 
3· Ibid . 
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fascists s ought to establish uni t y by appea ling to the 
myth o f na tional supremacy. Radic al communism tried to 
provide unity t hr ough the myth of c l ass-l es s s ociety and 
the withering a way of the sta te. But all t hese attempts 
at unity a nd attempts to cre a te myths adequate for multi-
group s ociety ha d, according to Maciver, 
the mortal defect that they rejected 
t he difference-breeding processes in-
herent in modern c l vili zat ion a.nd 
f ound no source of author;i. ty except 
through the usurping and precarious 
power that arrogated to itself the 
supreme ri ght to crush what it could 
not reconcile.l 
For Maciver, all these failed or wil l fail because they 
did not or do not face the real problem--namely, "the 
problem of unity in diversity". 2 
2) The Myth of Law and t he Sense of Law-Abidingness 
( 1) The Law 
According to Maciver, 1:ociety rests on 11 a firmament 
of l aw 11 tha t encompasses and undergirds all aspects of 
society. Men as well as governments depend upon law. It 
is Maciver's belief that 
without l aw there is no order, and 
wi thout order men are · los t, not 
knowi ng where ther g o, not knowing 
wh a t they do..a3 
No one is completely l aw-lef ;S, not even "the savage 11 , nor 
the out-law , nor the tyrant ,, nor the sophisticate.4 Man 
is a law-abi ding b eing who nay d isobey, viola te, and rebel 
1. i11aciver, VlOG , 58. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 61. 
4. Ibid. 
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against laws, but he i s nevE~r completely separate from 
law. Yet man may not recognize any law between himself 
and an out sider. One commulli ty may not recognize any 
law regarding its r e l a tions with another community. For 
Maciver, 
The world has beerl, and up to the 
present has remair~d, a collocation 
of areas of lawfulness, communities 
with no law binding the one to the 
other.l 
Nevertheless man is law-abic.ing and law is a basis of 
authority. 
Chronologically speakir.g, the conception of law has 
undergone multitudinous charges. To the primitive the 
law is unassailable, inexorable, and sacred. It is not 
made by legislator, chief, judge or king; 11 1t is time-
lessly ordained 11 • 2 Leaders appear and councils arise to 
interpret the folk-ways, the l aw, but they do not legis-
l a te in the true sense. Yet in their interpretations 
of the l aw, changes in the law take place. Government is, 
at first, "more the guarantor than the maker of the law" •3 
All societies are intricate and complex, but especially 
modern society. Therefore the government or the law of 
the sta te can never re gul ate the whole gamut of social 
relationships. The l aw of the state or legal law merely 
touches the surface rel ationships; the deeper relations 
1. Maciver, W'OG, 61. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 63. 
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are maintained by the law )f the folk--the conventions, 
the customs, and the mores. However, the more complex 
the society the more is go11ernment needed to make legal 
laws for the governance of social rela tions. 
Maciver points out that in primitive society, in 
ancient civilizations, and in the medieval societies, 
11 the ruler was subject to the laws, not above them" •1 
The l aw was the law of the community, given either by 
the will of God or by the will of the people. 2 1 hen 
the rulers insisted upon making laws, they made them in 
the name of the people. The medieval kings and emperors 
made l aws either with the coopera tion of a council repre-
senting the community or with the idea that he was merely 
interpre ting t he natural law. And although medieval 
rule r s often oppressed the people, there was a common 
feeling tha t rulers we r e under the lav~ of God. Maciver 
writes tha t even after allowing certain qualifications, 
"government in the Middle Ages wa s f ar more the cre a ture 
than th e creator of the prevailing system of law and 
order".3 
However, the Renaissance introduced a new doctrine 
regarding the r e l a tion of government and l a w. This doctr·ine 
set "the ruler above the law and made his single will the 
very source of l aw11 • 4 The ruler was the sovereign, the 
1. Maciver, WOG, 66. 
2. Ibid. 
3· I bid., 67. 
4 • I b 1 d • , 68 • 
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authority. This theory cr < ~cked the old f i rmanent of 
l aw and he l p ed to c reate a condi t i on th c:; t led to an 
inevitable n eod for a new 1.. .ni t y and a ne w a utho r ity for 
societ y . 11acive r e xp res s e ~ . t h e p oint thus, 
Men felt the ne eC. for new authorit y and 
a ne w unity. ThE· new unity they found 
was the gre a t er !:. tate, comi ng gradual ly 
to b e viewed a s ihe na tion--state. The new 
authority was t hE authority of t h e 
sovereign.l 
But the fall a cy of this doc :trine was t h :::.t i t did not 
provid e a s olution fo r rell g ious dif f erenc es . The peop le 
of one fa ith c ould not acknowledg e the sovereign t y of a 
ru l er who s ha red ano t her f~.i th. Hence reli gious s trugg les 
ensued a nd continued until a ne w doctrine was adv a nce d . 
It was the doct r ine "that e: i vic allegiance d i d not re-
quire reli g ious conf ~rmi ty' •2 It was t he doctrine tha t 
diversity of' belief , op inic,n, a.nd thought was inevitabl e 
in c omplex societies a nd t hat "the s oci a l order was more, 
not les s , secure 1 f no s ovE,r eign p ower a ttemp te d to 
regula te or 'co-ordi n a te' i.his dive rs i ty' 1 .3 ''la civer p oint s 
out t hat men be c a me aware, a t le as t, 
t ha t a co mmunity is held together 
b y many b onds , t ha t ma ny of the s e a re 
not p olitica l ancl t hat t he li berty 
of men to pu rsue t he i r diffe rent a l-
l eg i ances c an attach them the more 
s t r ong l y to the E;reat er un1 4y t hat 
s u s t a ins t heir djfferences. 
(2 ) Iv~an ' s Sens e of Law- i' b idingness 
1. ~aciver , WOG , 69 . 
2 . Ibid ., 73 . 
3 . Ibid . , 73 · 
LJ . • I b id. 
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The que st ion of l av1-ab i d ingne s 8 i 8 an import a nt one 
in l!iaciver ' s theory o f ma n a nd rs overnme nt. He points 
out that t h ere are t wo a s pect s of the question . One is: 
Why ought men to obey ·the law? .Ana the other 1 s : ' 'itihy 
do rr:en cbey the lt:l\'!? Regarding tr~e i' ·:.xst , 1 a clver be-
lievE:ls r im.;J l y tl: ."'~t _  ~!1 is a l ways bligated to obey t he 
l aw , 11 excep t when in the c onsidered judgm ent of t he 
citizen di sobedience p romotes the grea ter we l fare of t h e 
society a s a 'vVh ole in which he lives 11 • 1 But r esp ecting 
the second question , Maciver says it is a problem of 
11 s ocial ~::Jsy c hology , of the motives and ' interests tha t in-
? 
cline men to l aw- abidins ne ss 11 • ·- And h e 1 terat e s t hat men 
obey the l aw not me rely bec:au s e t hey recognize the 
l egitima cy an d r i ghtness of' the l aw s , nor merely out of 
a sense of ob ligati on t o t~e sta te or fe a r of the conse-
quence of breaking the l aw . · 1thou3h t hese are involved 
in obe dience of l aw , they a re not simple motivations of 
man's conduct. Rather, for Maciver, 11 Law- abi d ingness is 




I b i d . , 
Ibid ., 
Ibi d ., 
Ibid ., 
Men obey because t h ey a re socia l 
beings --or , if you prefer it, be-
c au se they are socialized beings, 
trained a nd indoctrina ted in the 
ways of their soc iety. All the 
mo t ivations t hat a re evoked and 
active in t h eir E! Ocia l ci r cle con-
spire to ma k4 them, on the whole, 






11/~e..civer b elieves t hat no li sting of' s pe ci f ic mo tivations--
such as , de sire f or socia l approva l, or wish to a void 
p 2rsona l molestat ion , or p r e ference for the line of le as t 
resistanc e - - c a n offer a n a de qu a te ans wer to the q uestion 
of l aw- abi ding ness. He sayE, , 
All t he ties t hat ho l d men to g ether 
in any society , a ll the needs and a ll 
the h opes tha t dep end on t he i r 
so ciety for reali z ation, promp t the m 
to l aw- ab idingness.l 
There a re, ~aciver believes, certa in social phenomena 
whi ch corrobora te thi s inclusive answer. As examp les, he 
cites the high crime r a te among g roups that a re discrimi na ted 
against, the social unres t under frontier condi tions , and 
the rela tive lawlessness among second generation i mmigrants. 
Ma civer writes, 
Only whe r e the vari ou s loya lties of 
men can live to g ether, inter- a djusted 
within the s ame framework of legal law, 
can the firmament of order be susta ined. 2 
The degree to which this cond:Ltion is achieved, the unity 
of the g roup is streng thened a nd l aw-abid ing ness increases •. 
Under t h ese conditions the several g roups tha t mak e up t he 
community, irresp ective of th e con flicti ng intere s ts among 
t hem , ca n "identify themselves with the b road purposes of 
the state 11 . 3 Under these conditions, only a sense of eco-
nomic exp loitation by a part .. icula r group can constitute 
4 
a threat to l aw-abiding ness. 
1. Maciver, WOG, 77 . 
2. Ibi d ., 79 . 
3· Ibid ., 
4. Ibid ., 79 . 
In the multi-group society, the spirit of l aw-
abi d in2:ness is a fundamental element in the authority 
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of g overnme nt . nd l aw-ab idingness is enha nced when gov-
ernment r ecogni zes and respects differences in faith and 
loya lties. The f a ilure on th e part of tota litarian states 
to a cknowl edge ·thi s fact is, according to Maciver, a 
s erious shortcoming . He says, 
The totalitari a n, confusedly identify-
ing order wi th co-ordina tion, seeks to 
reduce all faiths to the one authori-
t a rian faith of t h e state . He thereby 
destroys the very spirit of law-abiding-
ne s s, not only for the excluded or 
suppressed groups but even for those 
who sha re the f a ith his state enthrones. 
For tha t f a ith itself then becomes ex-
ternal and coercive, subject to polit -
ical expediency, incapab le of spontaneous 
growth , strait~jacketed by the necessities 
of power.l 
The 11 free responsiveness of the socia l beings" is essen-
2 tial to the spirit of l aw-abidingness. Ther efore Maciver 
maintains that 
there are strong new reasons why the 
modern state should by every practicable 
means extend to all its groups a genuine 
equa lity of civil rights, a ttaching no 
diBabi li ties to any do ctrine , save in 
so far as that attacks the civil rights 
of others, ·and at the s ame time removing, 
so far as it is able to do so, such 
barriers and discriminations as cause any 
group to feel alien or disprivileged within 
the l a rger community.3 
3) The Myth of Power , Property , a n:i Status 
l.Ibid., so. 
2.Ibid. 
3.Ibid., 80- 81 . 
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( l) Power 
'v1ac iver says social power signifies "the capacity 
in any rela tionship to command the service or compli ance 
l 
of others". Although social power is not the same as 
authority, it se eks to shape the sense o f authority. 
Po wer i s always involved in government; yet the p ower of 
g overnme nt is but one form of socia l power. There are 
many other forms of power, such as , economic, religious, 
cultura l, etc., tha t a re active in social life. Ma civer 
says social p ower 11 inheres in all socia l rela tions a nd 
. 2 
in all social organization 9 11 • 
However the power of g overnment is superior to all 
other social power , even though government is res ponsive 
to the myriad strains and stre sses of the various con-
vergence s of other social po wer. Speaking of government , 
Maciver says, 
It is formally supreme, in the sense 
that government alone h a s the ultimate 
right to use direct coercion. Formally 
it assigns limit and place to all other 
exercises of power.3 
Government is the only "organ of a whole community"; there-
fore political p ower has a function and an authority whi ch 
4 
no other p ower can claim. Yet the state a nd the social 
order are not the same. 
Ec onomic power is prominent but it is not primary in 
1. Ibid., 82 . 
2. Ibid ., 90 . 
3· Ibid., 90- 91. 
4. Ibi ci ., 94. 
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capita listic society. The Marxist view of the primacy 
of economic power is false because economic power is 
11
multi-centered and is the scene of internecine warfare 11 .1 
It is also false because, 
economic power cannot be segregated 
from other forms of social power as 
though 1 t operated by itself ani 
sought objectives inherent in its 
own nature .2 
Finally Maciver says the Marxist view of economic power 
is psychologically and sociolog ically unsound because it 
3 does not understand the nature of human motivation. Various 
forms of social power are involved in man's social relations; 
hence economic power is not predominant. 
To Maciver, social power undergoes constant ch ange, 
assuming new forms and pa tterns, converging into new rigid-
ities only to disintegrate and again converge in other forms. 
Maciver describes three major forms which social power 
has assumed in hi s tory. He says soci a l power has taken the 
form of "the caste pyramid of powern, "the oli garchical 
pyramid of power", and 11 the democratic pyramid of power".4 
Man's use of soci a l power reveals human nature. Maciver 
says the founda tion of every pyramid of power is nma n's 
mortal fe a r of the dissolution of the social order--more 
broadly his instinct f or soclety".5 According to Maciver, 
1. Maciver, WOG, 91. 
2. Ibid ., 9 2. 
3· Ibi d ., 93. 
4. Ibi d ., 100-104. 
5 • Ibid • , 98 • 
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there is grada t ion in every social order, and there is 
also cha nge. Ivlaciver states t hat in the c aste pyramid 
of p ower, 
the major lines of power are simply 
demarcated a nd rigidly drawn ••• 
There is no l a dder up vv'n. i ch members 
of lower gr oups can ascend to a 
h i g her. The barriers between the 
different levels of the pyramid are 
virtually i mpenetrable from beneath .l 
The oli g a rchical p yramid o f power differs but little 
from the caste type pyramid. In the oli gar chic a l type, 
''the p ower lines stil l s trongly sep e.r a t e level from 
level 11 , 2 and the p opula tion is d ivi ded by diffe rer..ces in 
culture , opportunit y , and powe r. However , unlik e the caste 
s yst em of p ower, individuals do h a ve some op p ortunity t o 
r i se from level to level. The middle clas s constitutes 
a l a rger prop ort ion of the p opula tion than in the caste 
pyrami d . Trade and industry, a s wel l a s comme rce and fi-
n a nce, pe rform a more sig nificant rol e , an d t here is some 
opportuni ty f or members of the middle c~,ss to rise to 
p l a ces of p ower.3 '.I'he fascist state, and in some re-
spe c ts the communist , i ~ a variety of the oligarchic a l 
4 pyrami d of power . 
In the d emocratic type of the pyramid of p owe r, the 
p ower lines are mobile . And a lthough t h ere are ins tances 
of entrenched power here and t he re , there 1 s ac cess to the 
1. Maciver , \1 0G, 100 . 
f2 · Ibi d ., 101 . 
3 . Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 102-103 . 
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h i gher l eve l s . Heredity and class do not p l ay as 
prominent a p ar t as abi lity and resolution in as cending 
to h i gher levels . Competition and organization &re im-
p ortant determinants in the democratic p yramid. There is 
no l a rge illitera te group ; hence "the first condition of 
opportunity is s a tisfied ••• " 1 Under mo dern conditions, 
the mo s t ef fe ctive method of c ounter-acting entrenched 
social p o'.';rer is throu gh organization. Ma civer observes 
that "organi za ti on in t h e hands of capab le l eaders c an ••• 
counter -ba l ance or outwe i g h the p ower attaching to property 
or prior privilege of any kind" . 2 Certain modern condi-
tion s are t herefore work ing together to make de mocra cy 
p ossible , for unde r a demo cratic g overnme nt, organizations 
can more r e a di ly fl ourish . Diversity of economic interests 
and the emerg ence of new p ower groups--economic, reli g ious, 
and others--ma ke democracy the pattern of p ov;er b est sui ted 
to t he modern . era.3 
(2) Status 
Maciver defi nes status as 11 the rela tive p osition 
occupied b y man or g roup within any estab li shed h1erarchy". 4 
S t a tus r ests on v a rious and changeable grounds--"such as, 
wealth, p ower, functi on , or birth ••• 11 5 However status 
should not be identified with i ts grounds, f or status is 
1. Ma civer, WOG, 103. 
2 . Ibid . , 104. 
3 · Ibid ., 108-109 . 
4. Ibid ., 114. 
5. Ibid. 
"irremedi ably subje ctive, an :i.deolog ica l creation". For 
Maciver , stat us is clo sely rela ted to social class, and 
the term soci al-class , for him , refers to 11 a status-defined 
s trat i f ica tion of the community, a tier or l evel of the 
social hierarchy". 1 Although status is ever-present, 
i t does not always create social cla sses. 2 In some simple 
societies, status i s not socially e stablished but remains 
personalized. However in more comp lex societies, status 
is socially sanctioned a nd the elite class assumes the 
le adership of t he government . 3 Government is then linked 
to a class system whi~h garners to gether a ll possible 
forces to maintain t he status quo . 11 Thus all the great 
sta tes of h i s tory came into being as class-bound states," 
according to Maciver, "organized and controlled by a 
ruling class.'A The ruling class· consolidated its powers 
and extended its control, through conquest, over ever-widening 
areas. The history of government is in large part a history 
of class struggle--the ruling class against the lower 
classes. This i s a truth which Marx and Engels exaggerated 
. 5 
out of proportions but nevertheless it is a truth. Although 
at times other kinds of struggle over-shadowed class struggle, 
yet class struggle was on the whole pre-domina nt in the 
his torical st a te. The rel ation of government to status and 
1. Maciver, WOG, 115. 
2. Ibid. , 116. 
3. Ibid . 
4. Ibid., 117. 
5. Ibid. 
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class has had a checkered history. 'l'aking a broad view 
of the r el ationship, Maciver p oints out "two main typ es 
of cl ass structure" •1 On the one ha nd. he describes what 
2 
he calls corp orate status. Under this type, s t a tus i s 
ri gid; men genera lly live and die in the class in which 
they are born, and ''clas s approximates to or i s i dentical 
with caste'' .3 On t he other ham Maciver discusses another 
type of' clas s structure which he re f er s to as competitive.4 
In this type, status v aries and class lines are not ri gid. 
I ndividuals can, in various ways, ris e to higher levels. 
Government may be in the hands of those lacking high 
status or it may b e in the hands of a cr oss-section of 
a ll classes.5 
Class distinctions ma y change and governments may be 
under the control of various classes, but in a complex 
society status and class can be minimized but they cannot 
be eliminated. Status is an expression of human na ture •. 
Maciver says, 
Those who deny this conclusion either 
refuse, in the face of evi dence, to 
admit that a class system ca n exist ex-
cept on an economic basis or else they 
plainly believe that the inveterate ex-
pr e ssions of human n ature no longer 
manifes~ themselves under a collectivi s tic 
regime. 
1. Maciver, WOG, 120. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid . 
4 • Ibid. , 121 • 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid ., 125. 
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( 3) Property 
For Maciver, property i s not wealth or p ossessions • 
.Property is "the ri ght to c ontrol, to exploit, to use, 
or to enjoy wealth or p o s sessions".l Property is always 
dependent up on government b ecause 11 property rights are 
l egal rights ••• 11 and "they exi st only be cau s e government 
recognizes and pr otects them" •2 Maciver says in a sense 
11 it is g overnment tha t creates property".3 According to 
Maciver, the pattern of state and the pattern of property 
corresp ond at many points. He says, 11 The form of property 
itself presumes the form of social organization. 114 And 
the ma mer in which property is held greatly inf luences 
social arrangements. The mode of property-holding determines 
certain rela tions of man to man, determines opportunity 
and power, and makes for r e l a tions of dependence and 
independence.5 Therefore for Maciver, 
The economic activities of any 
society constitute the bulk of 
all its acti viti es and strongly 
influence all the rest ••• The order 
t hat every state upholds is an order 
based on the existing distri bution 
of property.6 
Maciver says that Hegel was only p a rtially right when 
he said that property was an 11 extension of personality" •7 
The wh ole truth , for Maciver, not only include s the fact 
1. Ibid. , 126. 
2 . Ibid. 
3· I bid. 
4. Ibi d ., 127. 
5. Ibid. 
6 . Ibid . 
7. Ibid . 
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that property is "a necessary condi t ion of the fulfillment 
of p ersonali ty1' but a lso t h e f a ct t hat "prop erty is ••• an 
extensi on of t he personality of one ov e r the personality 
of others 11 • 1 IIEaciver criticizes Lqcke for havi ng a 
one -sided view of property, 2 but be says tb~t even in 
Loc k e's view t h e thesis t ha t p roperty and g overnment are 
closely r e l ated i s clearly demonstrated. 
To substantiate furthe r his view th a t fonns of govern-
ment an d forms of property cor r esp ond, Maciver g ives a 
brie f hi s torj_ca l survey of government-p roperty relations3 
and p r esents some "typica l modes of inte r -rela tionships". 4 
As the first typical mode of g overnment-property inter -
relo. tionship , vla civer describes proDerty r el a tions under 
ancient empires , monarc hic a l s t ates, and class -bound 
oligarc hi c a l s t a tes. Under this type, property was 
mainly in t he h a nds of the ruling class and it wa s pre-
dominantly pr operty in l a nd. Accordins to Maciver, 
"Economic ownership and political a u thorit y were fused and 
5 
often s c arcely distinguishable." What distinction that 
did e x i st was between a hi gh ly elevated monarch and the 
oligarchy or between those who b e came wealthy from sources 
very differ e nt from t he sources of we a lth of the oli garchy. 6 
1. Ibi d . 
z. Ibi d . , 127-130. 
3 · Ibid ., 130-136. 
4. Ibid ., 137-143. 
s. Ibid., 137. 
6 . Ib i d . 
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Under t h i s sys tem ovmership of l am conferred proprietary 
ri s hts ove r the indi vi ctu a ls who tille d the l a ni. Prop erty 
in l a nd ge.ve status a nd prestige; but Yve a lth a c qu ired throug h 
trade and usury carried little socia l ~~d political signi-
f icance. 
The se cond t yp e wh ich Maciver d i scusses is p roperty 
rela tions t h::J. t obtained when 11 the class-bound oliga rchy 
underwen-J_. chan....ge, moving in the direct ion of democracy 11 • 1 
Under f eudal cond itions, a wedge wa s driven into the 
f usion of propert y a nd g overnment, sep a r ating to some 
exte n t pr operty and p oll tic a l authority. The g ro wth of 
cities and the conse quent hi ghe r status g iven to trade 
and i ndu s try contri buted to the dissociation of p roperty 
and g ovex'nment . And in som e measure "the non-p ropertied 
or a t le a st the les s - p ropertied were invested wi t h po~i t ­
ical rights ••• 11 :? Howev:er, Maciver observes, 
the dissociation of civil ~~d polit-
ical rights from property a c hie ved in 
various degrees in the process tovvard 
the democratic states , did n ot mean 
th a t ~'oovernment was completely de-
tached f rom the control exercised by 
propert y. Even in th e fullest d e moc-
racy no such assertion could be made. 
Differences of oroperty are a l ways dif f er-
ences of power .~ 
~qua l voting be t ween wealthy men and p oor men is seldom 
e qual, for 11 a t many points wealth has an adv ant age that 
1. ¥0G , 138 . 
2. Ibid . 
3 · Ibi d ., 139· 
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inc reases i ts p olitica l s tre ng th far b eyond its vot i ng 
s t reng t h 11 .1 
I.ta c i ver r e fe rs t o a third t ype of government-
2 property rela t i onsh i p ; namely, 11 the Soviet system 11 • 
Th e Sovi e t sy s tem 11 uni quely denies to p rivate prop erty 
a ny role wh a tever in the sph ere of government", r.iaciver 
s ays. And he p oints out tha t although there are broad 
dif f eren ces of earning s in the U. s . S . R., it i s s tl.ll 
true t hat 11 the p o·,ver of p rivate prop erty over g overnment 
i s a bolished in t he Sovie t Union 11 .3 He j_tera tes however 
t hat t he Sovie t Union is a n ind isputable examp le of his 
hypot h e sis lltha t every form of g overnment s u s t a ins a 
cong eni a l form of p roperty''. L~ The g overnment of the 
Soviet Union i s ba se d d ire:ctly "on an i deology of 
property, on t he Marxian doctrine of ' communism'" . 5 
However, Maciver sta tes c a tegorically tha t to 
elevate economic interests as such to a comma nding role 
in the determination of the form of g overnment is a 
6 
serious mi s take. To d o this, he says, is to "misapp rehend 
on the one hand the nature and b a sis of authority in any 
society a nd on t h e other ha nd the comp lexity of human 
moti v a ti ons 11 • 7 
1. Maciver, WOG, 140. 
2. Ibid., ll~l . 
3 · Ibid ., 142. 
4. Ibid . 
s. Ibi d . , 143. 
6 . Ibid ., 130. 
1· Ibid ., 131 . 
C. The Rela tion of Human Nature to the Rise 
And Transformation of Government 
1) Human Nature a n d the Ri s e of Government 
The or i gin of government is man's social nature. 
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Accord ing to M:a civer, g overnment emerges within t he social 
li f e o f man through t he social order, so tha t "in the 
rela tion o f man to man everywhere there is the seed of 
1 government". Maciver writes, 
VVherever man lives on the earth, 
on whatever level of existence, 
there is social order, and always 
permeating it is government of some 
s ort.2 
S ometimes g overnment has agents, sometimes it is main-
tained wholly by myths, but in every case however simple 
or however elaborate, it ie always "gua rded by ••• myths" .3 
Rejecting the theory tha t government a rises by social 
contra ct or by force, Maciver points out that constituted 
government h a s never re s ted on mere contract or mere 
force. He says, 
In all cons tituted government, authority 
of some sort lies back o f force ••• The 
force of government is but an instru-
ment of authority, ind icating the de-
mands of' an order that force alone 
never creates. Authority , i f it endures, 
depends p rimarily on the prevailing myths 
of those over whom it is exercised. These 
myths, arising from and playing upon man's 
social nature, br:Lng to government a rati-
fication without which no prince or parlia-
ment, no tyrant or dictator, could ever 
1. WOG, 20. 
2. Ibid., 21. 
3· Ibid. 
rule a people .l 
2) Human Nature a.nd the Changes in F'orms 
of Government 
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II/Iaciver says "no spec:Lfic form of g overnment endures, 
thout')l there are certain major type-forms tha t have a t 
least a r e l::~ti ve permanen c€l 11 • 2 He says further that 
forms of g overnment chang e because they are products 11 of 
a myth and a situa tion".3 Myths and situa tions change; 
hence forms of government resulting from t hem also change. 
And myths a r e p roducts of human nature. The myth is never 
completely embodied in the form of g overnment, although 
"the c ore of the myth •.• may be long-lived, ma y be capable 
of endle s s revival, may in ;3ome sense be as enduring as 
human nature" •4 Various pressures ani counter-myths con-
tinuously imping e upon the form c ausing it to adjust and 
readju st, bringing about transform ations of various sorts. 
Occasionally t here are terr:l.ble crises resulting in full 
scale revolutions. 5 Maciver says, "There is recurrence 
and regression , but always with a diff erence. 116 There is 
never a pure recurrence o f forms of g overnment because 
each new g overnment faces a new situation. To Maciver, 
Even if human emotions and human de-
sires remain substantially unchanged 
1. Maciver, WOG, 16-17. 
2. Ibid., 147. 
3. Ibid ., 163. 
4. Ibid. 
5· Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 163-164. 
from age to ag e tite situa tion, the 
environment is grea tly altered, .§:!!9:. 
the f ormer situa tl.on does not recur. 1 
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Some forms of g overnment, s uch a s the city-state, 
h a ve d is app e ared f r om the earth never to return. Other 
f orms, such a s t h e feudal form, a re obsolescent. But 
still other farms, such as democracy, are on t he a s cendancy. 2 
Macive r s a ys tha t from a wid'3 p erspective, 
the a lternatives t h a t now confront the 
world are in ef f ect, the non-authorita rian 
structure of evolu t.ionary socio-c api tali s tic 
democracy a nd the authoritarian structure 
of dicta torship, ~tethe r sta te-capita li st, 
communi s t, or conserva tive-theolog ical in 
its i deology.3 
The p roces s es o f chang e within and below g overnment 
are ma ny a nd va rious ; hence great transformation s may take 
p lace abruptly or gradually. Maciver refers to the more 
abrup t or precipita t e changes of government as revolutions. 
He says, 
we may b roadly dist :lnguish the more 
precip itate changes of g overnment we 
name revol~tions from the more gradual 
processes. 
The n he states, 
we ma y u s e the term 'revolution' in 
the wider sense to embra ce decisive 
cha nges in t he charc;~cter of gove r n-
ment, even though they do not involve 
the violent overthrow of an establi shed 
order, but in the s pecific sense 
1. Ibid . , 164. 
2. Ibid. 
3 · I bid ., 174. 
4. Ibi d ., 269 . 
revolution signif:les explosive 
erup tion of pent-up forces that 
break through the resist an ce of the 
status quo, substt tuting a new sys-
tem of a dif ferent kind.l 
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In the n a rrower or s pecific sense Maciver distinguishes 
t wo main types of r evolution. One is a na tiona l revolu-
tion in whi ch 11 a pe ople overthrows a government it re-
gards as a lien". The other is a class revolution in 
which a disinherited oppresBed soci a l class overturns a 
moribund g overnment of the ruling clas s . Revolutions 
of the first type are import ant not merely b ecause they 
h a ve p layed a significant role in the hi s tory of civiliza-
tion but also bec ause they disclose 11 the rele. ti ve impo-
tence of imposed milita ry mt ght when a strong will to 
resist i t p ervades a people,, even though they can muster 
dqui v a lent mi ght on t heir slde". 2 It i s the n a ture of 
men to resist what they com,ider to be alien. 
For Maciver, a study of class revolutions reveals 
imp ortant tendencies of human n ature. He p oints out that 
after the le ader of a class revolution , togethe r with his 
circle of a ides and followers, h a s establ i shed a ne w 
g ove r nment, the le ade r a nd his followers fa ll under the 
s pell of p ov.rer. The y shift their emphasis f rom the ideal 
goal and s eelr to mainta in their power a nd abolish all 
opposition. acive r de clares, 
Human n ature does not conf orm to 
the mythology of the p rophets of 
1. Ibid ., 270. 
2 . Ibi d ., 272 . 
the revolution . 'rl:le ::_sreat ins titu-
tiona l changes do not abolish the 
old motivations . The 'third e state ' 
is emancip&ted or the ' proletari a t' 
is on top . But li be rty~ e qu a lity 
and fr a ternity are still far from 
being achieved-- anc~ the 'classless 
society ' remains a dream.l 
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Although cla ss r evolutions follow a cycle of development, 
they uo not appe ar as rep licas of each other. They vary 
greatLy in pntte~n . Uhile history does not repe a t itself, 
it does reveal ''always af re sh the permanent tendencies of 
2 
human nature". Every revolution, hov!ever , has its p e-
culiar features an d arises from particula r circumstances; 
therefo r e every revolution i s different in some re spe cts 
from e very other. 
The phenomenon of counter-revolution also reveals 
some interesting traits of hm1an na ture. Macive r observes 
tha t a study o f counter-revolutions shows that the extreme 
conserva tive and t h e radical p erson ha ve a great deal in 
c ammon. The conserv a tive stands firmly for law and order, 
but '' wh e.t he believes in is his own l aw and order 11 .3 Maciver 
states, 11When the establishment is a lien to his desires 
114 he is ready to turn rebel. On the other harrl , he says 
"the extr eme radic a l, when his side wins, readily takes 
over the s ame k ind of devotion to law and order tbat he 
previ ously i d entified with reaction". 5 
1. Maciver, WOG , 275. 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid. , 277 . 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid ., 278 . 
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The fac tors underlying clas s revolutions ar e mu l ti -
t ud inous and compl ex. There are ma ny determinants. 
Economi c int ere s ts as we ll c:.s soci al a nd cultura l intere s ts 
co n join in a complex manner t ha t rule s out t h e ef f ica cy 
of any one ma terial f a ctor t aken alone. The Sovi e t Re vo-
luti on 11 could not demonstra te the eterna l va lidity of the 
cree d under which Mar xism triumphed".l Maciver says, 
The great array of f orces t hat under-
lie poli t ica l am socia l change, as 
t hey continually take ne w and unex-
pected conjunctures, cannot b e dis-
posed of so summar1ly.2 
Hence t he Soviet Revolution is a prime exemp l ar of the fact: 
There a re cla sh es of p ower as well as 
of economic interest. Ther e are re-
lationsh i p s between men and groups 
t hat do not depend on their clas s posi-
tion. There are g reat unities and 
great divisions that are not resp onsive 
mainly to 'material' considera tions.3 
Thus a true analysis of soci al revolutions reveals t hat 
Marx' concep tion of social causality is too one-sided. 
According to Maciver, class revolution occurs when 
cond itions are favorable a nd when, under tho se cond itions, 
the ruli ng oligarchy stubbornly resists the de mands of 
the exp loited clas ses. He says, 
Th e drive that animates it i s the 
r an kling sense of the opp ressiveness 
of social inequality, as it ga thers 
momentum under the stimulation of 
social and cultural change tbat is 
1. Ibid . , 280. 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid., 280-281. 
l debarred from poll.tical expression. 
Then he adds, 
Social inequa lity genera lly brings 
with it economic exp loitation, and 
the remova l of economic burdens be-
comes most frequently the objective 
in the name of which the leaders 
of the revolution ca n most effectively 
rally their f ollowers •• • The economic 
a spect i s very important but it ~annot 
b e separ ated from ~ther aspects. 
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Maciver s ays there is inequality everywhe re in human re-
li..=t tions as well a s in all other rel a tions. But according 
to him, there are t wo kinds of inequality that have "pe-
culiar power to stir protest :, am, when conditions make 
it possible, to turn protest into revolt" .3 He says, 
One i s the sheer inequality of wealth 
that is so utterly disproportionate 
to any dif f erences of merit or service 
and th at provides t.he contrast between 
p rivation and endless hardship at one 
end of the scale and want on super-
fluity at the other ••• The other is the 
inequality of opportunity attendant 
on the inequality of po wer, evoking 
the deep-working sense of injustice, 
since men feel that their capacities, 
their personalities, are thwarted and 
repressed by the irrelevant advantages 
that the possession o4 greater power 
bestows on other men. 
In a rel2.ti vely static society, men c ornpensate for in-
equalities in various ways. 3ome find present satisfaction 
in projecting future utopias; others ga in relief in re-
lig ious considerations of a b13tter life after death .5 
1. Maciver, WOG, 282. 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 283. 
4. Ibi d ., 283-284. 
5. Ibid., 284-285. 
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Gre a t transformations in government and in other 
social insti tut1ons t a ke pla ce in a step by step fashion. 
Such transformations usually are more stable and enduring 
than ar e changes which ace ompany revolutions. At all 
times slow processes of change a re going on in society 
which a ct as determinants o:~ government. The processes 
are comp lex and difficult fully to understand; they in-
volve environmental, climattc, racial, cultural, and 
other f actors. To sing le out any one factor as pre-
dominant is to misunderstan.C. the na ture of social change; 
hence "the transformation of' government is the consequence 
of the entire social dynam1sm". 1 
3) Human Nature and the Chall5es in the Functions 
of Government 
Government seeks to perform vaster tasks than any 
other human association. In recent times because of 
increased technology and more complex economic and cultural 
relations, g overnment, irrespective of its ideology, is 
enla r g ing its functions. 2 Maciver says, 11 It happens whether 
collectivist or individualist doctrines are dominant. 11 3 
The functions of government change in response to socio-
cultura l changes. Although there are certain basic functions--
such as, police protection a~d administration of justice--
which all governments fulfill, there are other functions 
which are undertaken according to the dernan:is and 
1. Ibid. , 289. 
2. Ibid., 314. 
3. Ibid. 
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circumstances of the social structure. Maciver examines 
and ela borates three types C·f governmental activities in 
order to show clearly the ma nner in which g overnment 
alters its functions in respon se to cha ngin-_. needs and 
conditions. He calls the three types "cultural fun ct ions, 
general welfare functions, and f unctions of economic 
control" •1 He recognizes tha t these types are interrelated 
and in part over-lapping . 
Re gard ing cultural functions, Ma civer shows trut the 
attitude of g overnments towa r ds morals, re U g ion, a nd 
other cultural functions ha ve varied at diff erent times 
and under cU vera c i r cumstancHs. He notes that the govern-
ment of At h ens, Greece, 11 in h er pe riod of gre a tness organized 
and superintended a considerab le v ariety of cultural func-
tions".2 However, Athens did not force tbese cultural 
acti viti es upon the people bt;.t simp ly gave promotion to 
them. Maciver says tha t Pericles cle a rly recognized that 
Athens did not imp ose any orthod oxy on the people. But the 
constitution of Athens and the a ttitude o f Pericles were 
in opposition to the thoughts of P lato who in his Republic 
and in his Laws expressed the view t hat th e state should 
exercise rig orous control over the opinions and t he a rts 
of the p eop le.3 Maciver observes that " governments h a ve 
been censori a l a nd inquisitorial, making mig ht the arbiter 
1. I b i d ., 317. 
2. Ib i d ., 322 . 
3. Ibi d ., 322. 
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of op inion and faith" •1 
To li mit sta te control over cultural activities was 
a p roblem which wa s not seriously c ha llenged until "the 
2 
distinction between community and stat e was recogni zed'. 
During the Mid dle Ages , the i ~; sue was discussed on the 
ground of authority b e cau s e the Chri s tian Church claimed 
a divine a uthority 'Nhich ws.s superior to the state . There-
fo re the controversy hinged upon the question of the tttwo 
swords" or the t wo kinds o :~ authority--church and sta te. 
However , a c cording to lVIa civer, ''the right o f the co m.rnuni ty 
to limit t he cultura l contl'ol exercised over it by the 
state \ a s not yet a ccep t ed b y either s i de in the contro-
versy". 3 ~a ether the church nor the state recogni zed the 
pr ior right of the commu:ri t.y to: restrict the sta te ' s 
authority over cultural activities until "irreconcilable 
cre eds began to arise side by side vvi thin the same commun-
ity" . 4 ut of the confusion which resulted from the claims 
and counter-claims of church a nd state c am e the admission 
on the part of g overnments tha t citizenship d id not re-
QUire a specific confession of relig ious f a ith . The 
principle o f the s epa r a tion of church and state was rec-
oc;nized . • nd "the democra t ic pr incip l e of reli gious liberty11 
5 
wa s extende d to include the sphere of mora l s . It was 
recognized t ha t the state cannot p roperly imp ose a moral 
l . Ibid.~ 323 . 
2. Ibid . 
3· Ibid . 
4. I b id. 
5 . Ibid. , 325. 
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code upon t h e p eop le. To streng then this p oint , ~aciver 
states th a t ''la w ca n n o more be a substitute f or mora lity 
tha n th e h a n d can b e a subs1Ji tute for the eye" •1 He 
further states, 
Morality is an exp ression o f nerson-
a lity, as it conc.eives itself
4
in 
rela tion to other p ersonelities. A 
mor a l rule is a rule a man o beys from 
his heart, in the li ght of his system 
of va lues . The l a w ca nnot compe l that 
kind of obe d ienc e , t houg h its h old is 
a ll the stro~ger whe n it i s obeyed in 
tha t spirit. 
Ther efore the sta te does not h ave the right of contro l 
ov er cu l tural pursuits. The communi ty restricts the state 
along cultural line s . 
As a limiting guide f or the g overnmen t o f mode rn multi-
gr oup s ocie ty , vla c i ver sug ge :3ts the follo wing maxim: 
S o fa r as one group can practice its 
particula r cod e wi·t.h out entai ling out-
ward consequences that directly im-
p ede or p revent othe r groups from p r a c-
ticing in equa l li berty t heir own no 
coercive sanction Bhould be invoked a -
gai nst t he code in question.3 
The mai n p oint wh ich such a maxim makes f oca l is that 
laws prohib iting specific folkways should be based on 
whe ther the folkways or behavior p a tterns violc~te t he 
rights of ot her men. Whether the pra ctice hurts human 
per sonc.J. li ty is the main consj,deration. Therefore Maciver 
claims, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid . 
3· I bid ., 326. 
it becomes the function of govern-
ment to guarante e and to safeguard 
the cultural liberty of its diverse 
groups against discrimination and 
encroachment that one group may 
bring to bear against another.l 
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Even though Maciver believes tha t community limits the 
cultural functions of th e ::~ta te, he points out tha t 
certain cultural functions are still left within the 
domain of the state, such as , 11 the sustainment a nd equip -
ment of the arts of living!, and the provision of oppor-
tunities for the citizen to share the cultural heritage 
of' mankind11 .2 
Considerable changes l:'.tave taken pla ce in the attitude 
of governments toward wha t is re garded as "general-welfare 
functions 11 .3 For Maciver, general-welfare functions 
include, 
wha tever a gov ernment does that is 
directly addressed to the ameliora-
tion of the conditions under which 
people live or work , what it does 
for health a nd safety, for housing 
a nd the decencies of life, f or 
s ocial and economic security, and so 
forth .4 
General- v1elfare functions easily p ass over into cultural 
functions at one end and economic controls at the other.5 
Maciver says, 
Functions o f this category have been great-
ly expan ded in the modern state, along 
1. WOG, 327. 
2. Ibid . , 328 • 
3. Ibid., 331. 
4. Ibid. 
5 . Ibid. 
with the facilities for render-
ing them.l 
Wh a t t he state should do and what it should le ave to 
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other a s soci ations in the area of g eneral-welf are func-
tions 11 cannot be set t led merely by the establishment of 
broad principles 11 • 2 Howev :J r, Maciver believes that there 
are certain cond itions und·3r which g overnme nt can supply 
communi t y s ervices better ·c.h an any priva te ·a s sociation 
or organi zation can a lone E:!Upp ly. He describes these 
cond itions as follows: 
Whe r e the proces nes inherent in 
the operation~ of private organi-
zations invol·,.re avoidable human 
costs or socia l loss es that such 
organizations do not or cannot 
by themselves unc.ertake to pre-
vent. 
Where other agenc:ies are too limited 
in scope or ra nge to render services 
the benefit of which is non-contro-
versial, although there may be dis-
pute concerning the role of g overn-
ment in rendering them. 
Where no other ag ency exists possessed 
of the requisite powers or resources 
to orovide a service demanded or 
approved by the community.3 
Rela tive to control which governments exercise over 
economic relations, Maciver obs erves that conditions within 
industrial societies are such that governments are 1m-
palled to t ake larger measures of regulation and guidance 
in economic af f airs. He says there are two attitudes which 
1. WOG, 331. 
2. Ibid., 337 • 
3· Ibid., 337-339 . 
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governments take toward the economic order. One is the 
attitude which seeks to 
correct the defec:ts of the self-
regulating system, to maintain 
by whatever measures the 1 equil-
ibrium' of the system as well as 
to restore tha t equilibrium when 
it h a s been grossly disturbed.l 
The other is the attitude of seeing , 
no solution of tbe economic prob-
lem, except through the socializa-
tion or nationalization of the whole 
machinery of production.2 
According to Maciver, the fundamental is sue is not whether 
governments shall make economic plans or not make them. 
He says, 
The main issue liss between those 
who stand for 'ec·onomic planning 1 
within a soci o-ca·;:Ji talistic system ••. 
and those who regard this task as im-
possible under capitalism or for any 
other reason desi:re the abolition of 
the capitalistic :3ystem and the estab-
lishment of a socialistic order.3 
Maciver poses and suggtasts answers to two fundamental 
questions; namely, "whether the socio-capitalist state is 
changing by degrees into the socialist state" ••• and "whether 
the state that moves toward or arri vas at socialism can at 
4 the same time retain a demoeratic structure". Maciver 
regards the first question as being t o o speculative and 
therefore he offers no definitive answer to 1 t. He does 
say that "economic planning is a method of correcting the 
1. Ibid., 341-342. 
2. Ibid., 342. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 352. 
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gross deficiencies of the ffiarket economy" and that g ov-
ernments are resorting to 1 t on an increasingly l a rger 
1 
scale. Ho wever, for him, economic planning is f a r 
different from complete collectivism. Macive r answers 
the s econd question--the qUI3Stion of the compatibility 
of' democracy a nd colle cti vi:3m--in the fallo wing manner: 
'i e do not cone lud e that under no 
f uture conditions can a democratic 
policy survive unde r a system of 
complete collectivism. Our con-
clusion is tha t the evolution of 
democratic processes has still a 
lone; way to g o before the e x-perience 
is attained t hat vrould admit the 
marri age of the t wo without the 
i mminent peril of a divorce of a 
kind that would leave collectivism 
in sole p ossession of .t h e n a tional 
h ome. In any future for which men 
can now. mak e p l ans they c annot. reason-
ab ly hope to s ubst.i tute comp lete collec-
tivism for s orn e form of soc io-cap i tal is m 
without gr a ve risk to the libertie s t hat 
democracy offers. The i d e a li stic aims 
tha t animate many who would abolish 
cap italism her e and now woul d in all 
probability suffer disillusionment. 
II.!Iany o thers, wh o revolt fr om cap italism 
be c ause under i t t h ey suffer exp loita -
tion, would in a ll proba bility dis -
cove r th a t the new order they yearn ed 
for concea led mor·e inexorable oppressions. 
The unripe bet~e.r is the ene my of t he 
ri p e ni ne; g oo d . 
Ma civer maintains ri g i d ly t hat 11 ln soc ia.l reconstruction , 
as in all other k inds, the p ossible no le ss than the de-
s irab l e mus t diff er with the differ ences of t he actua.l ". 3 
1. Ibid ., 358-359. 
2 . Ibid ., 358 . 
3 . I bid . , 359 . 
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D. The Relation of Ma n tc t he State and Soci ety 
For Maci ver, a state is a n associa tion or an 
''or ganiza tion of whi ch g ove nment i s the a dministrative 
organ ". 1 r, I II .': 11ac ver says """ state has a const i tution , a code 
of l aws , a way of setting up its government , a body of 
2 
c i ti zens" . A stat e is more f orma lly orga niz ed than a 
community or society . Macive r s ays , 
He l ive in communi t i es ; we do not 
live i n s t ates . We do not move and 
have our being in states, they are 
not i ntegral t h ing s like communities .3 
Community or society is a we') of rela tionships wh ic h men 
create 11 as t hey buy and sell, a s they wors hip , as they 
rejoice a nd mourn11 • 4 Commu:n:lty is pr ior to formal govern-
ment a nd state~ 
l) The Re l at ion of Indivi dual to State and Soc iet y 
According to Maciver , individua l is the unit; society 
i s t he unity --the whole i n which indi vi duals reali ze them-
selves . The s t ate is not th e who le or uni ty in wh i ch indi-
vi dua l s h cve their being . Society or c omJlllliU.n i ty is the 
unity or · the whole to wh ic h ~-ndi vi dua l s are integrally re-
l a ted . Ji!laciver therefore di Bagrees with Hege 1, Rousse au, 
and all other believers in the all-inclusive state . How-
ever, he says t hat the re i s a log ic to t he theories of 
s t at e advanced by Hegel and Housseau. The los ic is 
tha t individuals r <~ali z e themselves 
in society, that they become devel-
ope d bei ngs only in and t hrough 
their rela tions wi t.h other s . To 
society they owe their exi stence, their 
nurture, their e qul pment, t he ir habits, 
their t h oug ht-ways" their opp ortuniti es , 
th eir satis facti onB, t he ir friendsh i ps , ~1-.~I~b-i-d~.-,-=3~1~.~ 2 . Ibid . 
3 . Ibi d . , 193 . 4. Ibid. 
their loves, their homes, their 
all.l 
But Maciver says t here a re dangerous confusions mixed 
in with thei r insights. He wri tes, 
In the first pla c•~ Rousseau and 
Hegel alike confm1nd society with 
the state. It i s society that g oes 
wi t h us whereve r we go. It is so-
ciety tha t gives us the sense of 
union, the union i~hat all social 
a nimals need and erave. It is so-
ciety that nurturE!s us, n~t merely 
or even mainly the1 state. 
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Then Ma civer c a lls at ten ti on to a second fa lla cy in Hegel 
and Rousseau's thought. He writes, 
They properly stress the need men 
feel for a gre a ter unity to which 
they can devote themselves and 
which gives gre a ter di e:P ity, great-
er purpose, grea ter meaning to t h eir 
lives. But they conceive this unity 
as organic, as of the same n&ture 
as the unity of an organism. 5 
But t he fatal defect o f belief in society as an organism 
is, according to Maciver, tha t such a belief 11 has no 
proper p l a ce f or the autonomy, the initiative, the selfhood, 
4 
the pers onality, of the indi v1dual 11 • 
For Maciver, the proper way to understand the relation 
of indivi du a l to society is not to take some kind of unity, 
such as bodily organism, and compa re society with it. Maciver 
says, 
1. I.[a civer, WOG, 406. 
2. Ibid . , 407. 
3· Ibid., 408. 
4. Ibid. 
Vie must seek to do justice to both · 
sides. We must ac:cept the individua-
lity of the unit, we must see the in-
dividual as the be1arer and 1nhe ri tor -of 
human values , a nd on the other hand we 
must see the unity as tha t which sustains, 




Pursuant to thi s end , he points out that "human beings 
2 
are ever ywhere me mbers of groups 11 • Human beings are 
utterly dep endent on their relations with other human 
beings within thes e groups. They are "dependen t for their 
nurture, their modes of livin , their economic and spiritual 
sustenance and the continuance of their species" .3 However, 
Maciver says that human beings are not integrally bound 
to a single group like cells in an organism, for individuals 
4 
constantly migrate, attaching themselves to other groups. 
Moreover, individuals belong to several g roups at the same 
time. This is true not only in developed society but in 
primitive society as well. lvlaciver ·summa rizes this idea 
as follows: 
Diverse group ing s exist becaus e man needs 
them, because no one suffices. Man needs 
a ma trix of societ:r, say the range of 
community within which he has si gni f icant 
rela tions, but thiB ma trix is not a form 
of organization, not a corporate or in-
tegral unity. The only way in which the 
opposing claim can be maintained is to 
i d entify the state with the community, 
and we have already shown the fallacy and 
1. Ibid. , 409 . 
2. Ibid., 410. 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid. , 410. 
l peril of that identification. 
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On the o ther hand, Maciver emphas izes the f a ct th at 
"the ind i v i d ual i s never wholly absorbed in his society, 
wholly r e sp onsive to it, wholly a ccounted f or by it".2 
An individual is priva te; in a sense, "he remains invin-
cibly insula ted".3 He is a self-directing unity, 11 a self, 
a f ocus of being , a n indi vidua li ty11 • 4 For Maciver, human 
nature i s such that when an indi vidual pursues the ends 
of the g roup, he seeks his own g oals as well. Speaking 
of the individual, Maciver writes, 
If he works for others he wo r'ks also 
for his own g ood name, his own pres-
ti ge, h is own advantage. He unites 
himself to others but he separates 
himself at the same time. He has 
always purposes, feelings, thoughts, 
tha t are not those of the group, tha t 
he does not she. re with t he group . The 
meanest an d g re a test alike lead also a 
private life ••• He coopera tes with a 
dif f erence, and therefore he competes 
as well. There is potential conf lict 
in every relationsh ip. A man cannot 
even worshiP his God without seeking 
his pr ivate- and peculiar g ood.5 
In Ma cive r 's thinking , eve r y per son is self-enclosed . 
Every person h a s some interests which cannot be i denti f ied 
with g roup interests. He s ays "tha t the human e go, the 
6 
selfhood of the unit develop a early in the child 11 • Yet 
a t t he very dawn of consciou:3ness, 11 t he e go sets itself 
l. Ibi d ., 411 . 
2. Ibid ., 412 . 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid . 
5 . Ibi d . 
6. Ibid ., 413. 
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over a gainst the world a t the same time thCl. t it seeks the 
f ulfillment of its utt erly de pendent being \vi thin the 
1 
wor l d 11 • - Maciver believes that the rela tions wbi ch the 
child h a s with its p~rents are tte e xpr ession of the 
child's own parti cula r n e,ture a s well as the nature of 
t hings outside the child . 2 The rela tions a re 11 s e le cti .ve 
and experimental". 3 The e go accepts and r e jects the 
training an d discip line of i t s world ; but "the e g o ca n 
never wh olly i dentify itself" with its world. As a 
matter of f e:.ct, Maciver po:i.nts out tha t the more a pers on 
enters extensively and intensively in to rel c.ti ons wi th 
other persons and groups, 
the more does he maintain, the more 
does he ne ed to maint a in, the 
autonomy-demanding ~elfhood tha t is 
h i s from the first. 
Althoug h Macive r recogn izes t ha t · ~wme persons a re more 
self -surrendering t han others, he sta tes that 11 there is 
II 5 
a l ways some p oint of e go inslstenc:e • He asserts em-
phati c ally, 
The:ce i s not, there cannot be, the 
total surrender o f the total self 
e ither to the service of society or 
to the will of a ll the variant 6 collecti viti es t h .:i. t com:p o se 1 t. 
It i s true, a ccording to Maciver, that society makes its 
imprint up on individuals . 3 u t he says i t is the individua l's 
1. Ma c iver , WOG , 413 . 
2 . Ibid. 
3 · Ibi d . 
4. Ibid ., 414. 
5 . Ibid~ 
6 . Ibid. 
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" s elf hood tha.t t ak es on the s ocial p 3.t t ern; this is the 
mode in ;;hi ch t h e autonomy-seel{ in~; self accommodates 
its elf to t h e p revailing mo~ . 1 
For Ma civer , the unity of t he sta te or of' any 
group means 11 a consensu s o:f ends c r ~)Urpos e s or i dea.ls 11 • 2 
Basi c all y , a ccording to Ma civer , 
t he way of li fe , ·:.he s en s e o f common 
int e r es t s to b e sus t a ined b y c ommon 
e nde a vor, crea tes th e uni ty of any 
group . The sens e of t he c onn:on 
over-rides the differences within 
t he ·g roup but 1 t cloes not ao oli sh the m. 3 
Therefo r e f or Maciver the un ity of s oc iety, or even the 
s t ate, is a "consensus about v a lue :3 cherished in common ••• 114 
But Maciver says , 
The values that are pursued in common 
are realized only in the individuals 
wh o compose t h e whole. ~?hey a re 
v a lues only as they are attained, en-
joyed, fulfilled in the experience o5 
men, in the quality of t heir living . 
However, Maciver points out t hat there is one sense 
in which an individua l may d ·svote h ims elf fully to a 
whole. It is this: 
___ , 
1. Ibid., 
2 . Ibid . 
3· Ibid. 
4. Ibid ., 
s. Ibi d . 
A man may ind eed dt3Vote himself un-
reservedly to the iVhole, to the ser-
vice of the g roup or o f the cause, 
but he can do so only in accordance 
wi th his own concept ion of v a lue ••• 
And then he does not surrender his 
selfhood to the whole. His self-
hood is then l 9.rge1y fulfilled in 
415. 
416 . 
that s ervice, for it iE) a congenial 
service, wi lling ly rendered, respon- . 1 sive to t he dictates of h is own being. 
According to ~a civer , this type of free dev otion is 
creativ e. He s ays t ha t su ,~h devotion is, 
t ha t kind of a ttachment that draws the 
individual beyond himself, liber ating 
him from the detachment o f his e go, 
evoki ng his potentialities, and g iving 
him the l a r gest <~plitude a nd f ulfill-
ment of which he i s capable .2 
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Therefore Maciver p articularly notes t he fact 11 that the 
devotion o f the individu a l to 'the whole' is attainable 
only in terms of his own s ense o f values ••• 11 3 Hence 
t here .are any number o f 11 wholes 11 becaus e 11 e a ch is sub-
jec t ively conceived a nd selectively apprehended 11 • 4 And 
he note s s econdly, tha t 11 our ul tirnate va lues, whatever 
they may be, are not inc arna ted in the unity but only in 
the units 11 • 5 Ultimate va lues are held by individuals and 
not by society. Society and individu als must therefore 
be ke p t in proper perspective. 
2) Human Nature and the Problem of Multi-Group 
Society 
Out of man's v ar ious interests have emerged many 
associ a tions and g roups , a ccordine; to Maciver. Because 
of the numerous types and v arious forms of groups in 
modern society, the question of the proper inter-adjustment 
1. Maciver, WOG, 418. 
2. Ibid . 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibi d . 
5. Ibid. 
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of these groups within society is what Maciver calls the 
1 
problem of the multi-group society. The different social 
groups are results of different interests and the v arious 
interests sp ring from human n ature. The problem of multi-
group society arises acutely when the state or any other 
associ a tion seeks to coordinate the a.cti vi ties of all 
groups, making a 11 uni-centered order". 2 A uni-centered 
order in a developed society tends to s tifle human creativ-
ity and to damage human personality. To prove this point 
Maciver calls attention to the utilitarian and cultural 
interests o f men, especially to the cultural interests. 
He states that utilit arian interests, particularly economic 
activities, cannot be left entirely unregulated. He says, 
"Economic activities, for example, cannot be left to the 
free arbitrament of individuals and groups without s erious 
3 interference with public order. 11 But Maciver says point-
edly tha t 
the many cultural organizations of 
society have not and cannot have 
any one focus, cannot without losing 
their identity and their function 
be amalgamated and absorb4d as mere 
departments of the state. 
By cultural interests, Maciver means those interests which 
are pursued as ends in themselves. He says, 
Again, cultural interests may serve 
1. V· OG, 421 • 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 424-425. 
4. Ibid., 426. 
as me re ly means, but sociologica lly, 
their utilitarian service is in-
cidental to the f act tha t we, or some 
of us , pursue t h em for their own 
s a ke s , because, that is, the~ bring 
us some direct satisfaction. 
238 
To h i m, cultural interests include "the advance of know-
ledge, the exp loration of art, of thought, of literature, 
of relig ion, and so forth". 2 Maciver believes that man's 
cultural intere s ts are very diverse and th at they "exist 
3 
on ever y level fro m the highe s t to the lowe st". It is 
in the: rea lm of culture tha t men seek fulf illment of 
their live s and give expr e ssion t o their crea tive spirits. 
Maciver writes, 
Dif f erent men find very diff erent 
sustena nce within t h e fields of 
culture. In the seeking of this 
sustenance they are mos t thems elves, 
most alive, mos t creative. Whether 
the sustenance be r efined or vulgar, 
ample or me ager, it is always t hat 
through wh ich man seeks fulfillment. 
Everything else on e arth is for the 
spirit that is in man n~thing but 
apparatus or mech anism. 
3) Maciver's Proposed Social Ethic 
To the problem of human r e l ations which aris es out 
of the mod ern multi-group society, Maciver proposes a n 
intere s ting solution. He says, first, that, 
the r e l ation of man to th e ma ny groups 
and forms of organi zation to which he 
is more ne arly or more distantly, more 
1. Maciver a nd Pege, SAI A , 42+8. 
2. Maciver, VOG , 422. 
3. Ibid ., 422 . 
4. Ibid. 
deeply or more superficially, attached 
is not solved by making one of thes e, 
whether the state or any other, the 
sole or inclusive o bject of his de-
votion, the one social focus of his 
being. There are other farms of 
order than the simple uni-centered 
order.l -
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He states secondly that "there is the order of the 
balance and int e r-ad jus tment of many elements" .2 To 
provide balance and proper inter-adjustment ·of organiza-
tions, g roups, and individuals "within the ordered yet 
free life of the community" is Maciver's fundamental 
proposal f or the solution of the problem of multi-group 
society.3 Vfhen the community is torn asunder eithe r by 
too much co-ordination or by too much intolerance and 
discrimination, "there is no way out •.. apart from revolu-
tion, exce pt the gradual read justment of group rela tions 
in the direction of equality of opportunity ••• 11 4 Equality 
of opportunity promotes community ani 11 the s ense of 
community, dissipated by the p ervading specialization of 
interests, needs to be re-inforce~'in modern multi-group 
society.5 Maciver declares, 
The sense of the need of community, 
if not the sense of community, is 
still a live and seeks embodiment. It 
is witnessed to by men's devotion to 
the nation and by their at tacr~ent to 
some local community they feel--or 
1. Maciver, WOG, 421. 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Ibid . , 426. 
4. Ibid • , 428 • 
5. Ibid. , 429 . 
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once felt--to be their home. 1 
However, Ma civer believes tha t the devotion which 
persons h::~ve for their na tion and for their local commun-
ity is not an adequate bond of social solidarity. He 
holds tha t devotion to the na tion anct attachment to the 
local community are bonds which 11 do not satisfy the need, 
do not suff iciently provide the experience of ef f ective 
solidari ty 11 • 2 
The unity and the spirit of cooperation which men 
in modern society seek c annot oe found, according to 
Maciver, in re s toring "the myth of the uni-group society" 
or in making 11 t he all-inclusive s t ate the suffi cient 
focus of our moral and spiritual being11 , or even in 
coordina ting "out of existence our cultural heterogeneity 11 .3 
The spir it of unity which obtained in early society c a n 
4 
never be fully regained because "there is no road back". 
"We ha ve left behind the one room s ocial habitation of 
our ancestors. We h ave built ourselve£ a house of many 
mansions," Maciver says. 5 The unity which modern men 











In the community a man finds his l a r ger 
home, the home of his peopl e. But als o 
in t ha t community he cherishes and 
works for his f a ith, whatever c auses 
are de ar to him. The faiths of those 
who share the same community ar e 
429 . 
429-430. 
different faiths. In other words, 
the re are t wo distinct kinds of 
a ttachment here, a nd in modern society 
it is most important t hat they should 
not be - falsely i denti f ied , as is done 
by the totalitarians. Ther e is t he 
attachment to the home in the larger 
sense, the soci al home the sentiment 
for which embraces both the home folk 
and the habitation of the folk. And 
there is the attachment to the cause, 
the faith, the cultural values that 
h ave locus there along with other -cul-
tural values to which we are not 
attached. Man needs both these attach-
ments. The home is the transcendence of 
the individual, the primary fulfillment 
of his socia l being . The cause g oes 
beyond personal relationships, it is the 
expression of man's rela tion not to his 
folk but to life itself, in a sense of 
his relation to the universe.l 
Social solidarity in primitive uni-centered society 
was keen becaus e there u the home a nd the cause were one 11 • 2 
However, in modern multi-group society home a nd cause, or 
home and faith, are not identical. Maciver asserts, 
A man's faith is no longer the badge of 
his citizenship. It i~ the hig h virtue 
of democracy tha t, when it is not 
corrupted, it upholds the distinction.3 
However h e further points out tha t although 11 the two 
kinds of a ttachment are complementary ••• tpe two must never 
be i dent ified11 • 4 Social unity is therefore pre s erved in 
community. 
Maciver believes that the modern widespread mechan-
ization of the means of production, the insti t utionalization 
1. Maciver, WOG, 441. 
2 . Ibid . 
3 • Ibid • , 442 • 
4. Ibid. 
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of the proce s ses of human rels tionships, and the systemat-
ization of rela tions among organizations and groups do 
not consti t ute a social mechani s m which men c annot control. 
He agrees tha t mo dern socia l life and modern social pro-
ce ss e s ::~. re ve ry comp lex, but he asserts t ha t 11 the social 
mecha ni sm i s no juggernaut t hat rolls on regardless of 
tho se who ma y be crushed b ene a th it 11 • 1 In Maciver's 
thinkin3 , the dangers of the soci al mechanism can b e 
11 controlled by the s ame unre s ting intelli gence t hat 
2 
cre a ted'' the mechanism. Therefore, for Maciver, the 
social ph ilosophers wh o call for a r e turn to the ways 
and practice of a simp le uni-centered society and those 
wh o express a warning t ha t the impersonality and dis-
organi zation within 'li e stern civilization are leading 
inevitably toward anomi e are equally wrong . According to 
Maciver, such philosophers, 
do not meet the modern problem ••• 
They h ave no solut ion that is 
appropri ate to the world in 'Nb.ich 
we live. They are right, however, 
in emphasizing the need for a re-
discovery of communi t y and in point-
ing out, even if sometimes in an ex-
aggera ted way, the danger tb~t man 
may b ecome enmeshed and socially 
frustrated in the ever more elaborate 
social mechanism that he has con-
structed.3 
Maciver beli eves t hat social arran gements, institutions, 
1. Ibid • -; ---·4 35-. -- -
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid ., 433· 
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and the entire social system are designed to serve the 
ends of the people who are involved in them. And although 
the social system does not render perfect service, it 
ca n nevertheless be chang ed a nd made more ef f icient through 
greater v i s ion and more good will. In Maciver's judgment, 
the soci a l system ma y be viewed, 
simply as a mode of relating means 
to ends, as an organization set up 
for the service of its membership. 
It serves their ends but its service 
is full of imperfections and of in-
adequacies, of ri gidities and exes see .1 
There are several factors and conditions which 
prevent the social system from cru. shing men to death. 
The first condition that he gives is 
the growth of the democratic spirit, 
the increasing assertion--if we look 
not at the moment but in the perspec-
tive of history--by the masses of the 
people of their right to control their 
own affairs and to make their leaders 
responsive to their will.2 
While ~aciver recognizes that unscrupulous leaders and 
managers of social organizations and associations can 
und er certain circumstances manipulate the consensus of 
the masses for selfish a nd anti- s ocial ends, he neverthe-
less believes tha t democracy is the 11 surest medicine 
against the p erpetuation of bureaucracy" in g overnment 
as well as the most effective shield against corruption 
3 in a ll other social arrangements. Maciver cites economic 
1. WOG, 439-440. 
2. Ibid., 436. 
3· Ibid., 437. 
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corporations and phila nthropic organizations as examples 
in which may be seen, 
the ef f icacy of democracy in making 
social institutions, as well as the 
officials who administer them and 
the leaders who preside over them, 
servicable and responsive to the 
emergent needs of society.l 
The second f actor in Maciver' ' s soci al ethic tha t helps 
to lib era te men from the shackles of their social mechanism 
is ttthe gro wing recognition of tne nature a nd the require-
ments of p ersonality". 2 For Maciver, 
Many men h ave many minds. They need 
dif f erent cultural sus tenance. They 
seek it through the diversity of 
faiths and styles and schools and 
mora l codes. The intolerance of 
dogma and the blindness of power have 
eter nally been suppre s sive of human 
nature, have thwarted its potentialities 
and fought against the primary l aw of 
organic li f e, that the higher the capa-
city the more variant are the modes of 
its fulfillment. The different types and 
varieties of persona lity must seek and 
find different kinds of adju s tment within 
the framework of society.3 
Persona lity therefore requires a social system in which 
there is room for dif f erence as well as unity. Maciver 
says, 
There are common needs as the basis of 
the common order, and to assure tha t 
common order there is a common dis-
cip line th at all must undergo. 'rhere 
are divergent needs that call for differ-
ences of adjustment, for dif f erent sys-
tems of rela tionship, different outlets.4 
1. Maciver, WOG, 437· 




Knowledge of persona lity, increasing r e cog nition of 
the nature of persona lity, and the modern development of 
more a nd more associations 11 g o ha m in hand 11 , according 
to Maciver.1 Awareness of this f a ct makes void the 
philosoph y that would "centrali ze all huma n activity with-
in the clasp of the state 11 a ncl makes availe.ble 11 the facil-
ities the democratic sta t e must employ to remain flexible 
and dynamic 11 • 2 
The third f a ctor in MaciYer' s social ethic is ex-
pressed in terms of t wo precepts. Speaking of these pre-
cep ts, he says, 
One is tha t government should never be 
suffered to impose tts controls on the 
cultural life of the community, to 
curtail the freedom of men to differ in 
their f a iths and optnions, in their ways 
of thought and their ways of life, s a ve 
when in the pursuit o :i' these ways they 
inflict overt and objecti vely demonstrable 
hurt on their fellowmen. The sec ond is a 
coroll ary of the first. It is that gov-
ernment should not be entrusted with so 
exclusive a monopoly over the economic-
utilitarian system that the implementa-
tion of these functions conveys with 1 t 
the ef fective indirect domina tion of the 
cultural li fe. For if the life-c hances, 
the v ery livelihood, of individua ls and 
groups are at the d i sposition of govern-
ment, then t h e p a rticula r values a nd ideol-
ogies o f the p articular government will in-
evitably become absolute and will inflex-
ibly imp ose t hemselves on t he whole . . commun-
ity, crushing its free spirit. Onl y by 
vi gilant adherence t.o t h e s e two precepts 
c an the people remain fr e e and still breathe 
the life-giving air tha t comes from beyond 
l. Ibid. , 4 39. 
2. Ibid . 
1 t h e realm of g overnme nt. 
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I~a.c i ver be lieves t hat society sh ould p rovi de f or 
cultural lib e r ty in order t hat man mi @!t e xpre s s his crea tive 
abi li t i es . Theref ore he s ev ere ly cri t ic ize s a ll tot a li-
t ari an states be cau s e t h ey :inv ar i ab ly d eny me n the oppor-
t u n i t y of c ultur a l lib erty. Here Ma civer i s not p leading 
f or cult ua l p l ura li s m, bu t r a the r he i s a s s e r ting t ha t 
men in a mult i-group society mu ;·Jt le a rn to a ppreci a te 
cult ura l d if f erence s and to d evelop a. community in which 
indivi du a l ~nd group diff ere nces c an e xist a long side a 
common b ond o.f unity. According to Ma c iver , the goa l of 
the soci a l s y s te m is n e i ther nc onf ormism" nor "cultura l 
plurali s m" •2 He s ays, 
The ob jection to ooth these a lternatives 
is t ha t t h ey a like, thou5h in di f f erent 
degree s , rej e ct the sp ontaneous pro-
ces s es t h li t f r om the beg inning ha ve 
built up community li f e. Only when 
dif f erences are free to stay a p art or 
to merge or to breed new v a ria tions of 
t he community t heme can huma n p erson-
a lity h a ve fulfillment a nd cre ative 
p ower, drawing its sustenance wh ere it 
f inds its prop er nouri s tun en t, neither 
c l i n ging to l i kene ss nor worsh ipp ing 
d i f f' e rence.3 
To Maciver 11 dif f e rence is not sep s.r a tene s s an d ••• 
community i s not i den tity11 • 4 Moreover he s ays t ha t men's 
a tta c hmen t to t he group is a d1f f erent 
thing f rom t heir a t t ach ment to the 
1. Ibid ., 445-446. 
2. :t!IPU, 9 . 
3· Ibid ., 9-10. 
4. Ibid ., 10. 
community and tha t the former must 
be duly ad justed to the l atter if they 
wish to enjoy the benefits and liberties 
of the civilization they ha ve inherited.l 
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Every group in e. community should ha ve the opportunity 
to work f or the good and the service o f the who le community. 2 
1 hen every group ha s sue h opportunity , c anmuni t y bonds are 
strengthened a nd ea ch group has a gr eater sense of belong-
ing to the whole. Maciver s ays the sharp line of dema rca-
tion wh ich p ersons a r e prone to draw b etween the '' we-group" 
and the ''they-group" the "in-group" an d the 11 out-group 11 
needs to be oblitera ted in modern society in order that 
persona lity and co mmunity ma y develop more fully.3 Yet 
he recogni zes that , 
it is n a tural for us all to magnify our 
own group , the nea r er group to which we 
owe our origin and our nurture and the 
greater group th a t sustains and contains 
it and forms the orbit within which our 
interests are bounded. But to ma gnify 
our own group , which is a lso an immedi ate 
form of our na tive self-ass ertion, is to 
set it ab ove other groups, is in a ll 
likelihood to d i s pa rage other groups. 
Th e emotional allegiance to one's own 
finds its compass point through the 
e qually emotional aversion from other 
allegi ances. The easie s t way to ma gnify 
ourselves, the inevitable way of the4un-tu tored mind , is to belittle others. 
Maciver says tha t the distinc t ion between the " we" and 
the II they II arises in t h e very process of socialization. 
He states, 
1. Ibid. 
2 . Ibid., 15. 
3 · Ibid., 206. 4. Ibid., 196. 
the very proces s o f social initiation, 
of r e ception into the 11 we-group 11 gen-
era t es t he anti thesis of the "we~ and t he 
11 t hey 11 , and tends to brand the "they" 
with the stigmata not only of exclusion 
but also of r epulsion.l 
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:r.aciver goes on, howeve r, to suggest that the 11 we 11 and 
t he "they" ne ed not be mutually exclusive. He says, 
Ve r a ise the question wheth er , g iven the 
right kind of tra ining , the antithesis 
need be so abs olute, s o stark, so n a ive. 
Mi ght not educ a tion, beginning with the 
you~~ child , 
1
aim at the cond itioning to 
embrace the 1 we" without imp lying the 
condemnation, the repulsion, or even, 
as far as we can rise to that level, 
the derogation of the 11 they11 ? There 
must be a "they" in anti thesis to the 
'' we" --that is a condition of group 
loyalty, of group unity. There must 
be some emot ional warmth to vvard the 11 we 11 
tha t is withheld from the 11 they11 • But 
the division of thinr;;s into the be loved 11 own11 
and the hated "other is primitive. It is 
the failure to see dif f er ences as they are, 
the failure to make inte lligent d is-
tinctions.2 
Re l ative to t his objective, Ma civer says, 
Education should set forward in a ll prac-
tical ways the objective that in our 
dealin3 s with others, tho se outside our 
group, we see them as persons, not as 
s amp les of a r ace or stock, and t r ea t them 
as persons , thus gaining for ourselves a 
new libera tion, opening to us the world 
of men as it i s , and making our relations 
with others more sincere, more genuine, 
and more intelligent.3 
In order to improve the quality of int er-group relations 
in a multi-group society, Maciver says that persons a nd 
1. Maciver, A~U , 200. 
2 . Ibid. , 201. 
3. Ibid., 189. 
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groups mu s t seek to unde r stan d the predicament of the other 
person or other group by imaginatively putting oneself 
in th e p l ace of the other. He states, 
we cannot understand the behavior of 
other men or o f othe r gr oups unle s s we 
conceive the situation wi thin which 
they act, t h e conditions to which they 
respond. 'Ne mus t know what that si tua -
ti on is, and t hen we must ask ourselves 
h ow v e would act in the same situation. 
Vi e mu st form the habit--if we wish to 
understa nd--of projec t ing ourselves 
imagin <-< tively into the p l a ce of the other 
gr oup .1 
However, f or Maciver , t his princi p le o f projecting one-
self in the p l ace of the other in or der to understand 
and ant icipa te the respon se of the other is not an ethica l 
pos tul.=.te but is "a condition of intellie;ent action" •2 
Further more Maciver holds firmly to the position t hat, 
in our closely knit society--knit by 
inter dependence i f not by inter-understand-
ing--wh at we do to improve the lot of 
other groups raises the entire standard 
of the communit3 and thus redounds to our 
own well-being. 
Finally, Maciver believes that the g rea test individual 
and socia l values are re ali zed in co mmunity--in being able 
to particip a te freely in the common good. He says, 
1. Ibid ., 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid •. , 
4. Ibi d ., 
t he common good is the deep wellspring 
from which we a ll, 1ndi vi duals and 
groups, draw th e cultural sustenance 





He expands this point by pointing out t hat, 
the tensions and anxieties that arise 
in the prejudici a l strife of groups 
and that work h arm to the discriminator 
in the very act of discrimin ation a re 
very l a r gely based on false assumptions 
and on false fea rs. We deny a group 
full admission to the privileges of' the 
co mmunity becaus e we fe ar their 'sub-
vers ive tendencies', but these ten-
dencies are crea ted by our denial.l 
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According to Maciver, "All men are under the impul s ion 
to belong , but it is the young vmo learn the ways of be-
longing .112 Therefore in his thinking, "the major determin-
ant of the social attitudes of all men11 i s none other than 
11 the scheme of' the community to which they belong 11 • 3 From 
t .his point, Maciver b e lieves a lesson follo ws: namely, 
t hat any c hanges which the makers of social policy can 
inaugurate in favor of group equality, 
if ef f ected either in the educational 
system or directly in the social struc-
ture, will not only immediately s erve 
their end but will also, provided they 
can be maintained for some length of 
time, have increasing potency as a new 
generation grows up ••• 4 
1. Maciver , :MPU, 194. 
2. Ibid ., 20~?. 
3 • Ibid • , 2 OL~ • 
4. Ibid. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMIIJIARY OF' II!J.ACIVER ' S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE 
A. Human Nature and Community 
Out of the discussion of Maciver's theory of 
I 
community has come a partial expos ition of his c6ncep tion 
of human na ture. Individuals, according to 





Th erefore individua ls cannot be separa ted from society nor 
I 
I 
can society be separat ed from indivi dua l s . Each : person 
I 
I i s a unity woven and interwoven of individuality and 
I 
sociality . Both individu a lity and sociality are : qualities 
which arise out of the pr ocess es of indi vi duali zation 
I 
and soci alization. 1 Viewed as a whole , the unity of the 
I 
I indivi dual, fo r Maciver, is the self or personality, 
11 the substantial re a lity ani end which individu ality and 
sociality together determine •.• !' 2 Development of an in- · 
di vidua l' s li fe involve s both organic and psychiqal growth. 
I 
In the course of psychical growth, important qualities of 
I 
personality emerge: namely, 1 
the ability to meet new situations, . 
the power to reason or synthesize, to [' 
conceive and e xpress i deals, the power 
to c ontrol passion by the idea of perma-
nent life-ends and to control imaginat ~ on 
by r e levant fact.3 l 
l.Page 139 of the dis serta tion. 
2.Maciver, COM, 221. 







Maciver lists some add itional qualities of personality 
which indic <:~t e adv a nced s ocial development, such as, 
the povver to understand and estimate 
the claims of others in comparison to 
our own, the pow er to enter into more 
and more complex relc"tions, the auton-
omy attained by the individu a l in those 
relations with his fellows, and his 
sense of responsibility towards others 
wtthin the s e r e l c:,tions .1 
All qua lities of per sona lity emerge from individuals 
through the p roces s es of indi vidualization and sociali-
zation. And according to Maciver, a ny theory which pre-
supp oses thEl development of human personality apart from 
communi ty and society is f a lse. Ma civer rejects pocial 
contra.ct theories of the state because they assume that 
I 
human being B c a n become persons apart fran society. 2 
Therefore, for Maciver, individual and s ociety, individual-
ity and s oc:Lality, are correla tive and a ny philosophy 
which exalt a the one above the other i s f a l s e. Individual 
p ersona lity cannot come into being without society, and 
human society cannot exist apart from individual p ersonality. 3 
I 
However , Iviaciver believes th at each individual person-
a lity is private. He holds tha t only individuals ' think, 
feel, and express their thoughts and feelings to others. 
An individual can symp athi ze with othe r individua~s, but 
he cannot tl11nk a nd feel for a nother. Thoughts and feelings 
I 
a re t herefore never .Q.Qllli!!On, althoue-;,h they may be like. 
1. Maciver, COM, 184. 
2. Page 139 o f the dissertation. 
3. Page 140 of t h e dissertation. 
253 
I 
I Hence every self, or personality, is in a sense insulated, 
I 
a view which Bri ghtman a lso holds. 1 Yet although each 
I 
individual pe rsonality is insulated, it is neverth~ less 
i 
social. Be cause human personality is involved in society, 
it is imbued "with interests, with aspirations, wi ~th goals", 
I 
and 11 it i s only in society that human na ture can t):lrive" •2 
I Each person is inextricably related to other persons; 
I individua l p er sonality c an only be fulfilled in community, 
I in the common life.3 Attitudes and interests which are 
I important psychic ele ments in ma n's nature indicate that 
man is both lndividual and social. 4 Attitudes and [ interests, 
I 
according to Maciver, are correla tive and exist together 
in social r el a tionships. 5 Attitudes are 11 subjectiye re-
I 
I 
actions •.• within the indiVidu a l human being, With relation 
I 
to objects 11 .6 Interests are 11 the objects t h emselv13s 11 , 
which may be ma terial or non-material.7 Attitudes ! are 
subjective and interes ts are objective and both attitudes 
and interests a re involved in a ll social relationships.8 
It is the nature of man to develop attitudes and 1hterests, 
but attitudes and interests a re not stable. They change 
constantly. 
1. Page 141 of th e dissertation. 
2. Maciver and Page, SAIA, 48. 
3. Page 1L1-3 of the dissertation. 
4. Page 126 of the dissertation. 
5. SAIA , 24. 





There is continual development in atti tudeL 
according to Maciver. He s ays the human infant h as an 
1 
attitude whi ch is "entirely ego-centric". But in the 
process o f mental growth ani soci a lization, the / child 
I 
le arns to make distinctions an d t h ereby to deve~op 
various attitudes. 
He writes, 
Thus arise those attitudes t hat 
support his devotion to clan or 2 tribe, to race or nation or class. 
Certain attitudes are therefore, 
nurtured and molded in the slow 
process of soci a lization character-
i s tic of man alone. The intolerance ~d 
pre judice that mark so many of men's ~e­
lati onships with one another are traer-
able to the same processes of socializa-
tion tha t produce- their opposites-- / 
tolerance and understanding .3 , 
i 
While particular a t t i t udes are developed through educa-
1 
tion and socialization, personality al ways involves 
4 
attitudes. Maciver says, 
In ac tual experience attitudes are 
subtle, complex, and changeful modes I 
of consciousne s s. They a re cons tantl~ 
being modified by our training , our r~­
flection, our health, our circumstances 
of eve ry sort ••• An attitude is not a 
static possession of the individual. 
It is al ways a changing valua tion: 
a way of regarding persons or t hings, 
a way of a s sessing them in relation tb 




3· Ibid . 
4. Ibid., 24-25. 
5. Ibid., 26 -27. 
On the ba si s of whethe r attitudes 11 t errd to preven tJ , to 
limit, or to p romote social relationships 11 , rviaciver 
cla ssifi es them as "dissociative, r estrictive, and associa-
tive 11 • 1 Finally he declares that 
attitudes are the expressions of 
complete human personalities--eval-
u a tions of the total social being- -
and, like personality itself, must 
be understood as p art of the pattern 
of re !ationships among human beings. 2 
Through h is exposition of a t t itudes Maciver asserts that 
I 
man is therefore a social being , for he says specifically 
that attitude s are "expressions or aspects of the whole 
personality of the soci a l being" .3 
For Macive r , where there is a n a t t itude t here is also 
an intere s t. He s ays, 11 Understand i !1f; of ac tual behavior 
situations , then, re quires knowledge of both ob1ect1 ve 
intere s t and sub.1 ecti ve attitude" •4 Man is a soc t a l being 
who is always involved in social r e l a tionships. Moreover, 
"All soci al _rela tionships involve both subj ective
1 
attitudes 
and ob jective interes ts."5 Man is therefore a social being 
who has interests . Maciver classifies man's interests, 
for purpos es of socia l understanding , into t wo basic types: 
namely, li_~e and common interes ts. He says, 
1. Ibid ., 
2. Ibid ., 
3· Ibi d ., 4. Ibid ., 
5 . Ibid ., 
6. Ibid. 
The like is what we have distributive-
ly, privately, each to himself. The 
common is what we ha ve collectively, 







Man's attachment to s ocia l gr oup s, such as I famil~, city, 
nation, and his at tac hment to impe r s ona l goa l s , ~ uch a s 
I 
interest in sc i ence, relig ion, and philosophy ar~s e out 
of common i nteres ts. Maciver wr ite s, f 
When men i de ntify th ems elves with 
s orne inclusive indivisible unity of 
their fel lows , c ommon interes t re-
veals itse l f . When men think of t hem-
s elves a s re al ly be longing to a 
family, to a city, to a nati on, to a 
team, to a friendly clique, they are 
s haring a common interest with othe r 
men. This sense of at tachment to a 
personal unity i s found in varying 
degrees an d is manifested in dif f erent 
ways in s ocial groups of ma ny kinds--
in communities, in associa tions , i n 
s oci a l classe s and castes , in both 
primary and se condary groups .l 
The credits student s receive a t I colleg e a re an example of 
like interes ts. Like interes ts ma y be c a lled s e~f -limited 
I 
interes ts •2 In mos t human behavior, 11 both, commolf and like 
' 
or s elf-limited interests Cl.r e combine d ••• Examinat ion of 
I 
soci a l b eh avior itse l f revea l s both types of interes t 
op erc:.t ing in varying degrees and arrangeme nts 11 .3 / 
Although Maciver believes th at the earliest [attitude 
of th e human inf ant is complete ly ego-centric, h [ does not 
be li eve t hat "eg o-centricity of interests appears prior 
to or underlies the common int erests 11 . 4 He writJs, 
It is sometimes said that the origina l / 
driving forces of man are those of 
self-preservation and self-expression. 
1. Ibid. , 33 • 
2. Ibi d . , 34. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
But social man as he appears in 
every generation is at once ego-
centric and sociocentric. Both 
elements are inextricably fused 
in all man is and does. He lives 
for himself and he lives for his 
group. He lives for himself and 
he lives for the causes that a re 
dear to him . And however far we pierce 
back to the earlier stage of human life 
we find the s ame i~redients of self- I' 
regarding and ~ self-transcending interest.~ 
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According to Maciver , an adequate understandirt~ of I _ _,
"man's comp lex activities must be grounded in a.~ utder-
standing of the society of which he i s a part 11 • Moreover, 
for Maciver , human nature is 
condit ioned in each v~riant human being 
by the unique series of experiences 
which are the hi story of the individual 
life, and yet exhibiting in us all the 
universal traits of humanity.3 
Man has his unique experience in the li f e of the community. 
B. Human Nature and Political Theory 
I In his poli tical theory, Maciver postula tes the view 
I 
' 
that man i s a kno wing beine; wh o develops myths and l tech-
niques by wh ich he i s controlled •4 Myths, which a~e "value -
impregn<:~ted beliefs and notions that men hold" ,5 a~ise out 
of and play upon man's s ocial nature.6 Man's socill n ature 
is th e ori gin of government and man 1 s myth-complex / is 1 ts 




1. Ibid ., 34-35· i 
2. Ibid ., 39. 
3· Ibid., 39-40 . 
4 . Page 185 of the dissertation. 
5. Maciver, ROG, 4. 
6. Ibid., 16-17. 
7. Ibi d ., 21. 
. i 258 
an order whi ch is presided over by myths. Man i s s o con-
I 
sti tuted thE.t society c annot e xist apart from some { e g ula-
ti on ov er man's na tive impulses . The family is the !p rima ry 
. I 
social unit in which the first steps ar e taken to g overn 
I 
th e ch i ld . It i s the prima ry s ocial unit in which person-
i 
a lity develops . 1 At birth the child is an "amorphotts beingt' 
I that is sensitive and educable. Through the p roce s s of 
I 
s oci a li zation a nd educa tion which the family pr ovidE1s, 
th e child's mentality i s molded into v arious at t itu ~e s 
• I 
and h abits v'ihich serve as th e foundation ''for aLl it~ later 
I 
activities" •2 The family begins molding the child' J self 
3 
" ccolrding prior to the child 's consciousness of a self. ~ 
to Maciver, there are two aspects to the process by I which 
the fami l y molds the se lf of the child. F'irst, thrQu gh 
I 
"the subtle unconsciously r eg istered intera ction" of the 
child with the fami l y members, espe cia lly a t first J ith the 
mother , the child "awakens gradually to a sens e of J ocial 
I 
rela tions , of self and otherne s s, of dependence and demand, 
of love and anger 11 • 4 Secondly, through family soci Ali za-
1 
tion, a process of regulation, indoctrina tion, a nd ~abit-
u a tion i s carried on whereby the child le a rns a senJe of 
g overnment . In every case authority is exercised • f en though 
it be authority permeated with love. 5 For the child the 
I 
"magic of the law" begins as soon as it b ecomes conscious 
1. Ibid. , 23 . 
2. Ibid ., 28 . 
3· Ibid. 
4 . Ibid. , 28 . 




of oth ers an d i t s rela tions to others.
1 
The sens ~ of 
authorit y wh ich is engendered in the child is the ' centra l 
I 
myth t hat susta ins order in all socia l rela tionships . 
I 
And eve ry society depends upon the myth 
stabi lity. 2 




In Maciver's philosophy, man ne eds order, an~ with-
I 
out l o.w there i s no order. Hence no man i s c ompl~ tely 
I 
l awless, not even the outlaw , nor t h e s avage, nor I the 
tyrant.3 Man is t herefore a law-abiding social b bing 
I 
even though he may on occasions violate a nd rebe l [ against 
l aws. Moreover man ma y not and communities may not recog-
ni ze any l aw between hims elf and outsiders, b etwe bn them-
selves an d other communities. 4 The main reason mkn is a 
l aw-abiding being i s not that he is afraid of the con-
sequences of l aw-breaking or is deeply loyal tot e state, 
a lthough the se motives are involved. Rather the funda-
mental r eason is that man is a social being or a ~ ocialized 
being .S All the bonds tha t hold men together, al~ the 
hope s and needs which depend on 
6 
prompt men to be l aw-abiding. 




I increases in social systems when all members of those 
systems h ave the opportunity to live i~er-adjust~d har-
moniously to each other.7 According to Maciver, 1 he 
1. Ibid., 30. 
2. Page 190 of the dissertation. 
3· WOG, 61. 
4. Page 198 of the dissertation. 
s. WOG, 77. 
6. Page 202 of th e dissertation. 
7. Page 202 of the dissertation. 
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I 
"free responsiveness" of the social beings is gJmane to 
the sense of l aw- abidingne ss. 1 Therefor€ any c dmmunity 
or social system which does not allow opportuni Jy for such 
free responsivene s s curbs human nature. I He say s the modern 
state should therefore where practicable grant, 
to all its groups a genuine equality 1 
of civil rights, attaching no disabil-
1 
ities to any doctrine, save in so far 
as t hat attacks the civil rights of 
others, and at the same time removing, 
so far as it i s able to do so, such 
barriers and discrimina tions as cause 
any group to feel a lien or disprivileged 
within the larger commun1ty.2 I 
Underlying the sense of l aw-abidingness is the sense 
of authority. And for Maciver, authority involves the 
sense of the "established ri ght 11 of a person or a group 
or an i dea to guide or to govern men.3 In all authority, 
the fundamental fact is the idea of right wh ich lis involved. 
i Therefore the authority of the social order is more funda-
.1 
mental t h an the authority of formal g overnment. ! But 
. I 
Maciver believes formal government is necessary /for the 
control o f' men except in simple homogeneous soc Teties. 
Formal sovernment is necessary for the control of human 
impuls es toward power and gain and for the 
5 





As socia l beings, men neces sari ly h 3Ve soc~al relation-
! 
ships with other men. Out of social relationshi ps, social 
1. Page 203 of the dissertation. ' 
2. woo, 80-81. 





power which is "the capacity in a ny r e l a tionship 1to 
I 1 
command the service or compliance o f ot hers 11 , emerges. 
Moreover , Maciver believes tha t property which is 11 the 
ri ght to control, to exploit, t o use, or to enjoy wealth 
or p ossessi ons 11 , arises out of socia l r e l a tionshibs. 2 
I 
Status (or position) is based on socia l valuation~ and 
rests on various grounds •3 Social power, prop er t !y , and 
s-ta-t us are invol"" d in gover nmen-t and in soc i a 1 r le l a -tion-
shi ps . Any government which deni es thi s fa ct or seeks 
-to ignore this fac-t i s dis r:garding "the inve-ter + e ex-
pressions of human na ture". I 
Governments are products of myths and a situla tion 
and ther e f ore they change. Myths and situa tions !cons tant-
ly change; hence governments can never b e complet/ely 
I 
stat ic. Tho se who beli eve tha t they can establish a 
classless socie-ty are mis-taken. They d o not unde~s-tand 
the moti vations of human na ture.5 The leade r s ofl a revo-
lution in time become intere sted in maintaining t eir 
• I 
I . 
recently gained social power. Human natur e does not 
I 6 
coinci de v1 ith the prophets of t he classless socie1ty. 








The 'th ird es tate' i s emancipa ted or 
t he 'pr oletariat ' is on top . But 
82. 
Ibid ., 126 . 
Page 208 of the dissert a tion. 
WOG , 125 . 
Page 211 of the dissertation. 
WOG, 275. 
lib erty, e quality and fr at ernity 
are still f ar from being achieved--
and the 'clas sless society' remains 
a dre am.l 
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Maciver thinks tha t while history may not repeat itself, 
I 
2 it doe s r eveal "the p ermanent tendencies of· human na ture". 
Karl Marx' theory of social caus ality is false bebause it 
is one-sided--it does not t ake into considera tion the 
mc~y f ~ce t s of human nature.3 
For Maciver, man's gove r nment mu st be di s tinguished 
from his community and society.4 Individu als realize 
themselves in society but not in g overnment. The 1 state 
i s not the unity which nurtures man, the unit; rath er, 
I 
"It is society that nurtures u s , not merely or even mainly 
the sta te. uS He gel and Rousseau identified the sta te as 
the unity which nurtures man. Macive r s ays they were 
6 
mi s t aken on t his p oint. In Maciver's thinkine; , an 
I 
individual is not related to society a s a cell i s re-
l ated to an organism. Such is the mi staken view bf Hegel 
a nd Rous s eau. But for Maciver, an individual is fependent 
up on h is r e l <: .. ti ons with groups. Everywhere "huma n beings 
are members of group s 11 ,7 and yet they are not int
1
egrally 
connected to a single group . Human beings belong to many 
groups. Maciver says, 
1. Ibid., 275. 
2. Ibi d . 
3· Ibid., 280-281. 
4. Page 230 of the dissertation. 
5. WOG , 407. 
6. Page 231 of the dissertation. 
7. VVOG , 410. 
Man ne ed s a ma trix of s ociety , say 
t he r ang e of community within 
which he h a s si gni f icant relc.tions, 
but t h i s mat r ix is •.• not a corporate 
or integr a l unity.l -
Ye t for Ma civer , an indivi du e:i.l is never fully abs orbe d 
b y his society or f u l ly. responsive to it. 2 
Maciver believes firmly that an individual
1
is 
11 a se lf, a focus o f bei ng , a n ind i viduali ty 11 , that has 
autonomy and initi a tive.3 tr I An indivi d ua l is a be arer 
and inheritor of human va lues 11 , and he must liv~ in a 
community Vih ich ''sustains, incorpora tes, and promotes ••. 
huma n values 11 • 4 When a n individual works for others, 
he a lso at the same time work s f~r himself. 5 Yet in 
I 
every c as e of individua l devotion and service to others, 
there is a l so private devotion and service. Mac iver 
says, 11 A man cannot even worship h is God vv ithout seek-
1 in ~~ his priva te and peculiar good. 116 The self cannot 
totally surrender itself to society or to anything else.7 
Society mak es i ts imp rint upon the indivi du al, but it is 
the i ndividual's self-hood which accepts the social 
patterns.8 
Maciver holds that an individual may on the ':las is 
I 
of his own concep tion of v a lues devote himself fully to 
l. Ibid., 411. 
2. Ibid. , 412. 
3. Ibid. 
4 • I bi d. • , 409 • 
5. Page 233 of the disserta tion. 
6 • VVOG , 412 • 
7. Ibid ., 414. 
8 • I bi d • , 415 • 
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the s ervic e o f the gr oup or to a c au s e; but even thel he 
doe s not surr ender his se lf-hood t o th e caus e . On the con-
I 1 trar y , h i s self-hood i s f ulf illed in tha t free s e rvice. 
Such devotion libera tes p ersonality and p romotes creativity. 
I Man i s a s ocia l b eing who ha s intere sts and out of 
hi s intere s ts have emerged var ious ass oci a tions and organiza-
t ions. Gover nment is a peculi ar a s s ocia tion t ha t hds devel-
oped out of int ere s ts. Intere s t s gro w out of huma n na ture. 
Any gov e r nment which seeks to establis h and mainta i J a 
uni-cent e re d s ociety i s a t t h e s am e time consciously or 
unconscious ly seeking to s tifle cre a tivity. 2 Especially 
is creativity hampered when cultural intere s ts--interests 
pursued a s ends in themselves-- are reg ulated by the lstate.3 
According to Maciver, human beings need dif f er ent 
cult ur al su s tenanc es; hence intolerance and d ictatorship 
I 
suppre ss human nature. Dif f erent types of per sonality re-
quire di f f e r ent kind s of adjustment within s ociety.t There-
fore, f or illaciver, persona lity requires opportunity for 
creativi ty. Persona lity needs a community in which there 
is 11 uni ty in di versity". Democracy is the only form of 
governme nt which permits "unity in divers ity'' to exist 
I 
suf f iciently. The r efore, of all governments, democracy is 
the mo st congeni a l to human nature. 
1. I b i d. , 418. 
2. Page 245 of the dis s erta tion. 
3. WOG, L~26 , 448 . 
4. Ibid . , 4 38 • 
CHAPTlili VII 
MACIVER I N RE: LATION TO REPRESEN'rATIVE VIEWS 
A. The Nature of the Self 
I Out of the investigation of the writings of 
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Brigh tman, Cooley, Me ad, Niebuhr, and Maciver the question 
of the n ature of the self ha s arisen. The points of view 
of Me a.d , Brightman, Niebuhr, and Cooley ha ve already 
I 
been di scussed. Wh at Maciver says on t h e question and how 
his vie ws comp~re with tho s e of the others will now be 
given. 
For Ma civer, "The human ego, the selfhood of the 
unit, develop s early in the ch1ld." 1 He says that, 
from the first dawn of consciousness 
the ego sets it s elf ove r against the 
world at the same time that it seeks 
the fulfillment of its utterly de-
pendent being within the world. Its 
relations to the near members of the 
family are not determined by the na-
ture outsi de it, they are also the 
expression of its own p articula r na-
ture. ~hey are selective and experi-
mental. 
According to Maciver, although the outside world makes 
1 ts impa ct on the ego, "with this world the ego / can never 
wholly i dentify itself" .3 The ego is present 11 from the 
first dawn of consciousne ss" •4 This means tha t the ego 
is present at birth. 
1. WOG, 413. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid., 414. 
4. Ibid., 413. 
Maciver's concep t of the bgo 
corresp onds with Mead 's idea of the 11 1 11 • Mead says, 
The "I" is i t i n a cer a n sense tha t 
with which we do i dentify ourselves ••• 
The '1I'' is the respons e of the orga nism 
to the attitudes of the others ••• The 
a t t itude s of the others constitute 
the organi zed 11 me 11 and then one reacts 
towar d that as an '~I" .1 
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For Mc:. civer, the self is personality or "the substanti a l 
reality and end which individuality and soci ality together 
2 dete rmine 11 • Personality is a unity, "a unity whose f ac-
3 
tors a r e indi vi du ality and soci a lity". For Brightman, 
the self or personality is "a living ·whole of conscious 
experi e nce, who ~3e parts h a ve no existence in isola tion 
fro m t he ~ :h ole and who s e na ture is to be conscious as a 
whole" •4 He says furt her that "the self •.• is not a mere 
unity •.• , nor mere multip licity •.• , but it is a synthesizer 
of unity 2..nd multip licity". 5 
Whether society is prior to the individua l or the 
individu al p rior to society i s not a s ignificant question 
in Maciver's philosophy. He claims th~t such a question 
i s b a s ed on "fa lse abstractions".6 For Macivei', neither 
society nor the individua l is prior; they exist together. 
Hence on this point Maciver disagrees ·with M:ead who holds 
that the soci al process precede s the ince ption of the self. 
However , Ma civer agrees wi t h Mead on the point that self hood 
1. Mead, MSS, 174-:}.75. 
2 . COivi , 2 21. 
3· Ibid., 2 25. 
4. POR , 357. 
5 . Bri ght man, ITP , 204, rev. ed. 
6. cm.1 , 244. 
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develops in s ociety. In reference to Me ad , Maciver says, 
Self-hood develops, as G. H. Me ad 
h as s hown, as the child in his 
dey-dreams and in his play with 
dolls and with othE· r children 
a s sumes the roles of others--of 
parenfs or other h eroes in his 
lif e. 
Maciver t ak es no t e of a nd mak es referen ce to Charles H. 
Coole y ' s emphas is on the importance of the ch ild's con-
tinua l e;d ju ~ tment to the behavior of others in the forma-
tion of pers onali t y. 2 Maciver p oints out that "the self 
ca n come into bei ng only in society--only \v i thin the 
g i ve-and-take of e;roup life ••• 11 3 
In Maciver's t h inking , the self grows and more-
over 11 the emGr gence of th e capacity for social life is 
an aspect of the g rowth of se lf-hood, of personality" •4 
Through the p roces s of imitation, the child 's o·.m "social 
nature 1 s gradua lly reve a led" .5 
Relative to p ersona lity, Brightman points out that 
there ar e certain qualities which emerge during the de-
velopment of the individual life.6 Chief among the 
emergent qualities of personality are "the consciousness 
of impera tive norms, freedom, and reason".7 Maciver also 
says that certain qu a lities of personality emerge during 
1. Maciver and Page, SAIA, 46. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
4. I b i d . 
5. Ibid. 
6. POR , 353 • 
7. I"oid. 
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the course of development of the individual.l Brightman 
points out t hc:.t one of the qua.li tie s o f p ersonali ~y 1 s 
priva cy . He says t h'"' t 11 every se lf i s directly experi enced 
-I 
only by i t self 11 • 2 And he adds, 
Althoucsh privacy is tra nsce1ned by 
l anguage and by understa nding , it 
rem a ins a fact t he,t all corn:nunic2.-
tion is sent by and received in 
priv~te exp erience ••• 3 
1ac i ver develop s t h e point tha t the s elf is p rivate by 
I 
say i ng , 
The ind i vi du a l i s never wholly ab-
sorbed in hi s society , wholly re-
sponsive to it, wltn.o lly accounted 
for by it. There is a sense in 
which he rema ins invincibly in-
sul~ted •.• In short, every individ-
ua l is self-enclos ed.4 
B. The Role of Society in the Development of the I Self 
Note has a lready been taken o f Me ad 's view tBat the 
self is a so ci al product arising 
society through communication and 
fr cxn a nd developed in 
I 
other social proce s ses .5 
I 
Cooley's v ie w is that the feeling of self is pre sent at 
I birth a nd the. t full personality is developed ·. through the 
social process, especially through the pr imary grbups of 
6 farn:l.ly a na p l a yma tes. Brightman holds th c.. t while con-
sciousness is the self, there is development in self -
1. Page 174~the dissertation. 
2 . POR , 352. 
3· W'OG, 412. 
4. Bri ghtman, APR, 353. 
5. Page 103 of the dissertation. 
6. Pages 103-104 of t h e d is serta tion. 
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I 
expe r ience as t he s elf interac t s wi t h the b i ologic al, 
phys ica l, s oci al, subc ons ci ou s , log ica l and i dea
1
1, and 
metaphys ica l environment •1 Brightman r ecogni zes t hat s oci a l 
int erac t ion i s v ery i mp or-t a nt in the d eve lopment! of person-
ality . Soci a l s timuli :nake s i gnifica nt di f f' erences in 
cons ci ou sne s s and t hereby contribut e to t h e growth of 
personality. 2 Accord i ng to Niebuhr, man's comp l btest 
self -re · li zation a s well as h is vilest Sin is a t tained 
in t he m .t r i x of socia l li f e. The self is inext~ ic ab ly 
conne c ted with soci a l groups.3 
Mc: civer stresses the point tha t p erson ality! re-
quires s ociety . Inde ed pe rsona lity i s inte rwoven i n -
separ abl y of indi v i du a 11 ty and soci ali ty . Moreo~ er , Maciver 
points out th at individua ls a r e utterly dependent up on 
society . He says, 
Every individual i s the off spr ing of 
a s ocia l relationship , it s elf de-
te rmined by pre-establis hed mores. 
Further, every person, as man or 
woman, is es senti ally a term in a 
relationship . The individu al is 
n eithe r beg inni ng nor end, but a 
link in the succes s ion of life . 
Thi s i s a sociologizal a s well a s 
a oiologica l truth. 
Man' s dependence up on society is even deeper yet l a ccord-
ing to Maciver. He states, 
society i s more than a neces sary en-
vironment, more t han th e soil in which 
1. Page 106 of the dis serta tion. 
2 . Page 107 of t he dis sertation. 
3· Page 108 of t he d i ssertation. 
4. Maciver and Page , SAI A, 46-47. 
we c.re nurtured ••• T e ar e born to a 
s ociety the processes of which de-
t ermine our heredity, and parts of 
which be come in time our internal 
ment a l e quipment--not merely an ex-
ternal possession. The social 
heritage, continuously chang ing 
because of our social experiences, 
evokes and directs our personality. 
Society both liberates an d limits our 
p otenti a lities as individuals, not 
only by af f ording definite opportuni-
ties and stimula tions, not only by 
p l a cing upon u s de finite re s traints 
and interferences, but also, subtly 
and impercep tibly, by molding our 
attitudes, our ~e liefs, our morals, 
and our ideals. 
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Finally Ma civer says that "without s ociety, without the 
support o f the social herit age , the individual persona lity 
does not and cannot come into being". 2 .Maciver believes 
therefor e that society is neces sary to the development 
of personality. Howeve r society a lone does not determine 
personali t y. ~ath er per sona lity i s determined by the inter-
action of individual and society, o f the interaction of 
individua lity and sociality. He says, "Personality is the 
substantial rea lity and end vm ich individuality and 
sociality t ogether determine ••. "3 Hence for Maciver, 
society an d individuality are interdependent; they are 
correlative.4 
Niebuhr says that 11 man is endowed by na ture wi tb. 
organic relgtions to his fellowmen •.• 11 5 Maciver, however, 
1. SAIA, 47. 
2. Ibid. 
3. COM, 225. 
4. SAIA, 52. 
5. MMIS , 2. 
does not hold that man is "social by virtue of some 
original constitution of human nature". 1 Maciver' ~ view 
is tha t 11 Without society, ·without the support of the social 
heritage, the individual personality does not and hannot 
come into b eing". 2 The individual and society canhot be 
sepa r ated . For Niebuhr, society is both 11 the basil for, 
and nemesis of, ••. 11 the fulfillment of life. For Mlciver, 
personality can be fulfilled only in community. 3 l 
C. The Possibilities and Limit a tions of Social Mo ality 
Reinhold Niebuhr asserts, 
Individual men may be moral in the 
sense tha t they are able to consider 
interests other than their o~n in 
determining problems of condu ct, and 
and capable, on occasion, of pre-
ferring the adva ntages of others to 
their own. They are endowed by na-
ture with a measure of sympathy and 
consideration for their kind, the 
breadth of which may be extended by 
an astute social pedagogy ••• But all 
these achievements are more difficult, 
if not impo s sible, for human societies 
and social groups.4 
Niebuhr therefore believes that individual moralit is 
I 
more advanced than social morality. However, Maciver 
believes that social groups, associa tions, instituiions, 
I 
as well a s the entire social mechanism are resnonslve to ~ I 
the constructive forces and creative intelligence that 
1. SAIA, 47. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Page 146 of the dissertation. 
4. i'vrMIS , xi • . 
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brought them into being •1 ] a civer says, "The social mech-
anism i s no juggernaut th at rolls on r ega r d les s 6f those 
wh o may be crus he d bene a th it. 11 2 He believes th.J t t h e 
I 
social sy s t em is amenable to intel l i gent control. He 
wr ites, 
I 
I t help s us to c orre ct the p icture 1 
if we turn our thoughts from the social 
mech anism to the complex patter n of I 
objectives--public ~ nd p riva te, co-
ope r a tive andconflicting, group and 
ind3vidual--men pursue in and t hrough 
it. 
I 
By turning, attention from the soci a l me c han ism to the 
I 
complex pa tt ern of" ob j e c t ives men pursue th ro ugh 
1
and in 
the mec ha nism, Ma civer s a ys t ha t we get ri d o f t~e notion 
th a t the vas t inclusive soci a l mechanism moves ofi its own 
4 
momentum, outside the control o f men. He s ay s f1urther 
t hat the changes o f t h e social mecha nism ar e r e s p onsive 
I 
to c ha nging d iscernments o f good and 111.5 Finally Uiaciver 
I 
says, 
the pervading p resence of the spirit of
1 democracy •.• c an ma intain the flexibility of 
institutions and prevent the rig or of I 
bureaucracy or the dominanc e of thos e 
who d ivert the institutions f r om pug11d 
f unctions to their own na r r ow ends. 
I 
Macive r asserts tha t 11 the opera tion of the democr a tic 
sp irit 11 a nd ''the g ro vving recognition of t he requilrements 
lo' OG, 434-435· 
2 • Ibi . • , 4 35 • 
3 · Ibid . 
4. Ibid. 
5 . Ibld . 
6 . Ibid ., 437-438 . 
of person::-: li ty 11 together c an mcJ.ke th.a social system 
I 
11 flexible and dyna.mi c 11 • 1 According to Maciver, the 
individual rea ches his highest moral d evelopment lin 
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I 
community wi th others . Throuc;h the pr ocess of individual-
1 
ization , a p erson b ecomes 11 mor e a di s tinct p ersonality 
I 
self-d irected and self-determining, recognizing a nd b eing 
recogni zed a s havi n g in himself a vorth or v a lue 1 of his 
0 I 
own". '- And through the pr oces s of socialization, a p erson 
I 
"finds ••• f ulfillment of his life in and through ~he in-
creas e a n d development of his relc"~ tions with his lfellows".3 
For Maciver , gro wth in personal morality is a lso 1accom-
l 
panied b y growth in social morality. 4 As persons ad-
1 
vance in E'l orali ty, their institutions and organiz
1
ati ons 
also become more developed.5 Maciver states, 
self-fulfillment is a meaningless 
term except in s ocial rela tions, 
and deliverance from servitude is 
vain unless Gt means also deliverance 
for service. 
Maciver's view tha t the individual c a nnot ·wholly surrender 
h ims elf to t he g roup is very simila r to Niebuhr's 1 vie w tha t 
I 
man a l ways h c>. s self-interest. Speakin g of' the ind ividual, 
I 
Maciver s a ys, 
Even in p ursuing the e nds of the group 
he is seeking his o~n ends as well. 
If he works for others he works also 
fo~ his own good name, h7s own pres-
ti ge, his own advantage. 
l. Ibid., 438-439. 
2 . COM, 21 9 . 
3· Ibid ., 219-220. 
4. Pag e 152 o f t he dissertation. 
5 . Page 153 of the dissertation. 
6 . COIV~ 243. 
7 • 'i' OG , 412. 
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However, Maciver differs sharply with Ni ebuhr 
on t he cond i tions th a t a re nec essary for ma n to be 
crea tive. For Tiebubr, man is most crea,tive in situa-
ti ons of anxie t y. But for Maciver, man is most cre ative 
wh en he will ingly devotes h imself to a cause, or to the 
free service of his group. 
Maciver says, 
A man may indeed devote himself un-
reser vedly to the whole, to the 
service of the group or of the 
cause, but he can do so only in 
accordance with his own concention 
of value, not in compliance with the 
will of an a lien master.l 
Then Maciver states that through this 
kind of devotion, parti a lly achieved 
by most individuals in some rela tion-
ship , whether it be directed to some 
loved being or beings, to famil~ to 
church, to sta te, or to s orne en-
grossing cause such as science or 
some form of art or philosophy or 
educ a tion or anything else, we find 
manifested that kind of attachment 
that draws the individual beyond 
himself, liberating him from the de-
tachment of his ego, evoking his po-
tentialities, and g iving him the 
l a r gest amplitude and fulfillment of 
wh ich he is capable.2 
D. A Crit i cal Appraisal of Maciver's Views 
Robert Maciver's interpretation of the self or per-
sona lity is fundamentally sound. His argument that per-
s ona lity involves both individuality and socia lity is not 
1. WOG ~ 418. 
2. Ibid. 
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only in ac cord with the conclusions re ached in much of 
the literature on personality deve lopm ent but it com-
prehends the experience of individual autonomy as well 
a s the f act o:f social influence on personal behavior. 
His assertion t hat ind ividu a lity and sociality are 
correlative and th at per sona lity is woven of both preserves 
the sense of freedom of choice which is p resent in per-
sona l e xperienc e and also shows the invo lvement of social 
stimuli in the development of personality. ~ ' hen he states 
th ~t every individual response and every individual re ac-
tion is selective, involving both the individ ua lity and 
sociality of the personality, Maciver recognizes the fact 
tha t indi vidua l responsibility as well as soci a l r esp ons-
ibility is pre sent in human actions. That pe rsonality 
is complex and is woven of individual and social aspects 
is a view 17hich Bri gh tman a lso holds. Brig htman gives 
support to r.Laciver' s concepti on when he says, 
A personality is a complex but 
self-i dentifying , active, selective, 
fe e ling, sensi ng , developi ng , ex-
peri e nce, whi ch remembers its pa st 
(in p art), p l a ns for its future, 
interacts with its subconscious 
processe s , its b odily organism, 
an d its n o.tura l a nd s ocial environ-
·ment, a nd is able to judge and g uide 
itself and its objects by r ationa l 
and ideal standards .1 · 
Moreover, Mead recognizes and emphasizes the point 
that the selfor persona lity is not altogether socially 
1. Bri ghtman, NV, 53· 
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I determined for he describes the 0 1 11 which is responsive 
I 
and unpredictab le a nd the "Me" which i s a social product. 
For M:e ad , pers ona lity includes an "I" and a 11 Me" . 1 There-
fore Mea d is cognizant of the fact th at per sonalilty in-
1 
volves both individuality and sociality. He believes 
I 
t hat th e 11 1 11 help s to change its e nv ironment and 
1
t hi::l. t 
every org a nism selects its environment in part. 1 i Niebuhr 
maintains that p ersona lity possesses ind ividualit~ . By 
I 
asserting thEt "genuine individuality ••• is a char acter istic 
I 
of human life", Niebuhr shows agreement with Ma cif er.2 
Maciver·' s be lief that personality is a unity, ( 1'a 
unity vrhose factors are individuality and sociali lty 11 ) is 
I 
consistent .3 Every norma l person remembers t ha t he is the 
I 
same pe r son today th at he was yes terday . He ha s 
1
changed 
but he h as also remained himself. Thus he experie nces a 
sense of unity of personality. Regarding the uni 1ty of 
personality, Brightman concurs with Maciver. 
I 
Br i ghtman 
I 
writes, 
A persona lity is a unity of comp lex 
conscious changes, including all its 
experiences--its memories, its pur-
p oses, its values, its powers, its 
activities, and its experienced inter-
actions with its environment.4 
El aborating this p oint, Brightman s ays, 
The sel f , t hen 1 s a unity in variety ••• 
1 
1. MSS , 215. 
2. NADI~ , 55. 
3. Maciver, COM, 225. 
4. NV, 56. 
which is many by virtue of the details 
of consciousness and is one by virtue 
of the experience and memory of 
self-uni ty.l 
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Maciver's interpretation of personality as a unity 
involving individuality and sociality is congruent ~ith 
the representative views and is exceedingly comprehensive 
in scope. 
For Maciver, society is not prior to individuals 
and individuals are not prior to society. I Society f!.nd 
individuals exist together. Society and its members live 
in society. At this point Maciver realizes the intr rdepen-
dence of society and individuals. The individual is con-
ceived through the physical and social union of its / parents 
and is born into a society, in a family; hence individuals 
and society always exist together. At this point Mjciver 
is in agreement with much contemporary sociological litera-
ture. 
I 
According to Maciver, individual and society begin 
wi t h life and continue to grow together throughout life. 
His emphasis on the point that a child is an "amorphous 
being" who is "the mo s t receptive, the most imitative, the 
most educable, the most highly endowed" of all creal ures 
accords with the points of view of the representative con-
ceptions of human nature described in this disserta~ion.2 
Moreover, Maciver stresses a very si gnificant fact when 
he points out that the child's personality is moldeld in 
1. Ibid. 
2. WOG, 28. 
society, pr i mari ly by the f amily . Her e he re cogni ies 
I 
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tha t the family a s well as o ther pr imm"y g roups prov id e s 
I 
t he cond i ti ons i n wh ich social a ttitudes a re developed 
I 
a n d h a bits a re f ormed wh i c h be come the found a tion of a ll 
I 
l a. t e r behavior . Educ at ors, psycholog i sts , p sychi a tri s ts, 
t h eolo::; i c;ns , an d others genera lly a gree tha t t he l dck 
i 
of love in the h ome and feelings of .: insecur i t,y whiqh 
chi l dr en a c qu i r e in t h e fam ily are i mp ortant fa cto t s in 
I 
per sonality disintegration. Conve r s e l y c hi l dren who ha ve 
I 
e xperienced the p r esence of lov e and g a ined the feeli ng 
I 
of security in the home generally be com e s t ab le int1e grated 
adul t s. The imp ortance of the f a mily and ot h er- pri1ma ry 
groups in the d e v e lop ment o f personality is a most lsigni-
1 
f icant p r inciple in Cooley' s philosophy of huma n n a
1
tur e. 
Me ad su p p or ts th e view t hat society p l ay s a tre menO:Iou s role 
I 
i n the development o f p ersonality, esp eci a lly that part 
of t he se l f or personality which h e c a lls t h e 11 Me 11 . I 
I 
Speaking of t h e 11 Me 11 which h e b elieves is cre a ted in society, 
I 
lv'Ie ad say s, 
It determine s the s ort of expression 
wh ich c an t a ke p l ace, sets t he stage , 
an d g ives t he cue.l 
Me ad s t resses t he importance of society in th e grow'th of 
I 
p ersona lity. Then he des c r ibes h ow the "I" or t he ~ndivi d-
u a li ty of the p er son, a cce pting the "cue" f r om t he I'Me", 
I 
becomes a ctiv e in persona li ty and s ocia l devel0pment. 
I 
l. MSS , 210 . 
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Bri ghtman points out the s igni f ic <:m c e of the role of 
society in the develop ment o f persons when he s tresses 
the f a ct tha t pr ivate p ersons are also social beings. 
By describing his beliAf tha t certain qualities of person-
a lity emerge in human life t hrough its intera ct ion with 
i ts environment, Bri ghtman advances the view that s ociety 
plays a v a luable role in persona lity 3 rowth. Reinhold 
Niebuhr, in his belief th at ethical att itudes a re dependent 
up on personal intim~te cont a cts,l reveals his belief in 
the idea that society is involved in the g ro wth and devel-
op ment of p ersonality. Hen ce Maciver's conception that 
the family a nd other prima ry g roups as we l l as the corn 1Uni ty 
itself a re a ctive a gents in the g rowth of human p ersonality 
ha s t h e support of each of the rep resent a tive vie ws of 
human n a. tu:r·e. It corre sponds a lso with the rep resentative 
defini t ions of human n a.ture descri bed e arlier , 2 and it 
seems to take into a c count t h e f a cts of persona l and social 
life. Maciver's d octrine of the role of society in person-
a li ty development is therefore tenable . 
Und er wha t conditions are human be i ngs most crea tive? 
Re inho l d -Jiebuhr ans wers by saying t hat anxiety is "the 
b a sis of a ll human crea tivity a s well as the prec ondi tion 
of sin 11 .3 He says tha t "anxiety, a s a permanent concomitant 
of freedom, is thus both t he source of cr e a tivity and a 
tem p tation to sin11 .4 Ilh:acive r , h owever , be li eves that man 
1. K ' DlVI , 28 ~--
2 . Pag e of the dissertat ion • . 
3 . NADUi , 183. 
4 • I b i d • , 18 5 • 
i 
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is most creative when he offers himself in free de-
l 
I votion to a cause chos en in accordance with hi s o wn 
I 




draw s the ind ividual beyond himself, 
liberc;.ting him from the detachment of 
h is e go, evoking his potentialities, 
I 
I 
and giving him the l a r gest arnpli tude I 
a nd f ulfillment of which he is c apab le.ll 
In a situa tion whe r e a n individua l is freely devoted. to 
I 
a c au s e, he is not likely to be exceedingly anxioul:! nor 
I 
is he li ke ly to ha ve a feeling of insecurity. But accord-
! 
ing to Ma. civer loyalty to a cause freely selected is the 
I 
condition for ma ximum cre a tivity. In d a y to day exp erience, 
I 
there is ev idence to support Niebuhr's vie w and there is 
I 
a lso evidence on th e s ide of Maciver. In the areas of 
I 
tec hnology and commerce or in the f ield of wh at Ma civer 
I 
calls "utilitarian interests", anxiety seems to pl~y an 
important role in cre a tivity. 
tions a nd impr oving inventions 
on the markets of the world. 
a competitive ma rket one must 
I 
Witness the many n evy inven-
1 
which are annually n laced 
I 
Manufacturers know that in 
I 
I be alert a nd be cre a~ ive 
i f he is to s tay in busine s s; hence special d epa rtm1ents 
I 
are ma intained for the purpose of improving or a t !east 
I 
changing the products wh ich are already on the ma rk1et s. 
I 




anxiety is cle arly a f a ctor in crea tivity. 
I 





However , turnine; to the realm of whc.. t Macive r calls 
11
cultural lnterestsn, s uch as music, r eligion, philosophy, 
I 
and art, a nxiety is r E,t her destructive. The condi tion 
I 
of cre a tivi ty is cle arly one of f ree d ovbtion to ~ cause. 
I 
Maciver 's point tha t the g re atest fulfillment of wers on-
I 
a lity c omes throug h persona l dev otion to a c a us e freely 
I 
chosen corresp onds in ma ny r e spects with Jesus' i dea that 
I 
i f one woul d save his life he must los e it for Ch}i st' s 
I 
sake. 1 
Maciver's d octrine thc..t the wh ole enviro nment is a n 
I 
important f a ctor in cre a tivity is a l s o si gni f ic an~ . His 
I 
view t hs t e nvironment and life p l ay reciprocal roles in 
I 
huma n crec.tivity is comprehensive and i t gives rep og -
nition to a ll the p ossib le f a ctors t ha. t c a n contrli 8ute t o 
I 
persona l cre a tivity. Although f or Ma civer both l life and 
I 
environm ent are involved in ma n's crea tive activities, 
I 
he believes th a t li f e t akes the initiati ve. He s1ays , 
The reaction o f li f e to environment 
is a true response, ••• not the mere 
a ccommod a tion of some formless stuff 
( n <: .med psychic a l) to the impress of 
a die.l 
Even though environment is corre l a tive of li fe , Maciver 
believes thc. t 11 li f e is it se lf t h e sbaper, not enJlronment 11 • 2 
I 
Life me ans not merely the living physiolog ic a l OFganism 
I but the psyc hic a l p owers a s well. This view of man's 
I 
crea tive a ctivities a nd the initia tive which life t a kes 
I 
1. COIV , 381 . 
2. Ibid. 
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in the pursuit of values coincide s with Brig htmanl' s 
point tha t human beings constantly seek values. krigh tman 
writes, 
Wherev e r huma nity exists, t here moral, 
scienti f ic, philosophical, artistic, 
and relig ious ends are s ought ..• For al ] 
t heir se eming fragility, the sp iritual I 
values a. r e the only clue to any real I 
meaning in history or in individual life. 1 
Bri gh tman of f ers support to the Ni ew that loyalty! a nd 
devotion to worthy ends are central in the develobment 
of culture. Cooley makes the observation that, 
human na ture, as a rule, is sluggish, 
needing some sort of external occasion 
and incitement, ani men of genius a re 
not always exceptions to this rule.2 
Cooley' s p oint h ere seems to support Niebuhr's i dea that 
man b e comes active and crea tive when f a ced with ~ situation 
t hat engenders in him a feeling of insecurity. ~erhaps 
the discovery of a tomic energy and the ma king of la tomic 
bomb s could be cited as creative efforts growing lout of 
anxiety. 
I . 
Cre a tions resulting from anxiety as well as from de-
votion to causes are ade quately explained by Mac+ er's con-
ception that life and environment are always present in 
development. Life is the shap er and environment lis the 
occasion and stimulus. 
involved in cre a tivity. 
Life and environment are lboth 
Maciver's vi evv of human I cre a ti vi ty 
thus ade quately accounts for material a s well as lcharacter 
1. APR , 361-362. 
2. STSR, 136. 
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development. 
I Ma.civer r a ises the problem of p ersona lity integra tion 
by p ointing out t ha t in mode rn s ociety individu a ls : are 
f aced with many a nd v aried c hoices am onp; culture tra its 
~ I 
an d conf lict i ng values. The unity of p rimitive so piety 
wh ere t h ere wa s lit t le cultura l dif f erentia tion d o~ s not 
ob t a in in moder n s ocietie s; hence ind i vi du a ls in t~e 
h i g h ly cu ltura l dif f erenti a ted societies o~ tod ay kre 
I 
f a ce d with a tr emendous prob lem. It i s t he p rob leF of 
how to ma ke order out of the myri ad p a tterns o f li r e which 
he f a ces e c.ch d ay . But the prob lem is even de ep er f than 
t h is. The prob lem i s pr of oundly the que s tion of h b w c a n 
the indi v i d ua l in mo dern socie ty gain and maint a in! unity 
in his own persona lity. t·acive r write s th:::~t 11 t h e ~ oci al 
I 
be i n__~ wh o f ormer ly a c cep te d a princip l e of unity h la s · 
he nc e for th to a t t a in it 11 .l Then h e s ays t h at the !solu t ion 
of the prob le m lie s in the f a ct and accep t a nce of lind i vidua l 
resp on s i b ility . A social being\ h a s e t hica l a utonob y and 
h e h a s a sen s e of ob lig a tion. The p o wer of persoda li ty 
int e gra tion i s in t h e ind i v idua l and the met hod coln s i s ts 
I 
of choosing e nds an d comp ar ing va lue s. He s ay s t ~at, 
r i ght a ction , t h e action which also 
cons e r ves the unity of li f e, is the 
c hoice a nd pur suit by t h e socia l being 
of t he gre a te s t v a lue which he ca n 
discover to cl aim re a li z ation t hr ough 
his conduct .2 
l. COM, 301. 










Moreover , IJa c ive r writes t ha t a person's life 
has no unity exc ep t in so f ar a s he 
is e .. ble to app ly a sing le stand ard 
of va lue to a l l t he diverse situa -
tions within wh ich he is called to 
act.l 
And f inally he a sserts, 
It is a que st ion of compar ative 
va lues, the surplus of we lfare over 
hurt, hurt ove r we lfare. Here is 
the rare formula for the sol uti on of 
the conf licting s oci a l cla ims of our 





















Macive r ho l ds t h at 11 eve ry s oci a l cl a im i s a dema.hd for the 
I 
maintena nce or t he r eali za ti on of s orne value 11 • 3 I But for 
him no s oci a l cla im i s absolute. I He s ays t ha t oply per-
s onality c an make an absolute cl a im. i 
I 
l!.c;.cive r ' s p oint t hat ri ght action conserve s ! the 
unity of life canno:t be assailed or denie d . And: his 
p oint that "right action •.. is the choice and pur;suit by 
the s ocia l being of t h e greatest value which he ban d is-
1 
lis a pro-cover to claim realization through his condu c t" 
1 f ound ethica l princip l e . It is reminiscent of ~ant's 
gre a t p rincip l e that: I 
I 
Not hing in the world- -indeed nothing 1 
even beyond the world--ca n pos s ibly I 
be conceived which could be called 
good without qualification except a I 
good I·Vi 11 ••. The good will is not g ood I 
because of vvha t it effects or ace om- I 
p lishes or b ecause of its adequacy 1 
I 




2. Ibi d . 





to achieve some proposed end; it 
is good only because of its willing, 





Maciver's idea of the "choice and pursuit by the social 
I 
being of the greatest value which he can discover" 1might 
I 
also mean the willing of the best that one can conceive. 
I 
It is willing the good. Kant's good will certainly _tn-
1 
eludes willing "the greatest value which he can discover". 
I 
Maciver has here expres sed a profound and valid principle. 
I 
Every one should choose and pursue the greatest value which 
he is able to discover. 







situations within which one is required to act wil~, accord-
1 
ing to Maciver, enable one to have a sense of persbnal 
I 
unity. Maciver believes that this will help to prbvide 
I 
personality integration. On this point Maciver ha1s uttered 
I 
a simple and fundamental truth, for if one applies1 a 
I 
distinct standard of judgment to each occasion of lchoi ce 
I 
I his standards will be as varied and as confused as
1 
the 
diverse choices which life requires him to make. :under 
such conditions there could not possibly be any p~rsonal I -
I 
unity. Hence Maciver offers a .way which is consi~tent and 
I practicable. If one has a single standard of val~e and 
will use it in deciding what he should do, he the* has a 
I 
frame of reference to which he can appeal for gui~ance. 
I He has a "compass within" which will serve as a synse of 
I 
I 
I 1. CPR, 55,56. 
I 
direction for him. 








standa rd of' value" to mean not only tha t 11 ri ght a c-tlion •.• 
is the choice and pursuit 11 of the gre a test v a lue wJi ch one 
I 
can d iscover , but a l s o to me an tha t 11 it is a question of 
. I 
compa r a tive values, the surplus of welfare ov e r hUlh, 
hurt over welfare 11 , 1 he ro.i.ses a serious question. I It is 
the question of how may one r ea lly det e rmine a pri ~rily 
whe ther a g iven act will produce more we l fare and less 
hurt. I Of course this is an ep istemologic al question, but 
- ·I 
it is a lso a ques t ion of p r actical moralit;~r _ wh ich f ne has 
to ans we r throue;h the us e of reason. However to kbow the 
full cons e quences of an a ct before the act is commi t t ed 
I is a very C. if :t' icult problem. Further elaboration pn t h is 
point by Maciver would hav e been appreciated. I 
~~ aciver' s principle that onl y persona lity canl make an 
I 
absolute claim is an imp ortan t criterion of juC.gment. The 
.. I 
inference f ollows tha t personality is the h i g hest f alue 
and t ha t pre servation of personali t y is always a wlorthy 
goal. His philosophy is tha t one should a l way s d ~ his 
duty, and he says t h e. t the r e is never a choice bet!wee n 
duties. Ther e is but one duty and tha t d uty is " i he pur-
suit o f the h i ghest value the social being is abll to con-
ceiv e within the s ituation11 • 2 Therefore, accordirtg to 
Iv-acive r, one i s never faced with a ch oice inv olvi Jg two 
I 









duties, t 'N O r i s hts. In situa tions of choice, thJr e is but 
I 
one du ty or one r i ght and t ha t is t he pursuit of 1 the 
h i ghes t v :J.lue t hat one c e::.n conceive. For II.IT a civ et this 
would a l way s inv olve the saving of p e ra ona li ty. /Fin· lly 
Macive r s ays the fundamenta l guide in morality a~ld p er-
s ?na lity integr a tion i s one's cons cience. By coJscience 
I 
•l.a.clver me ~n s t he indivi d u a l's s ense o f rig h t a nf wr ong , 
h is sense of v a lues. Em:9loying h is sens e of ri gt} t and 
wron~ , his sens e of v a lues ,' one i s ab le to foc us lhis li f e 
I 
in a p a rticula r dire c t ion an d thus uni f y himself 
1
• And 
1ifaclve r cla ims ths. t 11 the mor e the person fin ds himself the 
more h e fi nd s himself within society ••. ul I 
I 
Gra~ted tha t integration of personaltiy can l only 
come thrcugh the use of one 1 s own sense of values a nd 
g r ante d t ha t t he re i s but one ri ght a mong alternktive 
I 
choices, name ly, the duty to pursue the highest ya lue tha t 
one i s ab l e to conceive in t h e situat ion, there !rema ins 
sti ll a E;ra ve res ponsi bility on t h e family, schobl, church, 
I 
a nd soc i E: ty to t a ke p ersons a s c hildren a nd teacp them 
h ow to r e cogni ze the hi g hs st v a lues of life • On~ 1 s con-
science or s ense of ri ght an d wrong is inf luenceb greatly 
I 
by the c ulture in which he lives. Inde ed the r ersponsibil-
i ty for nor al i ty re s ting upon the educ fi tiona l fo~ces o f 
socie t y are exceedi03ly h eavy. Maciver's theor~ is very 
imp ortant. I 
I 






How,3ver, his vie w seems short a t one point It 
is t h .s. t il::ac iver d oes not emphasize any ne ed i' or 
divine o::o God . A lthou.sh he i s not a t h eo loe; ian he 
mi gh t re ·Jogni ze a need for God in the integrati of 
personalt ty . Hi s v ie w t ha t t he more the indi vi al f inds 
h i ms elf the more he fin ds h imse lf in society co 
expanded to includ e the f :3.ct t hat he finds 
to God t ll e Creator of va lues. Re l ative to the 
relig ion in the saving of p ersonality, Brigh 
Pe r sona lity is the soul to which 
relig ion offers salvation; and 'mode 
man in search of a soul' surely needs 
to be saved from himself as he is, 
the intere s ts o f himself as he may 
Maciver a.lmost ascribes to society t he union 
says t hat man h a s with God . 2 
The ethical ideal in Christiani ty , 
Maciver, is: 
the p rincip le of personal resp onsib il 
and obli gation, the principle t ha t t 





creator and the rede emer of social cl ims ••• 
The only va lue on earth is t he value ' the 
'souls' or lives of men, and th at sys ems 
and cre eds are vain and cor r upt excep 
as they fulfill t hese values.3 
Maciver's own social ethic is th at only persona tiy c an 
make an absolute claim. Socia l necessary 
but they are not absolute. The gre ate s t va lue 
a lity, and persona lity is developed through c ty. 
1. NV , 66. 
2. Acts 17:28 . 
3. COM, 310. 
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I Communities a re developed or undeveloped in nronortion 
- - ~ I 
a s they serve the ultimc te intere s ts, the organic[ a nd 
psychic interests of men. In a st r ict sense even[ org anic 
interests, ac c ord ing to Maciver , a re also psychickl. 
I 
Psyc hica l in its broadest sense is, for Mc civer, j'the 
adjec t ive corresponding to the substantive life, ·1· . 111 
Communal :ieve lopment is "psychical development a s [ ful f illed 
t h roug h co mmon life". 2 Common life, according to I .i1Iaciver, 
is: 
more or less adequate according as it 
mor e or less comp letely fulfills in 
a s oclal h ar mony the needs and person-
ali t ies o f its members, according as 
it more or less comp letely takes up 
into itself the necess ary differences 
which individuality imp lies, so t hat 






unity and not c ontradict ions of that 1 
unity. Common life is thus a question 
of degrees, and all existent co mrnunitieb 
realize only in degree the i d ea of 
comrnunity.3 
The emph a sis which Maciver p l a ces on the v a lue of l p erson-
ality a nd t he stre ss which h e g ives to the i deal pf 
. I 
c omp l etin,s 11 fe corresp ond closely with the Chri sttian ideal 
I 
of the dignity a nd worth of human personality . Yet in 
I 
Maciver ' s phi losophy t here is a noticeable absen ci o f a 
reference to the v a lue of persona lity in rela tion[ to the 
Divine. Maciver's concep tion is therefore an impbrtant 
I 
1. Ibid., 183. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid ., 171. 
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expression of humanism which a c cords favorably a nd 
I 
vitall y with the Christian ethic, except that it d9es not 
recognize the role of God in persona lity. Maciver' ls 
ethics recognizes the imoortance of individual dif~erences 
~ I 
as 'Nell a s t he s i gnificance of social unity . His ~deal 
i s t hs. t in s ocial life there should be unity wi thirt 
diversity. In the individu a l persona lity there is luni ty 
I 
within variety; .likewise in community there s hould lbe 
unity within di versity, according to Maciver. Mac:Dver's 
I 
concep tion of unity in d ive r sity correlates with Bri ghtman's 
view: 
The se lf, then is a unity in variety ••. 
which i s many by virtue of the details 
of cons ciousness and is one by virtue 








Not only does Brightman believe that individual pe~s onality 
is a unity in variety, but he also thinks that the : socia l 
order should provide for the expres sion of individfa l 
d iff erence s within the unity of the social system itself. 
Accord in.o;ly Mead, Cooley, and Niebuhr also recogni f e the 
necess ity of this principle. 1 
Maciver's view of the value of pe rsonality is l congenial 
I Brigh tman says, 
I 
to Bri ghtman's conception of value. 
In personality is the only truly in-
trins ic value we know or can conceive; 
all values are but forms of personal 
experience. Truth, g oodness , be auty, 
worship--these are nothing if a person 
d oes not apprehend, reali ze, enjoy, 
and develop them ••• Wh a t is goodness 
1. APR, 35 • 
if no person is moral, or worship, 
if no person is reverent?l 
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Maciver's socia l ethic encompasses many f a cts re~evant to 
persona l and social living . He organizes his eth ical 
I views in a systematic manner and expresse s them with a 
I degree of maturity tha t le aves very fe w if any l f ose 
ends . His socia l ethic is indeed comprehensive. [ It is 
prof ound a s well as sound. 
On the ques tion of t he possib ilities of soc[i a l moral-
ity, Ma civer expres s es some stimula t i ng and opti bis ti c 
thoug hts. He believes in the p ossibility of br+ dening 
the circles of" commu .11 ty until the "we-group" includes 
I 
the "they - gr oup'' not in terms of dominance and sf bordina-
tion but in t erms of mutual appreciation of like1ness an:l 
- I 
diff erence. There can be a unity of consensus v h ic h wi 11 
be uni t y ·within diversity. According to lvacive~, men are 
capable of rea lizing that the grea t est individu dl and 
I 
social values ar e reali zed in community and that community 
I 
may be e ::...rpanded to include the world. World c o~rnuni ty is 
possible. For Maciver, 
the common good is the deep 11ellspri rJ 
from which we all, indi vid uals and grcrups, 
draw the cultural sustenance we need as 
well as our grea t e r economic prosperi}Y·2 
More over, Maciver believes tha t social morality lcan be 
improved greatly if t he social system is viewed~ 
1. NV, 62. . - -
2. MPU , 193· 
simp ly a s a mod e of rela ting means 
to ends; as an organization s e t up for 
the service of its membership. It 
serves their e nds but its s ervice is 









'rvio imp ortant factors, a ccording to Maciver, ate 
operat i v e in the deve lonment of gr eater socia l morality, 
- .. I 
namely , the spirit of democracy a m the gr owi ng recpg-
nition o l' t he worth of human persona lity. Mac iver'~ idea 
I t ha t social morality ma y be greatly imp roved is in general 
I 
agreement with Cooley's views on social ethics. Co pley says, 
Those who dwell p reponderantly up on 
t he self ish a spect of huma n na ture and 
f lout as sentimenta lism the altruistic 
c oncep tion of it, make their chief er r or 
in failing to see tha t our self itself 
is a ltruistic, tha t the o b j e ct of our 
hig her greed is some desired place in 
the minds of other men, a nd that through 
this it is p ossible to enlist ordina ry 
human na ture in the s e rvice of ideal 
a ims. The imp rovement of society d oes 
not c a ll for any es s ential ch ange in 
human na ture, but, c hiefly, for a 
l a r ger and higher applica tion of its 












Hoyrever Niebuhr opposes Maciver am Cooley's 9ptimism. 
He says, I 
I 
The soci a l im:9ul ses, with which me n are 
endowed by n <:l. ture a re not po'uerful enougri , 
ev en when they are extended by a gr owing I 
inte l l l g ence, to apply wi th e qua l force 
toward all members o f a l ar g e community. J 
I 
Niebuhr believes t ha t men as ind ividua ls c. re more ! ora l t h an 
men as gr oups , but Cooley s tresse s the opposite p oint of view. 
1. WOG , 433 . 
2. so ' 36. 





Cooley writes, 1 
It is rare that human nature sus- I 
t ains a h i gh standard of behavior I 
without t he consciousness of opinions 1 
and sympdthies that i l luminc~te the I 
s t andard an d ma ke it seem worth wh ile. 
It lies deep in the soci a l na ture of I 
our minds that i deals ca n hs rdly seem 1 
r eal without suc h corrob ora tion.l I 
Yet Nie buhr maintains that, I 
I 
egoi st ic impul ses are so much more I 
p oTi erful than altrui stic ones tha t i f 
the l c:. tt e r are not g iven stronger t llin l 
ordinary support , t he justice -vvh ich I 
even good men des i gn is parti al to I 
those who design it.2 
I 
.Mead SU!)ports the view of Cooley a nd Maciver . ]~ead 
The selfish versus the unse l f ish as -
pects or side s of the self are to be 
a ccounted for in terms of the content 
versus the structure o f the se lf. We 





I of the s e lf is individua l (s e l f ish, 
therefore, or the source o f sel,fi shne ss), · 
wherea s t he s t ructure of the se lf is 1 
social--hence unselfish , or the b a sis 
1 of unselfishness. The rela tion between 
the r a tional or primarily socia l side I 
of the self and its impulsive or emo- 1 
tiona l or primarily anti-soci a l and i ~-
d ividual side is suc h tha t t he l atter is, 
f or the mo st pi:'.rt, controlle d vv i th re l 
spect to its behavioristic expression' by 
t he former; and tha t the conflicts wh;1-ch 
writes, 
occur f r om time to time among its d iffer-
ent i mpul ses--or among the various co~ponents 
of its imDulsive side-- are s ettled ana re-
concile d by its r a tional side.3 1 
Rela tive to indi v idual and socia l mora lity, Brikhtman says 
I 
t hat men norma lly seek sp iritual ideals. He asrerts, 
Far f rom bei ng unreal, spi1~tual i deab 
are wha t make men human, a s well as I 
akin to the divine. Ma n 1 s des p erate 1 
--·---1. SP , 139 . 
2 • I\fJiii P , 266. 
3 . MSS , 230 , fo otnote. 
wickedness is often due to the in-
a ccessi b ili ty of precisely these 
i d e a l v a lue s, or to the unjus t d is-
tribution o f the means o f a c cess to 
t hern.l 









I d o not know i f mind tenis to sub- I 
stitute a ltruistic action for e goi stic .
1 There is a ltruism a nd eg oism a t every 
different leve l o f intellig ence. But I I 
am s ure t hat mind increasing ly dis cover f , 
in ways before undreamed of, ~he de p end-
ence of the intere s t of e a c h up on the I 
int erest of a ll. It reve a l s tb ...a t the 
1 fund a menta l n ee ds of e a ch a re but rea li zed 
in the community of a 11.2 I 
IlEacive r does believe however t h at the earlie ~ t 
I 
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attitude o f the child is e go-centric and undiff' err ntiated 
but tha t h is interests are merely v arious. The ftmd a mental 
question for iaciver i s not whethe r persons a re e k oi stic 
I 
or a ltruistic. Since p ersons a re e g oistic and a l~ruistic, 
t he fund a me ntal question, for him, is whether the I social-
i zation and educ a tion to which persons are exo o s e~ stimu-
~ I 
l a, te them to broade n their interests in the welfare of 
othe rs an d d evelop a ttitudes of appreci dtion for !others. 
In oth e r word s , for Maciver, a child ' s interes ts la re neither 
I 
e goistic nor a ltruistic, but are various. E owever, the 
ch ild ' s a t t itude, a t first , is e go-c entric, but throu g h 
I 
s ociali zation a nd e duc a tion, his a t t itude is differentia ted. 
I 
The differentiation of h is a ttitude ma y or may n~t include 
f a vorab le regard for others. The main question ~h erefore 
1. APR , 361-362. 
2. COM, 397 . 
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is not e g oism or a ltruism, bu t a question of whether 
the chi l d 's ~ ttitude of e g o-centrism be comes in adulthood 
an a ttitude of ethno-centr ism • 
.iVIa civer writes, 
t firs t, h e is comple tely eg o-centric. 
E xperience and indoctrina tion evoke 
in the growing individual an area of 
s ocial comprehension ••• 1 
This 11 a re a of social comprehension" is limited through 
tra ining and s ocialization to the " we-g roup", especially 
to the bound uries o f t he state. The area of s ocial com-
prehension can be extended, in ever-widening circles, to 
includ e even the wo rld community. ence for Maciver, social 
morality h ;: ~ s great possibilities of extension. 
There is evidence which supports Maciver's view of 
the p ossibilities of socia l bett e r ment. At one time in 
the wor l d 's history slavery wa s t hough t to be an expression 
of human n a ture. Women vv ere considered to be, by nature, 
fundamentally inferior to men. And there was a social 
orde r wh ich supported the s e views. But today human slavery 
is not ope nly s anctioned and women are increasing ly gaining 
t heir ful l civil rights. Technology, modern means of 
communica tion, a growing recognition of the dignity of 
pe rsona lity, and other forces a re being used to bring about 
a world community. Althou 2_h increasi ng community does not 
elimina te a ll conflicts or solve all social p rob lems, it 
1. TAAP , 43. 
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is a f act tha t as community develops social morality 
also increases. 
1 a cive l~ 1 s point tha t one of the ways of r educing 
th e Sharp line Of demarcation betwe en 11 we-groUpS II am 
II t h 11 • ey-group s 1s to put oneself in the p l ace of the 
others and s eek to understan d them is a very practical 
suggesti on . He o f fers this i de a not a s an ethica l prin-
cip le bu t as a principle of action. Alth oug h it is a 
princi p le o f p ractical a ction and o f ten leads to a fuller 
appr ec i a ti on of the 11 t hey-group 11 , there is no guarantee 
tha t understanding leads to apprecia tion. In exper i ence 
sometimes when one underst a nds another p erson or another 
group or a nother nation, he may h e::.ve a feeling of hatred 
or some other ne gative feeling in resp ect to them. As 
a rule, to p l ace oneself imaginatively in the p lace of the 
other and try to understand him leads to gre a ter apprecia-
tion for him, but not in eve ry case. 
The doctrine that states should not 11 co-ordina te 11 
cultural interests (ultima te interests) and place restric-
t ions on cultural exp r e ssions is exceedingly important in 
modern society. Maciver expres s es he r e a princip le tha t 
is f undamenta l to huma n na ture. Observe;mce of the principle 
provides for cul t ural diversity within t h e unity of 
community. Cultural uniformity in a society composed 
of many 5roup s leads to soci a l strife and human conflicts. 
The princip le of the fre edom o f relig ion provides a social 
condition f or a gr eat er unity of the r e ligious fo r ce s of 
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a nation than any law establishing a uniform religi lon 
I 
could ever do. Hence Maciver's belief that the prirciple 
of unity within diversity is congenial to human nat~re and 
I 
is also coherent. 1 
Maciver argues that community is developing i~ pro-
portion as it fulfills the organic and psychic interests 
I 
of men. And he says that in a strict sense even o~ganic 
interests are psychical. Community development is !therefore 
I 1 
"psychical development as fulfilled through common llife". 
I Here Maciver uses psychical development or personality 
I 
development as his criterion of community development. 
I Moreover when he asserts that only personality can 1make 
an absolute claim, he uses personality as his standard of 
. I 
judgment. Hence it seems that for Maciver personatity is 
the most fundamental or the most ultima te of all v~lues. 
I 
This view i s consistent with t he philosophy of personalism. 
I 
Maciver • s conception of human nature is rich t n con-
tent, consistent with facts, and systematic in organization. 
I 
His approach to an understanding of human nature i~ scie~tific 
and philosophical. And the results of his 
terpretation are mature and coherent. 
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Cooley thinks that individuals are born with vague 
feeling of self, but Mead holds that the self as 11J e 11 is 
purely a social product. However the "I" is a priJordial 
phenomenon in Mead's thought. The self is present in the 
individual at birth according to Niebuhr. For Bri~tman, 
the self is consciousness and is a datum. Accordi~ to 
Maciver, the ego arises with the dawn of consciousi ess. 
That the self undergoes development in society is a belief 
held by each of the representative thinkers and by Maciver. 
Personality, for Maciver, is a complex unity j f in-
dividuality and sociality, and, for Brightman, pe~onality 
is a unity of changing self-experience. For Nieb r, man 
is a child of both nature and spirit. Cooley thin s that 
man has an animal nature as well as a human nature / Accord-
ing to Mead, personality involves an 11 I 11 and a 11Me 1 • 
There is agreement in the writings of Cooley, Mead, 
Niebuhr, Brightman, and Maciver on the view that e o-
insistence is ever-present in man. Free devotion o a cause 
does not eliminate the fact of ego-insistence, but according 
to Maciver-, sU:eh devotion liberates man and prov1d, s the_ most 
complete fulfillment of his personality. Cooley, i ead, and 
Brightman also think that personality fulfillment f s thus 
attained. Niebuhr recognizes the merits of this v ew, but 
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asserts that man's devotion to a cause, even to Go~, con-
tains an element of sin--the sin of selfishness an~ pride. 
Maciver believes that man is most creative wh~n he is 
unreservedly devoted to a freely chosen cause or gijoup. 
But, for Niebuhr, man is creative when he is insecure and 
I 
anxious. Devotion to intrinsic values aids man's lreative 
efforts, according to Brightman. According to Mac1ver, 
man's creative spirit requires community, a communi ty which 
provides unity within diversity. 
I Mead and Cooley believe that man is a unit that needs 
a unity in which to develop his human nature. The lprimary 
I 
social group is the unity which Cooley believes man needs 
most. Mead thinks that society is the matrix or udity which 
man requires. Brightman believes that man needs trie natural, 
social, and spiritual forces of his environment as jthe unity 
in which to develop his nature. Niebuhr also thinks that 
I 
man requires for his growth an environment 
the natural, social, and religious factors 
that inj ludes 
of life. And 
I for Maciver, man's nature requires the unity of a common 
I 
life--the unity of community. Maciver thinks the state is 
I inadequate as the whole or unity which man needs for the 
fulfillment of personality. For Maciver, only co~unity 
I 
can supply that need, and the community of which he speaks 
is a community in which there is unity of differen~e. 
The highest possible development of human life is a 
major concern of Cooley and Mead; yet they do not ~ake an 
assertion as to what is the highest value. Niebuhr accepts I 
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the biblical view that fellowship with God through faith, 
hope, and love is the most fundamental good. Brightman thinks 
that the highest value is personality and that the greatest 
fulfillment of personality is reached through fellowship 
with the Supreme Personality--God himself. Maciver asserts 
that personality is the only intrinsic value. 1 For him, 
only individual personality can make an absolute claim; 
therefore society is most developed when it meets the organic 
and psychic needs of personality in the maximum way. 
Man is more egoistic than altruistic, according to 
Niebuhr. Cooley believes that man is egoistic and altruistic. 
His egoism is grounded in his animal nature, but his altruism 
is rooted large l y in his primary social relationships. Mead 
thinks that man is more altruistic than selfish, for the self 
is a social product that is woven of the attitudes of others. 
Maciver's view is that man is ego-centric and socio-centric. 
Whether men are more selfish or less selfish, more altruistic 
or less altruistic, is a question of socialization and the 
unique experiences which men have had. The human infant's 
attitude is ego-centric but his interests are various. His 
interests are neither selfish nor altruistic. His attitudes 
become differentiated in the social process. 
Niebuhr thinks that man as an individual is more moral 
than man in a group; however, Mead points out that man's 
highest moral achievements are accomplished in community. 
An individual lives either by the highest standards of his 
community or by the lower standards. Cooley feels that social 
1. -Maciver, ESS, 153. 
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morality requires the support of the community. 
community aid, efforts to increase social morality decrease 
rapidly. Brightman thinks that group morality can fattain 
a high level, and he believes that man lives at his moral 
best in community with others. For Maciver, man is1 most 
moral and creative in community rather than as an isolated 
individual. He thinks that social morality can de1 elop to 
the point of solving such social problems as war, race, and 
economic injustice. 
A summary of the conclusions regarding Maciver's con-
caption includes the following: 
The individual ego arises with the dawn of consciousness 
and is socialized in the fannly and society. The j elf or 
personality is a complex unity of individuality and sociality 
which is developed through the process of eocializj tion. 
Individuality and sociality are correlative and wholly in-
terdependent. 
Man is a creative being. His creative epirit ,requires 
community, a community in which there is unity within di-
versity, a community in which cultural interests hl ve liberty 
of expression. 
The highest value is personality. 
. I 
Only individual 
personality can make an absolute claim. Groupe cannot make 
any absolute claims. Since personality is the supf eme good, 
institutions, associations, and societies are most developed 
I 
when they meet the organic and psychic needs of personality 
in the maximum way. 
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The attitude of the human infant appears to be, 
wholly ego-centric, but through the process of socialization 
it becomes differentiated, specific, and similar to those 
of his family and the larger groups. The child's i lnterests, 
however, are neither selfish nor altruistic; they J re various. 
In the socialization process, they are evoked, stij julated, 
discouraged, and suppressed. Whether a person is olerant 
or intolerant, self-regarding or other-regarding is largely 
determined througp the process of socialization a~ the pe-
culiar conjuncture of his personality and its envi, onment 
and the unique experience which arises therein. 1 n is 
creation's mo st educable creature. 
Through socialization and improved formal edu~ation, 
man can be educated to increase the circle of his 't e-group" 
and to be more tolerant of the 11 they-group 11 , to brladen his 
community until it encompasses all gr>oups of the edrth. 
Differences and unlikeness will still exist, but t , e unity 
of consensus will transcend them. Common needs wi J l be met 
by common training and endeavors, but individual differences 
will be allowed to express themselves within the r J amework 
of the community. Government is necessary as an a ' ency of 
coordination, but the form of government most congenial to 
Socj iety, and the developed community, and to the multi-group 
even to human nature itself, is democracy. 
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1 
What is the nature of man? An adequate answer to this 
question would provide important clues to an understanding 
of the critical personal and social issues facing the con-
temporary world. Philosophers, educators, theologians, and 
others have long sought to comprehend human nature; but 
today there is still need for more research on the question. 
The problem proposed for this dissertation was to in-
vestigate the writings of Robert M. Maciver for the pur-
pose of determining and describing his conception of human 
nature. A contributory part of the problem was to make an 
analysis of certain representative sociological, philosophical, 
and theological conceptions of human nature and compare them 
with the views of Maciver in order to sharpen the issues. 
The representative expressions of human nature are those 
made by Charles H. Cooley, George H. Mead, Edgar s. Brightman, 
and Reinhold Niebuhr. 
In an attempt to understand the na ture of human nature 
revealed in the writings of the five principal thinkers con~ 
sidered in this investigation, three important questions are 
raised. They are: What is the nature of the self? What 
is the role of society in the development of the self? What 
are the possibilities of individual and social morality? 
What Cooley, Mead, Brightman, Niebuhr, and Maciver say on 
these issues constitutes the materials of this study. 
What is the nature of the self? For Cooley, individuals 
are born with a vague feeling of self which undergoes devel-
opment in society. Brightman, however, defines the self in 
2 
terms of consciousness and holds that all consciousness is 
self-experience. For him, the self is personality, a living 
unity of experience and a synthesizer of unity and multi-
plicity. His view is mainly cognitive, but Cooley's is 
primarily affective. The self, according to Mead, is cog-
nitive; it is an organization of the attitudes of others. 
This is the "Me" or social aspect of the self, but the self 
also involves an "I". For Niebuhr, the self is a creature 
of both nature and spirit; it is an original endowment. For 
Maciver, the self is personality--a unity woven of individu-
ality and sociality. It is a complex unity of consciousness 
in which individuality and sociality are always correlative. 
The role of society in the development of personality 
is an important issue. For Cooley, an individual at birth 
is not a person; an individual becomes a person through ex-
perience and association with his primary groups. Human 
nature, according to Cooley, is a social product, created 
by primary group relationships. Man's animal nature is 
original, but his human nature is a social achievement. 
Human nature consists of those sentiments (organization of 
emotions around ideas) which have developed through ~ the inter-
action of man's native impulses with his primary groups. 
According to Mead, the 11 Me .. is solely a social product. For 
him, mind and the social aspect of the self are functions 
of society, not substantives. Niebuhr's view is that, though 
society is necessary to personal development, individuality 
is the focus of the relation of individual to society. 
Niebuhr centers his interest in the individual, but Mead 
and Cooley have their main interests in society. 
For Brightman, the social self is private and the 
3 
private self is social. The self or personality is actively 
interrelated with its environment. Through social relations, 
many qualities of personality emerge and eevelop in individual a. 
For Brightman, reality is social through and through. He 
believes that society plays a most important role in the de-
velopment of personality. For Maciver, personality requires 
society, and individuals are utterly dependent upon society. 
Personality cannot even come into being without society; 
however society alone does not determine personality. Per-
sonality is determined by the interaction of individuality 
and sociality. 
Wh at are the possibilities of social morality? For 
Niebuhr, individual morality is on a higher plane than social 
morality. And he holds that groups cannot act as morally as 
individuals. However, Cooley believes groups may act on as 
high ~ moral level as the best individuals in those groups. 
Cooley thinks it is possible through communication and organi-
zation to expand social sympathy to ·a great degree. For 
Mead, individuals may act above or below the average standards 
of their particular group. But the explanation for each re-
sponse is found in the society, and not in any theory of 
pure individuality. In each community, there is a high social 
"Me" and a low social "Me". Individual responses are always 
made in reference to the high or low social "Me 11 • Possibil1 ties 
4 
for g~owth in individual and social morality are great. 
For Brightman, the degree of social morality p bacticed 
in a community is an expression of the degree of mot al attain-
ment of the individuals making up the community. B~ightman 
believes that groups, as well as an individual, can jpractice 
brotherhood by cultivating reason and love. He believes 
there is real hope for an ordered society. Maciver believes 
that social groups and systems are amenable to inte l ligent 
control. For Maciver, the pervading presence of th' demo-
1 
cratic spirit and the growing recognition of the va l ue of 
personality make social groups and social systems flexible 
I 
and dynamic. Maciver believes that individuals are [more 
moral in groups than as mere individuals. He also f hinks 
that personal 'morality and social morality develop together. 
They are correlative. 
Conclusions 
Maciver's conception of human nature involves many 
. I 
factors, but only the more important ones are stated here 
as conclusions. 
The individual ego arises with the dawn of conscious-
ness and is socialized in the family and society. t he self 
or personality is a complex unity of individuality jnd social-
ity which is developed through the process of s~cia ~ization. 
Individuality and sociality are correlative and wholly inter-
dependent. 
1 
I Man is a creative being. His creative spirit ~equires 
I 
community, a community in which there is unity within di-
versity, a community in which cultural interests have 
liberty of expression. 
5 
The highest value is personality. Only indi vi1dual 
personality can make an absolute claim. Groups canpot make 
any absolute claims. Since personality is the supreme good, 
I 
institutions, associations, and societies are most developed 
when they meet the organic and psychic needs of personality 
in the maximum way. 
The attitude of the human infant appears to be wholly 
I 
ego-centric, but through the process of socialization it 
becomes differentiated, specific, and similar to thbse of 
his family and the larger groups. The child 1 s interests, 
I 
however, are neither selfish nor altruistic; they are various. 
In the socialization process, they are evoked, stimulated, 
discouraged, and suppressed. \Vhether a person is tolerant 
or intolerant, self-regarding or other-regarding is largely 
I 
determined through the process of socialization and the 
I peculiar conjuncture of his personality and its environment 
and the unique experience which arises therein. Maq is 
creation's most educable creature. 
I 
Through socialization and improved formal education 
man can be educated to increase the circle of his "we-group" 
and to be more tolerant of the "they-group 11 , to broaden his 
I 
community until it encompasses all groups of the earth. 
I 
Differences and unlikeness will still exist, but the unity 
of consensus will transcend them. Common needs will be met 
by common training and endeavors, but individual di~ferences 
6 
will be allowed to express themselves within the framework 
of the community. Government is necessary as an agency of 
coordination, but the form of government most congenial to 
the developed community, and to the multi-group society, and 
even to human nature itself, is democracy. 
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